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INTRODUCTION: THE  ANSI SIT ION FROM 
"COMMAND-OBEDIENCE" TO CONSENT 
American constitutional scholars have wrestled with the 
legitimacy of judicial review for many years. Judicial review's 
breadth of power raises the question whether in practice an 
organ authorized by democratic republican mechanisms can 
exercise such a degree of authority that the organ imposes legal 
rules upon the community in what Hannah Arendt describes as 
"a command-obedience relationship"' rather than in response 
to the community (a democratic republican relati~nship).~ One 
1. HANNAH AR~NDT, ON VIOLENCE 39-41 (1970) (quoting ALEXANDER PASSERIN 
D'ENTREVES, THE NOTION OF THE SFATE 129 (1967)). 
2. Arendt contrasts "the Hebrew-Christian tradition and its 'imperative 
.... conception of law' the result of a much earlier, almost automatic 
generalization of God's 'Commandments,' according to which 'the simple relation of 
command and obedience' indeed sufficed to identify the essence of law," id. a t  39 
(citation omitted), with the Greek and Roman 
concept of power and law whose essence did not rely on the command- 
obedience relationship . . . .  It was to these examples that the men of 
the eighteenth century revolutions turned when they . . .  constituted a 
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strain of American commentary concedes that the foundation of 
judicial review, a t  least in part, lies beyond democratic 
republican theory. Those observers contend that the United 
States Supreme Court's aura, adherence to higher law, and 
other qualities induce the people to have a quasi-religious faith 
in the authority of its opinions? At its foundation, "the model, 
in whose image" such a system of constitutional law operates, 
is the command-obedience relationship used by God at  Mt. 
Sinai4 From the perspective of democratic republicanism, the 
handing down of the Law a t  Mt. Sinai constituted a violent 
imposition, because there was an absence of prior communal 
~onsen t .~  
form of government, a republic, where the rule of law, resting on the 
power of the people, would put an end to the rule of man over man, 
which they thought was a "government fit for slaves." They too, 
unhappily, still talked about obedience . . . but what they meant was 
support of the laws to which the citizenry had given its consent. 
Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted). 
3. For discussions of the mystic function of the Supreme Court, see 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); CHARLES L. BLACK, 
JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, 
and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 
STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968). 
Those who do not justify the authority of judicial review by its responsiveness 
to the community do not necessarily base judicial review's authority on the 
Supreme Court's mystique. Many observers construct rationales such as the Courts 
reasonableness, morality, and political philosophy. Faith in judicial review based on 
the Court's responsiveness to precedent could fall into any of those latter three 
categories. See also HANNAH ARENDT, O N  REVOLUTION 157 & 11.32 (1965) 
(embracing natural law justifications for constitutional law and judicial review, 
while dismissing arguments for "supremacy [of] the Constitution . . . 'on the 
ground solely of its rootage in popular will7 ") (quoting Edward S. Corwin, The 
Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 
152 (1928)). 
4. See ARENDT, supra note 3, at 189 (Even though the substance of the 
American Constitution has Roman origins, the model of authority is "Hebrew in 
origin and represented by the divine Commandments of the Decalogue."). The 
substance of the Law handed down at Mt. Sinai is of a completely different 
character than that of the new laws and constitutional amendments adopted in 
Hungary. The Ten Commandments are rules of personal conduct, rather than rules 
setting forth the structure of government. I use the analogy to highlight only the 
issue of the source of the lawmaker's authority. 
5. The Israelites' first voluntary manifestation of consent to follow God's Law 
occurred many years after the Exodus. This lack of a foundation for law in a 
manifestation of communal consent is in accordance with the statement in the 
Bible that the Jewish people must first follow the Law and only later make a 
decision whether to consent to the Law's authority. See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, NINE 
TALMUDIC READINGS 30, 31, 37 (1990). Levinas justifies the Biblical command- 
obedience relationship. He explains that prior consent requires indulgence in 
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A competing school of thought (the "communal consensus" 
school) avoids casting judicial review in a countermajoritarian 
role. This school contends that the Court's opinions respond 
directly to manifestations of the communal consensus, such as 
the text of the Constitution and significant historical trends? 
Both schools contend that constitutional restrictions upon a 
democratic republican State are essential to  the success of such 
a State, but only the communal consensus school argues that 
judicial revieds enforcement of those restrictions is founded 
upon the democratic republican notion of prior consent. 
Alexander Hamilton considered the substance of the 
Constitution to have derived from the "reflection and choice" of 
the people, rather than "accident and force."' Similarly, the 
preconception, a form of knowledge which inevitably turns out to be false and 
corrupt. Id. at 37, 48. 
For Arendt, American constitutionalism and higher law in general are able to 
avoid the role of "absolute despotic power," even though the checks of popular 
consent are absent. The key is that the commands have origins in "divine 
principle" rather than human principles. Divine principle restrains the leadership, 
rather than permitting the leadership to exploit the command-obedience model for 
evil ends. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 162, 182-85. It is yestionable though, how 
American constitutionalism can have origins in divine principle, if there is an 
amendment process without any apparent restrictions on the content of 
amendments. Both the American Constitution and the Supreme Court are arguably 
manipulable by political forces. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 14-15 
(1991). 
6.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 5; Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional 
PoZiticslConstitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453 (1989); cf. Michael W. McCorinell, 
The Role of Democratic Politics in lYansforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 
YALE LJ. 1501 (1989) (book review). On the societal roots of constitutional law 
generally, as opposed to constitutional caselaw exclusively, see G r i 5 ,  Bringing the 
State into Constitutional Theory: Public Authority and the Constitution, 16 LAW AND 
SOCIAL INQUIRY 659, 674-75, 704 (1991) (analyzing societal roots of constitutional 
developments and arguing for structural reforms to permit a greater role for the 
influence of democratic public authority upon constitutional law). 
7. RIE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
Nor is the Constitution thoroughly democratic; indeed it was specifically 
designed to avoid the pitfalls of unbridled democracy, especially the 
dangers to individual rights. But this was accomplished without 
introduction of aristocratic or monarchical elements; all authority stems, 
even if indirectly, fi.om the choice of the people. The constitutional scheme 
was designed and defended as "a republican remedy for the diseases most 
incident to republican government." 
. . . .  
In Madison's words, "the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, 
and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the 
several branches of government hold their power, is derived." One of the 
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communal consensus school views judicial review as a 
mechanism enabling basic principles, which the majority of the 
community shares, to flourish and avoid subordination to the 
vagaries of the legislative process. Indeed, this Article's 
discussion of the recent history of constitutionalism in Eastern 
Europe shows that an elected legislature may neglect a 
community's fundamental, shared principles due to insdfkient 
insight into an enactment's ramifications and as a result of 
special interest politics. 
Whether constitutional law and judicial review operate 
through a command-obedience model or a communal consensus 
model is a particularly sensitive issue in the nations emerging 
from communism. The rhetoric of the historic days of change in 
Eastern Europe over the past two years has echoed with cries 
for the abandonment of the Mt. Sinai-type pretenses which 
characterized the forceful imposition of legal rules under 
communism. Now the question arises: Is a constitutional court 
simply a new pol it bur^?^ This Article will discuss the nature of 
judicial review in Eastern Europe and whether i t  functions in 
response to the community or imposes upon the ~ommunity.~ 
proudest claims of the American people is that they were the first to 
adopt a form of government "from reflection and choice," instead of 
"accident and force." 
McCo~ell, supra note 6, at 1523, 1527 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NOS. 1 
(Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 10, 49 (James Madison)) (emphasis added). 
8. The same question could be posed with regard to the exercise of authority 
by a directly elected legislature. An election process is no guarantee of actual 
representation of the electorate's will. See Robert Bernasconi, Rousseau and The 
Supplement to the Social Ccmtract, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (1990). And 
representation has not necessarily failed if the representatives exercise a 
deliberative function-i.e., they legislate based upon their own personal beliefs. See 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in 
CONS~ITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstaad eds., 1988). It 
is conceivable that the electorate prefers to have its representatives legislate in 
accordance with their own deliberations. 
But the potential failure of representation is more pressing with regard to 
constitutional interpretation by a judicial body for three reasons: (1) the probability 
of responsiveness to the community is lower where the members of a court are not 
directly elected; (2) the interpretation of abstract constitutional terminology is 
prone to a variety of legal realist influences, many of which may lead to the 
espousal of viewpoints that conflict with the communal consensus; (3) a court's 
interpretation of a constitution's meaning limits the legislative activity of directly 
elected representatives and tends to have wide-ranging consequences. 
9. The decision of a democratic republican institution does not "impose" on 
those who adhere to a minority point of view, because the minority has given its 
"consent to the procedures by which that decision was reached and even bind 
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This inquiry requires examination of (1) the formal extent of 
the power of judicial review and (2) the substantive theories 
underlying opinions. This Article will identify and analyze both 
those factors which determine the extent of judicial review's 
formal power and those substantive constitutional issues 
critical to a new regime. The particular focus of the Article is 
the exercise of judicial review in Hungary by the recently 
formed Constitutional Court; but the analyses require insights 
into other systems of judicial review and the transitional 
experiences of other post-communist countries, post-World War 
I1 Europe, the United States, and other former colonies. 
Part I provides a brief overview of the democratic 
foundations of the new Hungarian governmental structure. 
Part I1 shifts the focus to the Constitutional Court's prominent 
role in the new Hungary. ARer a summary of the Court's 
organizational structure, Part I1 analyzes the formal elements 
that determine the extent of the Court's power. The Court 
possesses jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions and to engage 
in review of legal rules before and after enactment. Recent 
decisions set forth ripeness requirements; however, the burdens 
on the Court remain heavy. The Court's vision of itself as a 
supreme interpreter rather than as a dispute resolver results 
in broad opinions and in the virtual absence of mootness 
standards. In addition, recent cases show how the prevalence of 
unconstitutional institutions left over from the prior regime, 
the lack of federalism, and the pervasiveness of State action 
enhance the responsibilities of the Court. Furthermore, due to 
a June 1990 constitutional amendment, the Court has greater 
authority than Parliament to determine the scope of 
constitutional rights. Finally, the Court has escalated its own 
authority by its reliance in recent opinions on an "invisible 
Constitution" and Western legal standards. 
Part 111 sheds light on the substance of the Court's work 
through examination of the legal theories and policies 
underlying the Land Act Case I-a controversial and complex 
decision. This recent case challenged the constitutionality of 
proposals to provide compensation for property confiscated 
under the communist nationalization laws. The case presented 
themselves indirectly to abide by whatever outcome the accepted procedure 
produces." Stephen Holmes, G a g - d s  or the Politics of Omission, in 
CON~~~~UTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 8,  at 19, 35. 
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delicate issues of retroactive justice, property rights, and equal 
protection. After an examination of the case's political and 
philosophical background, Part I11 analyzes the holdings and 
identifies the polices and constitutional theories endorsed by 
the Court. 
Part IV uses the insights of Parts I1 and 111 to  address the 
issue of whether the Constitutional Court functions in 
accordance with the democratic republican notion of 
government by consent. At the present time, whether the 
Constitutional Court's authority responds to communal ideals 
is not clear.1° This Article takes some initial steps toward 
resolving the issue. Part IV proposes two normative categories 
for analysis of the relationship between the form and substance 
of judicial review and the Hungarian populace. If the Court's 
authority is the product of communal consent, then it should 
respond to: (1) communal expectations of the nature of judicial 
precedents and the adjudicatory process, and (2) the popular 
ideals of the rendszervaltozas," the social movement that 
underlies the creation of the Constitution. Part WS 
examination of these two categories supports the contention 
that communal roots underlie the form and substance of the 
Court's work. Despite this apparent foundation, uncertainty 
exists as to whether the Court will remain a politically effective 
organ. Part V explains how recent developments in the 
relationship between the Court, Parliament, and the populace 
have given rise to this uncertainty. 
The election of a Hungarian Parliament in March 1990 
was an important step toward fulfilling the democratic 
10. Hungarian Sociologist Andrds Boz6ki wrote in September 1990, "One can 
only answer the question whether the new Constitution and system of public law 
correspond to the political and legal culture of the country after several years of 
tested experience." Andrds Boz6ki, Political Travition a d  Constitutional Change in 
Hungary, 39 S~DOST EUROPA 538, 549 (1990). 
11. Rendszerualtozas means literally "change of regime." Hungarians use the 
term to describe the great "change" from Communist Party control. The word 
rendszervaltas is often preferred. The difference is that rencEszerva1toza.s implies 
that the change occurred passively, while redszervaltas implies an active subject 
behind the change. By choosing the passive form, I do not intend to make an 
implication about the nature of the change. 
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republican goal of the rendszervaltozas (change of regime). This 
representative body assumed broad legislative power over State 
activities as well as control over the selection and affairs of 
both the Council of Ministers and the President.12 
The authority of the elected Parliament also superseded 
that of'the Civil Code and the judicial bodies which resolve 
non-constitutional issues. The rendszervaltozas did not revoke 
the Civil Code as the source of private law, but the newly 
elected Parliament possessed the authority to revise the Code. 
The judiciary also remained intact following the 
rend~zervaltozas.'~ However, the rule-making authority of the 
courts is limited in comparison with that of the elected 
Parliament. Hungarian courts primarily apply the Civil Code 
and the enactments of Parliament rather than develop a 
common law. Judicially created legal rules have precedential 
authority only when issued by the Supreme Court-the court of 
final appeal in Code and statutory matters-in response to an 
issue without a pertinent code or statutory provision." 
12. The structure of the Hungarian government is essentially parliamentary and 
derived from the West German model. The single house of Parliament elects the 
Council of Ministers and the President. The President is a figurehead with limited 
powers to act independently of either the Parliament or the Council of Ministers. 
The President independently can petition the Constitutional Court for review of a 
bill before its passage or for an interpretation of the Constitution, appoint the 
President of the National Bank when the prime minister co-signs, set the dates for 
elections, and initiate referenda. He is also the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces. See A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. 111, art. 29(2) 
(Hung.). 
Recently President Arpad Goncz has used the formal requirements that he sign 
all legislation and approve certain appointments to expand the President's scope of 
influence and limit the Democratic Forum's (MDF) domination. For example, 
President Goncz, who is a member of the opposition's Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ), withheld his signature and thereby attempted to veto the MDF Prime 
Minister's appointments to the leadership of the Hungarian equivalent of the 
Federal Communications Commission. Goncz's refusal to sign parliamentary 
enactments prevented the enforcement of the Zetenyi Act (permitting prosecutions 
for murder and treason co~nmitted over the last 45 years under the auspices of 
communism) and a statute providing for compensation for property lost to 
nationalization. A Constitutional Court decision in September 1991 held that the 
President's power over the armed forces and the political appointment process is 
subordinate to  the authority of the Prime Minister. 
13. Hungary has a single judicial system consisting of specialized courts, lower 
courts of general jurisdiction, appellate courts, and the court of final appeal in non- 
constitutional matters, the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court commenced 
operation in 1990 and is discussed at length herein. 
14. For a more detailed explanation of the siwcant differences between the 
legal cultures created by the Anglo-American common law tradition and the 
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A factor potentially more important than the elected 
Parliament in Hungary's transition is the Constitution. The 
present Hungarian Constitution is the product of meetings, 
from June 13, 1989 through September 18, 1989, between the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (the communists) and the 
Opposition Roundtable, the collective leadership of the 
opposition parties? Those meetings developed amendments 
to the 1949 Stalinist Constitution. 
The amended Constitution sets forth limits on State power. 
In particular, the document outlines restrictions on emergency 
power and provides for the guarantee of rights to property, 
education, a healthy environment, due process safeguards, 
equal protection, asylum, privacy, participation in elections, 
religious freedom, free expression, and other basic liberties. 
The Constitution also authorizes the creation of a new 
independent judicial body, known as the Constitutional Court, 
to enforce constitutional restrictions. 
Whether the framers of the amended Constitution acted 
with the consent of the community, in accordance with 
republican theory, is questionable. The communist Parliament 
was the product of elections held prior to the legalization of the 
opposition parties. Those who formally approved the amended 
Constitution had appeared to be complying with Moscow's 
dictates a short time earlier. Furthermore, the opposition 
groups who were present at the negotiations were primarily 
Hungarian Civil Code tradition, see infizc part IVA. 
The judges on the aforementioned courts are appointed by the President of the 
Republic, with the exception of the President of the Supreme Court, whom the 
President nominates and the Parliament elects. The length of time in office is 
subject to the specific judiciary act covering the particular judgeship. There are no 
constitutionally guaranteed appointments for life. 
15. A third group, made up of leaders of non-governmental organizations 
authorized by the communist party, also participated in these meetings. The 
meetings concerned not only the amendment of the Constitution, but also the law 
on political parties, the electoral law, the penal law, information policy, and 
safeguards for a non-violent transition. 
The negotiations operated on the premise that all agreements must be the 
product of the consensus of all participating parties. The Alliance of Free 
Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) of the 
Opposition Roundtable did not endorse the results of the meetings, but those 
members also withdrew their power to veto unilaterally the final agreement. The 
issue which inspired these withdrawals was the timing of the election of the 
President. The dissenters wanted parliamentary elections to precede the election of 
the President. The dissenters eventually got their way as the result of a 
referendum in November 1989. 
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anti-communist associations. Many of their leaders had risen to 
prominence through courageous endorsements of slogans like 
free expression and human rights; but the leaders had never 
presented particularized outlines for a new government to  the 
populace for approval. l6 
16. Furthermore, "[tlhe public was almost completely locked out of these talks 
behind the scenes." An&& Boz6ki, Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The 
Opposition Roundtable 18 (Jtizsef Btirticz trans., June 1991) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review). 
Another reason for hesitancy to accept the legitimacy of the amended 
Constitution is that the opposition parties originally opposed putting constitutional 
reform on the agenda for the transition negotiations. The Opposition Roundtable 
only wanted to work out the basic issues necessary for a transition to 
democracy-free expression and multi-party elections-and then leave the 
development of the future to the democratically elected representatives. The 
communists insisted on putting constitutional reform on the agenda, because they 
thought that they could entrench socialism in the Constitution and ensure the 
perpetuation of socialism through the Constitutional Court. See Boz6ki, supra note 
10, at 541, 543. The communist strategy failed, as the Opposition Roundtable 
insisted on a nearly complete replacement of the text of the Stalinist Constitution. 
The only concession to the Socialists was a meaningless reference in the Preamble 
to the "equal standing" of "democratic socialism" and "bourgeois democracy." The 
freely elected Parliament has subsequently repealed that portion of the Preamble. 
Nevertheless, cynicism still exists toward the legitimacy of the present 
Constitution. Professor Andrtis Stijo's account of the adoption of the October 1989 
amendments gives little weight to the negotiations between the Opposition 
Roundtable and the communists as legitimating the amendments: 
After only three hours of [parliamentary] "debate" the Hungarian 
Constitution was reshaped in October 1989. After the sudden collapse of 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) Party, it was believed by 
Government and opposition elite alike that only quick codification could 
safeguard the compromise achieved at the round table talks between 
communists and the opposition. 
. . . .  
. . . . [Tlhis was an ill-fated point of departure for a system which 
was aimed to serve as a transition to the Rechtsstaat . . . . 
. . . .  
As a matter of fact, the new Constitution was born from a lie as it 
was declared to be an amendment only. The Parliament wanted to avoid 
the public referendum which was required for a new constitution. 
Andrb Stijo, The New Legalism: Law as an Instrument of Social Transformation 
10-11 (June 18, 1990) (unpublished paper on file with the Brigham Young 
UniversiQ Law Review) (delivered at American Council of Learned Societies 
Conference on Constitutionalism and Transition to Democracy, Phs) (footnotes 
omitted). 
A week before the Opposition Roundtable negotiations on constitutional reform 
commenced, J h o s  Kis, the leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and a 
well-known dissident philosopher, published an article stating that the transition is 
"not [the product of'j a mass movement" and that all of the "parties have not yet 
proved that they represent the masses." J h o s  Kis, Not With Them, Not Without 
Us, UNCAPTIVE MINDS, Aug.-Oct. 1989, at 33-34 (translation of article originally 
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However, the fact that the October 1989 Constitution is not 
the product of a formal republican mechanism is no reason to 
dismiss Hungarian constitutional law as failing to embody a 
communal consensus. Although not elected, the framers were 
still subject to  the influence of popular sentiments. Moreover, 
they were aware that they would soon be subject to popular 
scrutiny in elections following the adoption of the democratic 
Constitution. 
Furthermore, the amended Constitution granted the 
elected Parliament the power to adopt both amendments and 
an entirely new Constitution by the simple process of a two- 
thirds majority vote. Thus far, the elected Parliament has 
amended the Constitution on six occasions, but does not appear 
to  be planning to adopt a new Constitution in the immediate 
future. Most of the amendments are procedural in nature and 
simply add detail to or delete detail from the basic ideas of the 
framers.'' The elected Parliament's failure to  modify the basic 
published in the official weekly HETI VILAG GAZDAS~G on June 10, 1989). 
However, Kis7s skepticism about the legitimacy of the Roundtable negotiation's 
workproduct diminished after his SZDSZ attained a victory in a November 1989 
referendum initiative to modify the presidential election provisions. Shortly after 
the referendum results were made public, Kis wrote: 
The referendum not only corrected the shortcomings of the 'triangular 
table7 negotiations, but more importantly, put the seal of popular approval 
on these negotiations. After September 18, [I989 -when the negotiations 
concluded-] it was still debatable whether the agreement was based on a 
national consensus. But, as modified and endorsed by the referendum, it 
can no longer be questioned. 
Janos Kis, The Message of the 'Four Yeses,' UNCAPFIVE MINDS, Jan-Feb. 1990, at 40 
(translation of article originally published in MAGYAR N- on Dec. 12, 1989). I 
question the sincerity of Kis's sudden shift from skepticism to complete faith in the 
Constitution's democratic legitimacy. Kis wrote the Tour Yeses" article in the midst 
of an election campaign. The viewpoint endorsed by Kids SZDSZ had just emerged 
victorious in the referendum vote. Kis's attribution of monumental signiscame to 
the referendum results was in his party's political interest because it signalled 
momentum for SZDSZ. Actually, the referendum won by only a narrow margin 
with a voter turnout of not much more than 50 percent. In addition, the 
referendum was on only one major issue. 
17. The only major amendment, for purposes of this Article, modified the 
relationship between the Constitutional Court and Parliament. See infrcs part 1I.F 
(discussing Article 8). Other amendments have (1) added the requirement that the 
parliamentary committee in charge of nominating Constitutional Court Judges shall 
contain one member of each party represented in Parliament; (2) added a 
description of the national coat of arms symbol; (3) elaborated on the provisions for 
municipal governments without conflicting with the original pmvisions on local 
authority; (4) repealed the requirement of a two-thirds vote to enact a law 
affecting the scope of State economic activity and the right to  engage in free 
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ideas approved in October 1989, despite the easily accessible 
amendment and replacement processes, is in part due t o  the 
plethora of pressing non-constitutional issues, especially in the 
realm of financial and economic matters.18 
Nevertheless, the elected Parliament's general lack of 
interference with the work of the framers is an indication that 
despite their nondemocratic origins, the October 1989 
amendments are consistent with the communal consensus. 
Whether the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the 
Constitution is founded upon a democratic republican 
relationship with the populace is a more complex issue. To 
resolve that issue, analyses of the formal extent of the Court's 
power and the substantive theories underlying opinions are 
necessary. After a short overview of the Court's organizational 
structure, Part I1 takes on the first of those tasks. 
11. FORMAL ELEMENTS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY 
A. Organization of the Court 
The Constitutional Court currently consists of ten Judges. 
Commencing in 1995, there will be fifteen Judges. The commu- 
nist Parliament elected the first five Judges following the Octo- 
ber 23, 1989 revision of the Constitution. Those Judges took 
office on January 1, 1990. The freely elected Parliament ap- 
pointed five more Judges. The Parliament of 1995 will elect an 
additional five Judges.lg The terms are nine years and a 
enterprise; and (5) made it more difficult to dissolve Parliament and implement a 
vote of non-confidence in the Prime Minister and his cabinet. 
18. The parliamentary process is also rather lethargic and distracted. For 
instance, legislators spent two weeks in March 1991 debating which day should be 
the official national holiday. 
19. The elected Parliament also elected a sixth Judge to replace one of the 
original five, who resigned to become Chief Justice of the Hungarian Supreme 
Court, the court of final appeal in nonconstitutional matters. 
The Act on the Constitutional Court (ACC), No. XXXII (1989) (on file with the 
Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter ACC], enacted by the commu- 
nist Parliament shortly after the October 23, 1989 overhaul of the Constitution, 
provides for the number of judges and their mode of appointment. 
The ACC staggers the initial appointments to minimize the influence of any 
single Parliament. However, the short time period between the election of Judges 
by the communist Parliament and the h l y  elected Parliament flaws this attempt. 
Barring any discontinuities in membership over the next nine years, the Parlia- 
ment in power in 1999 wiU have power over the election of ten positions on the 
Court. 
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Judge may be re-elected once. Only the Constitutional Court 
can impeach its members." 
Parliament elects and re-elects Constitutional Court Judg- 
es after they have been nominated by a committee composed of 
one member of each party with a seat in Parliament.21 The re- 
election provisions have the potential to influence a Judge; 
however, the re-nomination process decreases the likelihood 
that Judges interested in re-election will be responsive solely to  
the particular views of the ruling parliamentary coalition. 
While in office, Constitutional Court Judges cannot engage 
in political activity, join a political party, hold an office in a 
corporate enterprise, or earn money from an activity unrelated 
to the arts, science, or education.22 The President of the Court 
receives the same salary as the Prime Minister of the Republic 
and the other Constitutional Court Judges receive the same 
salary as the other Mini~ters .~~ In addition, the Judges re- 
ceive the same immunities as members of Parliament." 
Currently, the Court's decisionmaking process rarely takes 
place with the benefit of oral presentations. In a report on the 
Court's activities, the President of the Court remarked that the 
few public sessions which the Court has held impeded efficien- 
cy and were unnecessary in light of the statutory prohibition 
against the collection of factual evidence by the C~urt .~ '  The 
Court has not made a public appearance since October 24, 
1990, when the Court heard oral argument on one'case and 
then immediately issued an opinion which had been prepared 
20. Id. at ch. 11, 6 15. 
21. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKoTMANYA [Constitution] ch. IV, art. 32/A(4) 
(Hung.). 
Candidates for Constitutional Court judgeships must be "outstanding theoretical 
legal experts, university professors, Dodors of Political Science and Law, or jurists 
having at least twenty years of experience practicing law." ACC, supra note 19, ch. 
11, 6 5(2). 
A Judge also must be between 45 years and 70 years of age at the time of 
appointment. Candidates cannot have been a political party employee or have held 
public office in the four years prior to their nomination. Id. ch. 11, 8 5(1), (2). 
22. ACC, supra note 19, ch. 11, 6 9. 
23. Id. ch. 11, 6 13. The role of the President of the Court is akin to  that of 
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
24. Id. ch. II, 8 14(1). 
25. See Lbsz16 Sdyom, President's Report on the First Year of the Constitution- 
al Court 10-11 (Feb. 10, 1991) (unofficial translation on file with the Brighum 
Young University Law Review). The President of the Court issued the Report at his 
own discretion and for the benefit of the other members of the Court. He is not 
. under a duty to report to the other branches. 
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bef~rehand.~~ 
The opinions themselves emphasize the Court's unity. The 
voting is not anonymous; dissents and concurrences are permit- 
ted. However, an "Opinion of the Court" signed by all of the 
participating Judges, including the dissenters, always prefaces 
a decision. The Court's rules do not allow "concurrences in the 
judgment only," although it is possible to detect that point of 
view by comparing the substance of a concurrence with the 
opinion of the Court. The Court has yet to deliver a plurality 
opinion. In a report to the other members of the Court, the 
President of the Court referred to the possibility of a plurality 
opinion as "~nthinkable."~' 
B. Jurisdiction 
The foundation of the Constitutional Court's authority to  
interpret the Constitution is the set of rules embodied in the 
Constitution and in the Act on the Constitutional Court 
(ACC),28 enacted by the communist Parliament shortly after 
the October 23, 1989 overhaul of the Constitution. Article 32lA 
of the Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court 
"shall review the constitutionality of legal rules and shall per- 
form the tasks assigned to it by law." The ACC sets forth three 
major areas of activity for the Court: (1) review of proposed 
legislation and regulations for constitutional infirmities, (2) 
interpretation of the meaning of constitutional provisions (advi- 
sory opinions):' and (3) review of enacted legislation and reg- 
26. Id. at 6. 
27. Id. at 19. 
28. ACC, supra note 19. 
29. In American legal jargon, the following characteristics of judicial opinions 
are among those which prompt the appellation of a judicial decision as an "adviso- 
ry opinion": (1) when the allegations do not satisfy either jurisdictional require- 
ments, such as the condition of "a case or a controversy," or justiciability stan- 
dards, such as the "direct injury to a legal rightn rule of standing; (2) when the 
Constitution has committed resolution of the issue to another court or to a non- 
judicial branch. See generally Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410-14 n. 
(1792); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSI'EM 67-72 (3d ed. 1988). Under the standards of the first char- 
acterization, all cases before the Constitutional Court, except those brought on by 
allegations of an injury resulting h m  a constitutional violation, constitute advisory 
opinions. Under the second characterization, there is no category of advisory 
opinions among the three listed areas of judicial review, because the Constitutional 
Court's decisions are constitutionally authorized as final and binding. 
Herein, the decisions in response to petitions for interpretation of the meaning 
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ulations, as well as actions and omissions, for constitutional 
' infirmities. The ACC also authorizes the Court to decide issues 
of conformity with international treaties and to resolve conflicts 
over the scope of authority between national organs, between 
local organs, and between national and local organs. 
Only members of government, specified by the ACC, can 
file petitions for advisory opinions and for the review of laws 
before their passage." Anyone, however, including individuals 
who wish to remain anonymous, can file petitions for review of 
enacted laws, actions, or omissions. Among those who are spe- 
cifically authorized by the ACC to file petitions for the review 
of enacted laws and regulations are lower court judges and liti- 
gants before lower courts, who "consider unconstitutional a 
legal rule . . . which helshe [the lower court judge] should ap- 
ply."31 Article 38 of the ACC provides that litigants and lower 
court judges may initiate an interlocutory appeal to have their 
constitutional concerns resolved by the Constitutional Court. 
An Article 38 appeal stays the lower court proceedings while 
the Constitutional Court decides the constitutional issue. Un- 
der Article 38, the constitutional Court is the sole body enti- 
tled to  engage in judicial review. 
In addition, the duty of the Constitutional Court is to  issue 
determinations on constitutional grounds. Unlike the United 
States Supreme Court, the Court has never avoided a delicate 
constitutional decision by resolution of the case on statutory or 
evidentiary grounds.32 However, lower courts in Hungary may 
attempt to resolve cases involving constitutional questions on 
of constitutional provisions will be termed "advisory opinions." At its most specific, 
such a decision constitutes commentary directed toward a particular debate. 
30. Petitions for pre-enactment review can be filed by Parliament, a parlia- 
mentary committee, fifty members of Parliament, the President, or the Council of 
Ministers. ACC, supra note 19, ch. IV, $0 33, 35-36. Petitions for interpretation of 
a constitutional provision can be filed by Parliament, a parliamentary committee, 
the President, any Minister, the President of the State Audit Office, the President 
of the Supreme Court, or the Chief Prosecutor. Id. ch. IV, $ 51. These limits on 
petitioners, emanating from the ACC, conflict with the constitutional requirement 
that proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Court "may be initiated by anyone." 
A MAGYAR KC~ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. IV, art. 32/A(3) (Hung.). 
31. ACC, supm note 19, ch. IV, 8 38(1). 
32. See generally Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (Constitutional issue should only be reached if case cannot be resolved 
on other grounds.); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 US. 157, 173-74 (1961) (Supreme 
Court avoided ruling on constitutionality of lunch counter segregation law by 
holding that there is insufficient evidence for the convictions.). 
411 JUDICIAL REVIEW: COMMAND OR CONSENT 57 
nonconstitutional grounds. Article 48 of the ACC seems to pre- 
suppose that lower courts will act in this manner and thereby 
lessen the Constitutional Court's burdens. Article 48 requires 
litigants, who allege that their constitutional rights were violat- 
ed, to  exhaust remedies in lower courts before bringing a com- 
plaint in the Constitutional Court. However, Article 38's autho- 
rization of litigants and judges to file interlocutory appeals un- 
dercuts the likelihood that the Article 48 exhaustion require- 
ment will effectively restrict the Constitutional Court's case- 
load. Indeed, the shift of decisionmaking burdens under Article 
38 functions as an incentive for lower courts to  encourage cases 
t o  be resolved on constitutional grounds by the Constitutional 
Court. 
C. Justiciability 
The ACC's broad grants of jurisdiction are fashioned as 
mandates upon the Court. The ACC only permits the Court to  
deny "an obviously unfounded" petition. In the future, however, 
the Court may attain an element of discretion over its jurisdic- 
tion through a modification of the ACC by Parliament. In a 
move reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's efforts 
to persuade Congress t o  include certiorari provisions in the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, the President of the Constitutional Court 
has informed the Prime Minister of the Court's large caseload 
and need for a degree of discretionary jurisdicti~n.~~ As of 
May 31, 1991, 2,981 petitions had been submitted to the Court 
and 630 remained ~naddressed.~ For the present, the Court 
has managed the large caseload by deriving certain limitations 
33. Cf S6lyoq supra note 25, at 12-16. The certiorari provisions of the Judicia- 
ry Act of 1925 did not permit the unfettered discretion pre'sent under the current 
system in force in the United States, although they did enable the Supreme Court 
to assume greater control over its docket. Compare Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 
5 239, 43 Stat. 936, 938 with 28 U.S.C. 5 1254 (1988). 
34. Most decisions are short written opinions. A panel of only three Judges 
addresses cases challenging ministerial regulations; a panel of all ten Judges 
addresses all other cases. As of May 31, 1991, only 63 decisions had been pub- 
lished in the official gazette, Magyar Kazliny. All decisions declaring an act, 
regulation or proposal unconstitutional are published and usually include a several 
page opinion. The Court had received 3,097 petitions by July 1991 (1,572 petitions 
in the first seven months of 1991). The Court has invalidated laws and regulations 
47 times. The Court ruled in 235 cases in 1990 and in over 300 cases in 1991. E. 
Oltay, "The Post-Communist Judiciary," Report on Eastern Europe (Oct. 1, 1991) 
(published by the Radio Free Eumpe/Radio Liberty Research Institute). 
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on justiciability from the ACC. 
I .  Advisory opinions: "Distinct application" requirement 
The Court has attempted to develop from the ACC a 
ground for deciding whether to deny the justiciability of adviso- 
ry opinion petitions. ACC Article 22(2) provides: "[Tlhe petition 
shall include a distinct application." In The Rabar Case,s5 the 
Court interpreted Article 22(2) to require the rejection of Fi- 
nance Minister Rabar's petition for an explanation of the scope 
of welfare rights under the Constitution. The Finance Minister 
had submitted the petition for assistance in developing several 
ambiguous ideas for drafts of a bill.36 The Court's scrutiny 
revealed that the Minister's ideas were subject to future devel- 
opment in a variety of directions, each of which presented dif- 
ferent constitutional questions. Accordingly, the Court held 
that the Minister's embryonic ideas did not constitute a "dis- 
tinct application." 
The Rabar Case standard diminishes certain problems that 
accompany advisory opinion jurisdiction. The Finance Minister 
had petitioned the Court to select one of several ideas and then 
to provide instructions on how to develop that idea into a bill 
that satisfies constitutional standards. If the Court had helped 
to refine cmde ideas into legislative proposals, it would have 
infringed upon the duties of Parliament and the Ministers. The 
Court noted that its involvement a t  such an early stage of the 
legislative process would "inevitably result in the Constitution- 
al Court taking over the responsibility of the legislative and 
even the executive power and thereby creating some sort of 
government by the Constitutional Court, which is grossly oppo- 
site to the State organizational principles specified in the Con- 
stit~tion."~' Moreover, the requested advisory opinion would 
have eviscerated the Minister's responsibility to consider inde- 
pendently the constitutionality of his legislative proposals.38 
35. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1990 (The Rabar Case), Akotm&nybiros@ Hatbzatai 
[Constitutional Law Court], 199W128 MK. 136 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file 
with the Brigham Young University Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case 
which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brighum 
Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Rabar Case]. 
36. The Finance Minister's ideas concerned the National Savings Bank's in- 
crease in mortgage rates, which was the subject of several future decisions. See 
infra part II.E.2.b. 
37. The Rabar Case, supra note 35, at 4. 
38. See id. at 3 ("the legislative and the executive organs also interpret the 
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The absence of a "distinct application" requirement would 
subject the Court's resources to inefficient use. Review of the 
many constitutional issues that emanate fiom an embryonic 
idea would require the Court to analyze issues that may never 
be considered seriously by the Ministry or Parliament. The 
requirement that all petitions relate to a specific and concrete 
problem also enables the Court to  make its decisions more 
narrow and fact specific. Such decisions appear to  infringe less 
upon the discretion of the political branches and are, therefore, 
less likely to lead to political condemnation of the Court. 
A standard for identification of sufficiently developed ideas 
would facilitate the capacity of the "distinct application" re- 
quirement to bring about the aforementioned benefits. One 
possible standard would set forth a requirement that the Par- 
liament or the pertinent Ministry engage in debate to resolve 
the constitutional issue prior to the submission of an advisory 
opinion petition. The requisite debate would crystalize the 
petition's "distinct application." 
Currently the Court is considering a petition for an adviso- 
ry opinion on the meaning of the clauses in the Constitution 
pertaining to  environmental rights.3g The "distinct applica- 
tion" is simply the constitutionality of all future environmental 
protection statutes to  be considered by Parliament. The Court's 
response to this petition may provide an occasion for further 
elaboration of the requirements for satisfying Article 22(2)'s 
justiciability standard. 
Constitution in the course of providing for their duties); cf BICKEL, szcpra note 3, 
at 22 (quoting JAMES  BRAD^ THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901)) ("The ten- 
dency of a common and easy resort to this great function Ljudicial review], now 
lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to 
deaden its sense of moral responsibility."). 
To encourage other branches to participate more actively in the process of 
constitutional interpretation, the Court has requested various members of the 
Council of Ministers and the Parliament, as well as the President of the Supreme 
Court and the Chief Prosecutor, to submit amicus briefs or expert testimony on 
advisory opinion petitions. 
39. "The Republic of Hungary shall recognize and enforce the right of all to a 
healthy environment." A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. I, 
art. 18 (Hung.). "0 Persons living within the territory of the Republic of Hungary 
shall have the right to physical and mental health care of the highest possible 
standard." Id. ch. XII, art. 7Q/D (1). "(2) The Republic of Hungary shall realize that 
right by organizing labour safety, health institutions and medical care, by ensuring 
opportunities for physical exercise, as well as by protecting the artificial and 
natural environment." Id. ch. XII, art. 704) (2). 
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2. Pre-enactment review: Finality requirement 
In April 1991, members of Parliament from the Alliance of 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ) sought an advisory opinion on the 
constitutionality of a legislative proposal to compensate former 
owners of private property for losses caused by the communist 
nationalization laws. The Constitutional Court denied jurisdic- 
tion. The opinion set forth a justiciability limitation on pre- 
enactment reviewo4O The Court held that unless a bill was ex- 
empt from further modification, it was not ripe for pre-enact- 
ment review. 
The effect of this holding is ambiguous. Bills become law 
by a vote in Parliament and theoretically modification is possi- 
ble until that vote occurs. Before the decision, the Deputy 
Speaker of the Parliament, who desired the Court to review the 
proposed bill, and the Minister of Justice, who opposed review, 
testified before a closed session of the Court. The Court re- 
quested the expert testimony to understand at what stage a bill 
can no longer be modified. The two experts disagreed. Whenev- 
er the Deputy Speaker would point to a final stage, the Minis- 
ter would point out a way in which the bill could be subject to 
further modification prior to enactment. Consequently, a t  a 
press conference following the Court's decision, a spokesman 
for the Minister's Democratic Forum Party (MDF) asserted that 
the MDF interprets the principles set forth by the Court's deci- 
sion as requiring absolute finality, which would virtually elimi- 
nate the Court's power to review a bill prior to enactment. 
The MDF statement may be overly enthusiastic. At the 
time of the bill's submission to the Court for review, over 400 
modifications to the bill had been proposed and were still 
awaiting debate. Accordingly, rather than requiring the abso- 
40. Judgment of April 20, 1991 (The Land Act Case XI), Alkotm~ybirosPg 
Hatttrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], - MK. - (Hung.) (unofficial translation 
on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review; all pinpoint citations to 
this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the 
Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Land Act Case In. The 
Court's restraint in this case not only was a likely response to the Court's heavy 
workload but also may have been a reaction to criticism of the Court's activism 
and an attempt to have the issue of compensation defeated in the political arena. 
For an analysis of the particular political circumstances surrounding the decision, 
see Ethan Klingsberg, Hungary: l"he Constitutional Politics of Compensation, in 2 
S O W  AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW 1 (June 1991) (published by the Parker School of 
Foreign and Comparative Law at Columbia Law School); see also infm part V .  
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lute unamendability of a bill, the Court's holding may still 
allow pre-enactment review so long as there are no outstanding 
modification proposals. If the holding does require absolute 
finality, then pre-enactment review may virtually disappear. 
Parliament would have to pass a bill and set a prospective date 
for enforcement to enable the Court to review an enactment 
before it comes into force. Currently the Spanish Parliament 
utilizes such a post-enactrnentlpre-enforcement mechanism to 
obtain review by its Constitutional Court. A major problem 
with such a procedure, however, is the time pressure it puts on 
the Constitutional Court to decide the constitutionality of an 
enactment before the enforcement date arrives. Motions for 
preliminary injunctions and for temporary restraining orders 
require United States district courts to face similar pressure in 
deciding complex constitutional issues in a short period of time. 
However, the decision of a district judge is subject to extended 
appellate processes, unlike the unappealable decision of the 
Constitutional Court. 
Even if the Spanish option were a practical alternative, the 
ACC requires the Court to engage in pre-enactment review as 
well as post-enactmenupre-enforcement review. Separate provi- 
sions of the ACC mandate jurisdiction over proposed bills and 
over legislation that has been enacted but not yet come into 
force!' The MDF"s interpretation of the recent decision is un- 
likely to be correct, because it  conflicts with the ACC provision 
that "the Constitutional Court shall examine for unconstitu- 
tionality any contestable provision of a bill.ya2 In contrast, an 
interpretation of the opinion's justiciability standard as requir- 
ing the lack of any outstanding modification proposals would be 
consistent with the ACC. 
D. Beyond Dispute Resolution 
Ironically, while the Court has indicated that it would like 
to trim its ~aseload?~ it has taken certain steps toward ex- 
panding its jurisdiction. These steps and their ramifications, 
which will be discussed in the two subsections that follow, can 
be more frilly understood as part of the Constitutional Court's 
41. Compare ACC, supra note 19, ch. IV, fj  33 (preenactment review) with 
ACC, supra note 19, ch. IV, fj  35 (postenactment/preenforcement review). 
42. Id. ch. IV, fj  33(1) (emphasis added). 
43. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
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general trend toward minimizing the adversary nature of its 
proceedings. The trend appears most blatantly in the marginal 
role to  which the decisionmaking process often relegates the 
petitioner. The President of the Court, Judge Lbsz16 Sblyom, 
described a recent decision as exclusively the product of input 
from "experts and  friend^.^ Judge S6lyom continued, "It is 
our business as to what sort of help we intend t o  use to form 
our po~it ion. '~~ In some decisions the petitioner's name is not 
even listed? 
The Constitutional Court's position that it is not bound by 
the adversary constraints of a case is in part due to  the pre- 
scribed jurisdictional rules. Because anyone may bring a case 
before the Court, many petitioners lack any personal stake in 
the outcome. Advisory opinions and reviews of proposed legisla- 
tion are also often non-adversary. In some cases, a request for 
an advisory opinion or review of a proposed bill takes on an ad- 
versary character. For instance, parliamentary debate of an 
issue prior to the submission of a petition can divide the politi- 
cal sphere into camps of conflicting constitutional interpreta- 
tion. However, the more common advisory opinion or pre-enact- 
ment review is sparked by uncertainty as to "what the Con- 
stitution says about this issue," rather than by a marked dis- 
agreement about the Constitution's meaning? 
I .  ' Mootness 
The Court's vision of itself as a supreme interpreter, rather 
than a dispute resolver, affects mootness requirements as well 
as the scope of its opinions. The Court's conception of mootness 
permits the issuance of an opinion even though the petitioner 
is no longer affected by resolution of the constitutional ques- 
tion. As long as the issue still has pertinence t o  society, the 
Court will issue an opinion." Moreover, the Court has ruled 
that it will issue a type of declaratory judgment even if there is 
no way t o  remedy the alleged unconstitutional act or omission. 
That view approximates the "case or controversy" conception 
44. See S6lyom, supra note 25, at 10 (commenting on The Death Penalty Case, 
infra note 50, which held that capital punishment is a per se violation of the right 
to human dignity). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 15. 
47. See supra part II.C.l (discussing The Rabar Case, supm note 35). 
48. See S6lyom, supra note 25, at 30-32. 
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endorsed by American law commentators who favor broad pow- 
ers for federal courts.49 
2. Scope of opinions 
Another consequence of the absence of adversarial concerns 
limiting the Court's authority is that opinions occasionally 
extend far beyond the issue posed in the petition. One example 
is The Death Penalty Case," an opinion declaring capital pun- 
ishment to be a per se violation of the right to human dignity. 
This decision includes a lengthy dissertation upholding the 
constitutionality of self-defense provisions. The opinion does 
_ not approach the constitutionality of self-defense as a peripher- 
al issue, on which the Court's commentary would only consti- 
tute dictum.'' Instead, the separate section treats the self- 
defense laws as if the petition had directly challenged their 
validity. The petitioner, The League of Those Opposed to the 
Death Penalty, had never challenged the self-defense laws in 
49. Compare Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (no justiciability if 
no remedy available to plaintiff other than a declaratory judgment) with William 
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ.  221, 280-81 (1988) (justiciable 
controversy exists even if the sole remedy available is the issuance of declaratory 
judgment). 
The Constitutional Court set forth this latter principle when it held in m e  
Land Act Case I, infia, that it would review the constitutionality of the communist 
Parliament's nationalization laws, even though there would be no way to remedy 
the nationalization laws' alleged unconstitutionality. The Court wrote: 
The Constitutional Court notes that it is now examhhg the constitution- 
ality of the different regulations on nationalization. The Constitutional 
Court refers to . . . the provision that the annulment of a regulation of 
law-as a principal rule-does not concern the legal relations and the 
rights and obligations resulting therefrom that had come into existence 
before the publication of the decision. 
Judgment of Od. 4, 1990 (The Land Act Case I), AlkotmdnybirosBg Hatbzatai 
[Constitutional Law Court], 199W98 MK. 73 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file 
with the Brighum Young Unwersity Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case 
which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brighum 
Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Land Act Case I]. However, in its 
decision on nationalization, the Court did not issue such a retroactive declaratory 
judgment. See The Natiollalization Case, infra note 63. 
50. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990 (The Death Penalty Case), AlkotmanybirosBg 
Hatkozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 19901107 MK. 88 (Hung.) (unofficial 
translation on file with the Brigham Young Universie Law Review; all pinpoint 
citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on 
file with the Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Death 
Penalty Case]. 
51. See id. at 33-35 (S6lyom, Res., concurring). 
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their papers. 
E. Circumstantial Factors Contributing 
to the Court's Authority 
The role of the Constitutional Court in Hungary is also a 
product of circumstances such as the large number of unconsti- 
tutional institutions left over from the prior regime, the lack of 
federalism, and the pemasiveness of State action. 
1. Widespread unconstitutionality and remedial mechanisms 
A nation cannot effectively complete the change fkom cen- 
tral European communism to Western democratic republican- 
ism in the same short period that it takes to adopt a new Con- 
stitution and to hold elections. Even a year and a half after the 
rendszerualtozas (change of regime), many institutional rem- 
nants of the prior regime thrive. If the Constitutional Court 
scrutinized every one of these remnants, it could probably de- 
clare many aspects of State activity in Hungary unconstitution- 
al. 
For example, the Court has declared the vast socialist 
system of government agencies to  violate the Constit~tion.~~ 
Another decision held unconstitutional the Act on Social Insur- 
ance, which is responsible for supporting all elderly and needy 
Hungar ian~ .~~ The agencies were held to  violate due process 
52. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1990 (The Agency Case), Akotmhybiros6g 
HatArozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 199W130 MK. 145 (Hung.) (unofficial 
translation on file with the Brighum Young University Law Review; all pinpoint 
citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on 
file with the Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Agency 
Case]. 
53. Judgment of Apr. 27, 1990 (The Social Insurance Case), Alkotm6nybiros6g 
HatArozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 1990137 MK. 50 (Hung.) (unofficial 
translation on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review; all pinpoint 
citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the case on 
file with the Brighum Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The Social 
Insurance Case]. 
Until the Constitutional Court decision in May 1991, the nationalization laws 
still permitted the Minister of Construction to enlarge the list of nationalized 
property. See Judgment of May 20, 1991 (The Nationalization Case), 
AlkotmAnybiros6g Hatslrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], - MK. - (Hung.) 
(unofficial translation on file with the Brighm Young University Law Review; all 
pinpoint citations to this case which follow refer to the unofficial translation of the 
case on fde with the Brigham Young University Law Review) [hereinafter The 
Nationalization Case]. 
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because a system of administrative courts is not available to 
review their decisions. The Act on Social Insurance contains 
gender classifications that violate a constitutional provision 
which mandates equal treatment of men and women? 
Although the Court has declared major, longstanding insti- 
tutions to be in conflict with recently adopted constitutional 
standards, it has acted delicately in setting forth remedies. 
Initially, the Court considered undertaking the responsibility of 
rewriting all of the Social Insurance provisions to eliminate 
gender di~tinctions.6~ However, in both The Agency Case and 
The Social Insurance Case, the Court only held the legal rules 
prospectively unconstitutional. The Agency Case and The Social 
Insurance Case set deadlines for Parliament to  act to  remedy 
the unconstitutional ~onditions.~~ Under these decisions, the 
structures of the agency decisionmaking process and the Social 
Insurance Ad are constitutional until the deadlines pass. 
ACC Article 43(4) authorizes this concept of prospective 
unconstitutionality. The ACC states that in the presence of "a 
particularly important interest of legal security,"' the Court 
can set a date in the future when a legal rule and its applica- 
tion become unconstitutional. The Court relied on Article 43(4) 
t o  avoid the chaos that would have resulted from orders enjoin- 
ing the current decisionmaking processes of government agen- 
cies and the current operation of many provisions of the Act on 
Social Insurance. 
Reliance on Article 43(4) also increases the chances of 
compliance by designating an opportunity for Parliament to fill 
the gap that would be left by the invalidation of current laws. 
Nevertheless, Parliament has been slow to  react to The Agency 
Case. With reference to the lack of parliamentary progress 
54. A MAGYAR K~TZARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. XII, art. 66 (1) 
(Hung.) ("The Republic of Hungary shall ensure the equality of men and women in 
respect of every civil, political, economic, social and cultural right."). 
55. S6lyom, supm note 25, at 17. 
56. The Agency Case, supra note 52, issued on December 22, 1990, gave Par- 
liament until January 31, 1991, to set up a system of administrative law con- 
sistent with due process. Provisionally, the Court ordered judicial bodies to review 
individual disputes with administrative decisions. The Social Insumnce Case, supra 
note 53, issued on April 27, 1990, gave Parliament until December 31, 1990 to 
modify the Act on Social Insurance. 
57. ACC, supra note 19, ch. IV, 8 43(4). The term ''legal security" derives from 
the German concept of Rechtssickerheit. Article 43(4) enables the Court to refrain 
from upsetting established legal relations and expectations. 
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toward creating administrative courts, the President of the 
Court has written, "I wonder whether the legislators keep a 
record of these  deadline^.^' The use of Article 43(4) facilitates 
the Court's efforts to  force Parliament to reconstruct the coun- 
try, but it remains to be seen whether Parliament is equal to  
the challenge. - 
2. Federalism and State action 
One limit on the authority of the Constitutional Court is 
certain. The authority of the Constitutional Court can be no 
broader than the authority of the Constitution itself. This sec- 
tion discusses the effect in Hungary of two Western doctrinal 
limits on the scope of constitutional law: federalism and State 
action. 
Federalism sets limits upon the authority of the national 
law, including the Constitution,sg in deference to  local law. 
State action doctrines limit the applicability of certain constitu- 
tional provisions, in deference to the rules of private law. In 
Hungary, the laws governing transactions between private 
individuals are in the Civil Code and parliamentary statutes. 
Supreme Court decrees also fill in gaps in the Code and legisla- 
t iodO 
Ultimately, the scope of the doctrines of federalism and 
State action and their effects upon the scope of constitutional 
law depend upon two factors: (1) the substance of constitutional 
provisions and (2) the nature of the society. The first factor is 
determined by whether the Constitution sets aside realms for 
local law and private law autonomy and by the breadth of the 
legal rules set forth in the Constitution. The second factor 
depends upon the levels of development of regional governing 
structures and of the private sector. The ensuing subsections 
examine the role of the doctrines of federalism and of State 
action in Hungary through reference to these two factors. A 
third subsection analyzes the effect these doctrines have on the 
58. S6lyom, supra note 25, at 29. Parliament's failure to meet a deadline may 
be due to the presence of other pressing concerns during this transitional period, 
rather than a lack of respect for the Court. As discussed in the Part I, many com- 
plex financial and economic matters are before Parliament and the nature of 
operations in Parliament has been slow and distracted. 
59. In Hungary there is only a national constitution. Accordingly, all references 
to constitutional law are to national law. 
60. See i&ra part IVA (comparing Civil Code and common law). 
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Constitutional Court's approach to a case concerning abortion 
regulations. 
a. Federalism. Chapter M of the Hungarian Constitution 
requires Parliament to divide the country into regions and to  
permit local governing bodies to "independently regulate and 
administer the municipal &airsM1 of those regions. Chapter 
M also requires the approval of two-thirds of Parliament for 
passage of an act "restricting the fundamental rights of the 
m~nicipalities.'~~ Parliament passed an act empowering local 
governments pursuant to  Chapter M during the summer of 
1990. The vague terms of the Act provide for the structure of 
local governments and empower them t o  pursue measures 
directed toward ensuring the general welfare. Despite Chapter 
M and the Act, the American idea of federalism-that certain 
areas of lawmaking are more appropriately subject to  the con- 
trol of regional governments-has not yet appeared as a factor 
in the Constitutional Court's de~isions.~~ 
Federalism is not functioning to limit the areas of the 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction because a realm of local 
authority does not yet exist in practice. Elections of local offi- 
cials began in the fall of 1990. However, financial factors have 
hampered the authority of these officials. At the present time, 
most of the funding for local activities originates in the nation- 
61. A MAGYAR KO~ZARSASAG ALKOT'MANYA [Constitution] ch. M, art. 44/A(l)(a) 
(Hung.). 
62. Id. ch. M, art. 441C. 
63. A hint of federalism finally appeared in the Judgment of June 3, 1991 (The 
Land Act Case III), Alkotmbnybiros@ Hatslrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 
199V59 MK. 1091 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file with the Brigham Young 
Universi6y Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case which follow refer to the 
unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brigham Young University Law 
Review) [hereinafter The Land Act Case IIT]. The Court held unconstitutional 
Parliament's attempt to return property lost as a result of nationalization. See 
infra parts 111 & V. One of the Court's reasons was that Chapter M denies Par- 
liament the power to order the local governments to return property that the Act 
on Local Governments designates as within local control. It is not yet clear, howev- 
er, whether the holding implies that there are restrictions on the Constitutional 
Court's power to restrid how the local governments dispose of their property. 
There has been so little activity by local governments that the Court has had no 
occasion to restrain itself ikom interfering with local organs. For statements of the 
restrictions imposed on American constitutional case law resulting fiom the federal- 
ist tradition, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (limiting school desegre- 
gation remedies for violation of federal equal protection clause due to deference to 
local control over schools); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 
(1941) (federal courts should abstain from deciding constitutional cases premised on 
difficult and unsettled interpretations of State law). 
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a1 government. The significance of local law is further dwarfed 
by the absence of regional constitutions and local judicial sys- 
tems to interpret local rules. Most importantly, the prior re- 
gime eliminated remnants of local control over law enforcement 
agencies, financial institutions, hospitals, welfare programs, 
schools, and judicial systems." An additional indication of the 
lack of importance of Hungary's new regional authorities was 
the turnout of only 25 to 40 percent of eligible voters at most 
local elections. 
Hungary's centralized past may be responsible for the slow 
start of the development of local government, but post-commu- 
nist antipathy toward centralized control may yet come to h- 
ition. In contrast to  Hungary's anti-centralization sentiments, 
the United States experienced anti-regionalism some two hun- 
dred years ago upon the demise of the Articles of Confedera- 
tion." Just as the new Hungary must now confront a long 
history of centralized power, the new United States had to  con- 
front a tradition of State power. It took many years and several 
transitional events (including a civil war, a New Deal, and a 
civil rights movement) for the Union to overcome the remnants 
of States' rights. Similarly, it may take many years and addi- 
tional acts of near-revolutionary change for Hungary to  rid 
itself of centralized control.66 
64. During the eighteenth century, power in Hungary was primarily at the 
county level. After World War I, the nation began a centralization trend which has 
yet to cease. The future development of autonomous, regional universities may strength- 
en the desire of university towns to exert local authority. See Mbt4 Szab6, Was 
There A Strategy? Hungary's Path To Democracy (June 25, 1991) (unpublished 
paper presented at Convention of the Hungarian Sociological Association in Buda- 
pest, on file with the Brigham Young University Law Review). 
Gdbor Demszky, the Mayor of Budapest, explains the lack of power on the lo- 
cal level. "A signiticant portion of the new political organizations find it very 
diflicult to accept that they must share power, must curb it, that they cannot 
decide issues single-handedly . . . . [Dlecades of ingrained behavior patterns must 
be changed . . . ." Gdbor Demszky, Local Government Finding Its Way, BUDAPESF 
WEEK, Aug. 15-21, 1991, at 2 (Amy M6dly trans.). In particular, Mayor Demszky 
notes, "It took fourteen months after the democratic parliamentary elections for 
legislation to be enacted on the legal status of Budapest municipal governments. In 
effect, their executive abilities were paralyzed to this extreme . . . ." Id. 
65. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776- 
1787, 474 (1969) (anti-regionalism of framers of United States Constitution). 
66. By "near-revolutionary," I do not imply an overthrow of the government but 
a shift in direction such as the Civil War Amendments or the New Deal in the 
United States. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 458-59, 474. The so-called "Reagan 
Revolution" was an attempt to dramatically transform the United States back into 
a more decentralized system. 
411 JUDICIAL REVIEW: COMMAND OR CONSENT 69 
Currently there is little indication of movement toward 
regionalism in Hungary. The national government continues to 
play a leading role in running the economy and in dealing with 
the West to resolve domestic crises. Moreover, aside from the 
vague language of Chapter IX, the Constitution provides the 
national government and courts with authority over most sub- 
ject matter. 
b. State action. Two factors combine to expand the authori- 
ty of constitutional law over life in Hungary: (1) the prevalence 
of State action in society as a result of the nation's communist 
history and (2) the ma& constitutional rules that limit State 
actione6' 
State action in Hungary is prevalent because the State 
owns and manages the majority of property and enterprises. 
Although privatization plans' have been enacted, the process 
has been extremely slow thus far. On February 12, 1991, The 
Washington Post reported that "only 130 out of 2,300 sellable 
[sic] enterprises were privatized* in the last yead" An exam- 
ple of the failure to effectuate a quick sale of State property is 
the fate of the First Hungary Fund. This group of foreign inves- 
tors arrived with 60 million dollars in its coffers, but one year 
later reported purchases of only approximately 2.5 million dol- 
lars of Hungarian property. 
There are several reasons for the slow pace of privatiza- 
tion. One is administrative. Auditing the value of enterprises 
and property takes time. Investors as well as government prop- 
erty administrators both proceed cautiously to assure that they 
receive a fair bargain. Another factor is the political influence 
on the privatization process of managers and unions who fear 
the loss of jobs which usually results afker a private entity pur- 
chases an inefficient, State-run enterprise. Finally, the failure 
of the government to resolve the claims of those whose property 
was confiscated by the former regime has caused many inves- 
tors to hesitate to pursue deals out of fear that Parliament will 
67. Certain constitutional rights, such as the rights of children, impose obliga- 
tions on both the State and private individuals. Examples of the few constitutional 
rules pertaining exclusively to the private sector are the rules pertaining to trade 
unions, political parties, and citizen violence. The main sources of private law are 
the Civil Code, parliamentary statutes, agency regulations, and Supreme Court 
precedents. 
68. Blaine Harden, East Europe's Efforts to Sell State Firms Qf to Slow Start, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1991, at C1. 
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attempt to return the property to its pre-nationalization own- 
er. 
In a society where State actors are so prevalent, many 
commercial, contract and tor t  disputes enter the realm of public 
rather than private law and raise questions of whether the 
State has infringed on an individual's constitutional rights. 
Banking is one State-run enterprise which has put the Consti- 
tutional Court in the business of resolving what appear to be 
private law issues. The reform of Hungarian banking laws over 
the last decade has resulted in the opening of a small number 
of semi-private banks, which in theory are independent of the 
State and have a range of powers. Nevertheless, in practice, 
the National Savings Bank of Hungary remains the organ with 
which most citizens engage in sayings and loan transa~tions.~~ 
A contract dispute between the National Savings Bank and 
a class of private citizens who had taken out loans turned into 
a major constitutional case this past year. The National Sav- 
ings Bank Case arose from a decision by Parliament, in its 
capacity as head of the National Savings Bank, to  pass legis- 
lation which authorizes an increase in the interest rates on 
loans that citizens had taken out for the purpose of buying 
homes from the State. Parliament acted on information indicat- 
ing that, due t o  inflation, the Bank would be on the verge of 
bankruptcy without the increase." The borrowers challenged 
the increase as a violation of the terms of their loan contracts. 
In Hungary, as in the United States, a contractual promise 
from a State body creates a property interest on behalf of the 
 promisee^.^' Accordingly, the allegation that the National Sav- 
ings Bank was in breach of its promise raised the issue of State 
infringement on the promisees' property rights.?' 
69. See HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, The Transformation of the Hun- 
garian Banking System, in PUTlWG THOSE HECTIC YEARS IN PERSPECTIVE 1987- 
1989, 9-10 (1989). (discussing limited citizen transactions with new semi-private 
commercial banks, which are currently owned primarily by the State and State 
enterprises). 
70. According .to the Bank, the increase is permissible because its survival is in 
the best interests of the country and the borrowers. In addition, the Bank argued 
that it is fair for the State to ask for increased mortgage rates because the State 
had increased the salaries of most of the borrowers (the vast majority of whom are 
State employees) to keep up with inflation. 
71. Cf. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) 
(State promises create property rights on behalf of promisees); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (State promises of tenure to teachers 
create property rights). 
72. Cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (government taking of 
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The Constitutional Court must now resolve this case by 
deriving standards from Article 13 of the Constitution which 
prohibits the State from taking an individual's property with- 
out compensation. The resolution of a complex commercial 
dispute &om the abbreviated text of the Article 13 "takings 
clause" is a difficult task.13 If the case had arisen from a 
breach by a private party, then a civil court could have applied 
a refined excusable breach of contract rule derived from the 
Civil Code and Supreme Court private law precedents. Howev- 
er, the Bank's alleged breach is not subject to  a challenge un- 
der those non-constitutional provisions because the rate modifi- 
cation is in accordance with a Parliamentary enactment. The 
only means for challenging the legality of Parliament's action is 
through reliance on the Constitution. The National Savings 
Bank Case shows that if State action remains widespread in 
Hungary, then constitutional interpretation will play a central 
role in the resolution of litigation in "private law" realms like 
commerce and banking. 
c. The abortion issue without federalism or a private sector 
distinction. A brief comparison of the handling of the issue of 
abortion rights by the United States Supreme Court and the 
way in which the Constitutional Court has to approach chal- 
lenges to the constitutionality of the Ministry of Health's abor- 
tion regulations manifests the sigmfkance to Hungarian consti- 
tutional jurisprudence of both the absence of federalism and 
the prevalence of State action. 
The major issue before the United States Supreme Court 
in recent abortion cases is how much authority the States have 
to establish their own abortion regulations. The trend toward 
resolution of this issue in favor of local autonomy requires 
careful scrutiny of concepts of federalism. The focus on federal- 
ism has enabled the current Supreme Court majority to  avoid 
answering the more sensitive question of when a fetus is via- 
ble." Even if federalism does not give States plenary authori- 
property rights occurs when government breaches promises in disability and life in- 
surance contracts issued to veterans). 
73. The United States Supreme Court's attempts to decide whether infringe- 
ments upon property rights in pursuit of police power objectives constitute takings 
of property have resulted in decisions which are unpredictable, incoherent, "ad 
hoc," "confusing," and "bafllingly inconsistent." See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Recon- 
structed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 & 
n.6 (1984) (reviewing takings clause commentary and'case law). 
74. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (de- 
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ty in the area of abortion regulation, the United States Su- 
preme Court may still refrain from reviewing the substance of 
many laws restricting abortion because of the well-developed 
American private sector. Ignoring the poverty factor, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Webster v. Repro- 
ductive Health Services, concluded that a Missouri statute's 
restrictions on a woman's ability to have a State-subsidized 
abortion do not even raise the issue of abortion rights. Even if 
there is a right to an abortion, the removal of the State from 
the business of abortions would not infringe upon that right. 
The "reality" underlying the Chief Justice's reasoning is the 
availability of abortions in the private se~tor.'~ 
By contrast, constitutional review of regulations governing 
State-subsidized abortions in Hungary has to meet head on the 
substantive questions concerning the scope of abortion rights, 
because neither the federalism question nor the publidprivate 
distinction are issues. The Hungarian Court cannot evade the 
question of when life begins by holding that the question f d s  
within the discretion of local authorities. The national govern- 
ment promulgates the abortion regulations and hospitals run 
by the national government conduct the abortions. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's private sector distinction is also 
not a factor in the consideration of the abortion issue in Hun- 
gary. Private abortion facilities in Hungary are now conceivable 
under the new constitutional provisions protecting private 
enterprise initiatives. Nevertheless, the possibility of private 
ferring to State's authority to determine when the foetus is viable, because it is 
one of the "areas of medical practice traditionally subject to State regulation"). 
75. Chief Justice Rehnquist defends the regulations because they "only restrict 
a woman's ability to obtain an abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a 
physician affiliated with a public hospital." Id. at 509. The legal basis for that 
statement is that there is " 'no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where 
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the 
government itself may not deprive the individual.' " Id. at 507 (quoting DeShanney 
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). Neverthe- 
less, a footnote reveals that this legal basis is only legitimate because there is a 
private sector option available. In the footnote, the Chief Justice concedes, "A 
different analysis might apply if a particular State had socialized medicine and all 
of its hospitals and physicians were publicly funded." Id. at 510 n.8. The Webster 
dissenters argued that for most women who seek abortions in Missouri, the private 
sector is not a viable option and that the failure to qu* for a State-subsidized 
abortion means the impossibility of having an abortion. See id. at 540 n.1 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that 97% of all Missouri hospital abortions occur 
in public institutions, and therefore those who are "too poor to travel [to another 
State for a publicly funded abortion], perhaps [are left with] no choice at all"). 
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sector abortions will not be a factor in the deliberations over 
the abortion issue at the Hungarian Constitutional Court. One 
possible reason is that Hungarians cannot afford private sector 
abortions. But there must be something more. Most abortion 
seekers in Missouri could not afford private sector abortions, 
but this factor did not inhibit Chief Justice Rehnquist's reason- 
ing in Webster." The United States Supreme Court could rely 
on the private sector alternative to avoid the issue of women's 
rights to abortion in a case challenging governmental withhold- 
ing of funds because such reasoning reflects a common Ameri- 
can belief in the sigmficance of the private sector. The Consti- 
tutional Court's refusal to give credence to the legally feasible 
private sector option while deliberating over the abortion ques- 
tion is a product in part of the failure of the Hungarian private 
sector to develop in practice, but more simcantly it is a prod- 
uct of the private sector's failure to develop in the communal 
imagination of H~ngary.~' 
F. The Constitutional Court and Parliament: 
Acts of Constitutional Force and the Amendment Process 
1. The original Article 8 . 
The absence of federalism and private sector considerations 
- enlarges the national government's responsibility to  interpret 
the Constitution. The increased burden on the national govern- 
ment, however, does not necessarily mean that the Constitu- 
tional Court's responsibilities should increase. As in the United 
States, the members of all branches of government in Hungary 
take oaths to uphold the Constitution. There is nothing inher- 
ently illegitimate about delegating the ultimate responsibility 
for constitutional interpretation t o  Parliament or to the Council 
of Ministers. 
76. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that "indigency . . . 'may make it d B -  
cult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions' 
without public funding." Webster, 492 U.S. at 509 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 474 (1977)). 
77. The Constitutional Court's fmst abortion decision found a way to evade the 
issue of abortion rights. The Court held the current abortion laws unconstitutional 
because they had been enacted by the Ministry of Health, rather than by Parlia- 
ment. Dictum in the decision stated that the Constitution does not specify when 
life begins. If the Christian Democrat Party, a member of the ruling coalition, at- 
tempts to push a restrictive abortion law through Parliament, then the Court will 
have to decide whether the Constitution protects a woman's right to an abortion. 
74 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
The Constitution, as amended in October 1989, contained 
such a provision. Article 8, Section (2), stated, "Rules affecting 
fundamental rights and duties shall not be provided for by 
legal rules other than acts of constitutional force." Under this 
provision, the constitutionality of "rules affecting fundamental 
rights" depended on the "constitutional force" vote in Parlia- 
ment. An act of constitutional force is an act passed by a two- 
thirds vote of Parliament. Although adoption of a constitutional 
amendment requires the same two-thirds majority," a bill 
designated as an act of constitutional force is not an amend- 
ment to the Constitution. Furthermore, an act passed by a two- 
thirds vote of Parliament is an ordinary statute unless predes- 
ignated as either an act of constitutional force or a constitution- 
al amendment. Article 8, Section 3, added that an act of consti- 
tutional force could only be passed under Section 2 if it is "in- 
dispensable" to a limited set of government interests: namely, 
"State safety, safeguarding of home, law and order, public secu- 
rity, public health, public morals, or the protection of the fun- 
damental rights and freedoms of others." 
Article 8, Sections 2 and 3 were replaced in June 1990, but 
while in operation they enabled the Constitutional Court to  
shift to  Parliament the burden of resolving hard cases in which 
rights conflicted either with each other or with compelling 
government interests. Examination of The National Savings 
Bank Case and The Abortion Case, described in the previous 
section, shows how Article 8 can function to relieve the Court of 
the responsibility of making substantive decisions on difficult 
legal questions with potentially serious economic or political 
consequences. 
The National Savings Bank Case required the Court to  
decide whether the National Savings Bank's increase in inter- 
est rates was unconstitutional interference with property inter- 
ests. Article 8, Section (2), relieved the Court of having to re- 
solve this diffcult constitutional issue. The Court held that the 
law "affected a fundamental property right" and presented the 
risk of grave social consequences. Therefore, the Court conclud- 
ed, Article 8 required Parliament to pass the rate increase as 
78. A slight difference exists between the prerequisites for a constitutional 
amendment and an act of constitutional force. The former requires a two-thirds 
majority of all members of Parliament, while the latter requires a two-thirds 
majority of all members who are present at the time of the vote. 
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an a d  of constitutional force and with the support of a Section 
3 justification. The pending challenge to the Ministry of 
Health's abortion regulations could have been handled similar- 
ly if it had come before the Court prior to the June 1990 modi- 
fication of Article 8. The Court could have held that abortion 
regulations "affect fundamental rights" of unborn life and fe- 
male liberty and that therefore Parliament must enact the 
Ministry of Health's regulations by a two-third's majority for 
the rules to have validity. 
Article 8 relieved the Court of the burden of deciding deli- 
cate questions, such as banking and abortion issues, to which 
the Constitution provides no clear answer. The determination 
of the constitutionality of a rule that ''affects" a fundamental 
right rested almost entirely upon the outcome of parliamentary 
debates on acts of constitutional force. The Court's roles were 
(1) to shiR the burden to Parliament by i d e n t w g  when a rule 
"affected" a fundamental right and (2) to assure that a compel- 
ling Section 3 interest supported all acts of constitutional force. 
2. The amended Article 8 
In June 1990, Parliament amended Article 8 to  alter dra- 
matically the roles of the legislature and the Court in deter- 
mining the scope of constitutional rights. Under the amended 
Article 8, Section (2), "rules respecting fundamental rights and 
duties shall be determined by Law which, however, shall not 
limit the essential contents of any fundamental right." Section 
3 was eliminated in its entirety. 
Under the old Article 8, an act of constitutional force and a 
Section 3 justification were necessary for any enactment "af- 
fecting" a bdamental  right. Now, however, Article 8 only 
imposes restrictions upon enactments that 'limit the essential 
contents" of a fundamental right. Consequently Parliament has 
free reign t o  pass laws that expand-i.e., "Uaffect" but do not 
'limits-the scope of a right. 
The amended Article 8's restrictions upon enactments that 
limit rights are of even greater consequence. Article 8 now 
invalidates "Laws that imposes limitations upon rights. Accord- 
ingly, the Court must approach issues of whether legislation 
limits constitutional rights in a new manner. The Court can no 
longer shift the responsibility for determining the proper scope 
of rights to parliamentary debates on acts of constitutional 
force, because an act of constitutional force cannot limit the 
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essential contents of a right.7g The Constitutional Court is 
now solely responsible for outlining the "essential contents" of a 
right and protecting those "essential contents" from all State 
interference. 
Even though Article 8 burdens the Court with the task of 
setting forth the essential contents of a right, the Court might 
not have the "last word" because of the amendment process. It 
is questionable, however, whether the amended Article 8's 
proscription against "Law. . . limit[ing] the essential contents 
of a fundamental right" leaves Parliament with the option to  
amend the Constitution in a manner that would infringe on the 
essential contents of a fundamental right. If Parliament at- 
tempts to  infringe upon the "essential contents" of a right by 
constitutional amendment, then the Court will have to  decide 
whether the June 1990 amendment in effect amended the 
Constitution's rules of amendments0 to prohibit amendments 
that limit hdamental  rights. The resolution of this issue will 
have important implications for the exclusivity and superiority 
of the Constitutional C o d s  of the mtours of rights.81 
79. The amendment's framers must have intended acts of constitutional force to 
fall within those acts of "Law" that are inadequate to limit the "substantial con- 
tents of any fundamental right", A MAGYAR KO~ARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitu- 
tion] ch. 1, art. 8(2) (Hung.), otherwise the June 1990 amendment would not have 
accomplished any signiscant modification of the old Article 8 provision that acts of 
constitutional force permit the enactment of "rules affecting fundamental rights." 
Id. 
In apparent conflict with Article 8's absolutism, clauses providing for restriction 
by an act of constitutional force accompany the provisions for the rights to travel, 
to reside, to strike, to associate, to worship, and to have personal data protected. 
See id. ch. XII, arts. 58(3), 59(2), 60(4), 7WC. When a statute infringing on the 
right to have personal data protected was recently challenged, the court did not 
declare the law unconstitutional because it was not supported by an act of consti- 
tutional force. Instead, the court asked whether the statute infringed on the 
"substantial contents" of the right, as proscribed by Article 8, Section 2. The court 
then declared the statute unconstitutional for infringing on the essential contents 
of a fundamental right. See Judgment of Od. 4, 1990 (The Communist Data Case), 
Alkotmbybirostig Hatbozatai [Constitutional Law Court], - MK. - (Hung.) 
(protecting privacy right of former communist officials). 
80. Prior to the amendment of Article 8, no restrictions applied to the content 
of amendments that could be adopted under Article 24 of the constitution. 
81. For an insightful discussion of whether it is logically possible for an amend- 
ment process to authorize amendment of the amendment process, see John M. 
Finnis, Revolutions and the Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRU- 
DENCE (SECOND SERIES) 44, 50-61 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ed. 1973) (discussing 
H.LA H&, Self-Referring Laws, in F E S T S ~  TILL AGNAD KARL OLIVECRONA 314- 
16 (1964); H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 195-200 (1967); A. ROSS, ON 
LAW AND JUSTICE 81-83 (1958)). After pointing to holes in all attempts to resolve 
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On a technical level, it appears plausible that the June 
1990 amendment was intended to entrench bdamental  rights 
in the Constitution beyond the reach of the amendment pro- 
cess. The prerequisite for an amendment-a two-thirds majori- 
ty of Parliament-was unchanged by the June 1990 amend- 
ment. Prior to the June 1990 amendment, Article 8 permitted 
infringements upon fundamental rights by acts of constitution- 
al force, which also required a two-thirds majority of Parlia- 
ment.82 If the June 1990 amendment did not achieve en- 
trenchment, then the only real change the amendment made 
was to require Parliament to label its votes on whether to limit 
a fundamental right as votes on an amendment rather than on 
an act of constitutional force. It is unlikely that Parliament 
would amend the Constitution to achieve such an insignificant 
change. 
There are also indications that the consensus in Hungary 
is to entrust the Constitutional Court with the duty of the 
absolute protection of fundamental rights from all interference 
including that of Parliament's amendment process. The basis 
for this sentiment is a reaction to the history of 
constitutionalism under the prior regime, the implications of 
which will be explained further in Part N. The Constitution in 
force for four decades prior to the rendszervaltozas (change of 
regime) contained an extensive list of fundamental rights.83 
Today the Parliament, which amended Article 8, looks back 
with disdain on the way in which the old Constitution's rights 
were rendered meaningless in practice. What eliminated the 
meaning of those rights was not a denial by the State that the 
rights existed, but the constitutional provisions that left the 
contents of the rights subject to  the whims of the political 
branches of govern~nent.~~ 
the issue by legalistic logic, Finnis concludes that the validity of an amendment to 
the amendment process depends upon whether the change conforms with the vision 
of the spoudaia polis or the "mature" sector of society. For further explanation of 
the spoudaia polis, see infra part III.C. 
82. But see supra note 78 (slight difference between prerequisites for consti- 
tutional amendment and act on constitutional force). 
83. See A MAGYAR K ~ ~ A R S A S A G  ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. VIII (Hung.) 
(1949 version). 
84. An analogous historical precedent of fascism supported the decision of the 
West German and Austrian peoples to adopt constitutional systems which prohibit 
amendments that limit certain fundamental rights. G R U N D G E S ~  [Constitution] 
[GGI art. 79 (F.R.G.); Rudolf Machacek, Law and Politics 1, 9 (1990) (unpublished 
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The operation of Article 8 as a restriction on the amend- 
ment process is a practical means of assuring the protection of 
rights. The ease of attaining a two-thirds majority in Parlia- 
ment leaves fundamental rights vulnerable to frequent amend- 
ments. Moreover, an easy amendment process means that an 
amendment could fail to embody a firm national commitment. 
A two-thirds majority at  one meeting of the Parliament might 
reflect only the views of a temporarily popular special interest 
Although the elected Parliament has amended the Consti- 
tution six times in the past year, there has not been an amend- 
ment since the fall of 1990. Parliament may be disciplining 
itself despite the easy process. However, a more likely explana- 
tion is that the current ruling coalition possesses only a 60 
percent majority. If a tworthirds majority becomes attainable in 
the h ture  and Parliament begins to resort more to the amend- 
ment process, the authority of both the Constitutional Court 
and the Constitution could become trivialized. The interpreta- 
tion of Article 8 as insulating the Court's fimdamental rights 
jurisprudence from modification by the amendment process is 
one way to prevent such a result. The following section pres- 
ents another way. 
G. Beyond the Control of Amendments: The Invisible 
Constitution and the Influence of Western Legal Standards 
The determination of whether Article 8 permits amend- 
ments which limit the essential contents of rights may not have 
a definitive effect on the division of power between the Court 
and Parliament with regard to certain constitutional matters. 
Examination of two recent decisions, The Death Penalty Case 
manuscript) (explaining how the Austrian Constitutional Court and the Indian Su- 
preme Court have "formulated the standpoint that even in the course of the 
amendment of [the] constitution, it is not permissible to change provisions of the 
Constitution . . . belonging to its essentials"). 
85. See Boz6ki, supra note 10, at 548-49 ('The objective [of the June 1990 
amendment] . . . was to avoid the 'dictatorship of the legislature.' "). The view that 
the new Article 8 entrenches fundamental rights from modification by amendment 
has not been recognized at this time by either Parliament, the Council of Minis- 
ters, or any court. 
James Madison observed that a diflicult amendment process encouraged demo- 
cratic "bargaining and mutual learning" and heightened the quality of the 
amendments. See Stephen Holmes, Precomittment and the Paradaz of Democracy, 
in CONS~P~ZPTIONAL~SM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 218. 
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and The Union Case, reveals that factors beyond the text of the 
Constitution play an important role in the Court's development 
of constitutional law. 
The Death Penalty Case held capital punishment to be 
unconstitutional per se. The Union Case proscribed trade un- 
ions from representing employees without their consent. In 
both cases the Court relied upon two extra-textual factors: (1) 
conceptions of the right to human dignity and (2) the 
precedential value of Western legal standards. 
An application of the right to human dignity served as a 
basis for both decisions. Such a right can be found in Article 
54(1) of the Constitution. Nevertheless, The Death Penalty Case 
and The Union Case both explain further that the right to 
human dignity is a foundational principle of Hungarian consti- 
tutional law and therefore it would exist even without a refer- 
ence in the constitutional text. The concurrence of the Presi- 
dent of the Court in The Death Penalty Case described the 
decision's reliance on the right to human dignity as a utiliza- 
tion of the "'invisible constitution'-[which is] beyond the [con- 
trol of both the] Constitution, which is often amended . . . [, 
and] future  constitution^."^^ The Union Case adds that when 
"none of the . . . named fundamental rights are applicable for a 
given state of affairs," then the "general personal right [to 
dignity] . . . may be relied upon at any time by the Constitu- 
tional 
The Court rested The Union Case's holding upon the right 
to dignity even though the Constitution contains clauses that 
specifkally relate to the right of unions "to safeguard and rep- 
resent the interest of  employee^."^ The Court could easily 
have held that these clauses only authorize representation by 
86. The Death Penalty Case, supra note 50, at 16; cf. supra note 84 (quoting 
Machecek). 
87. The quote is found in the The Union Case, infia, at 5: Judgment of Apr. 
23, 1990 (The Union Case), Alkotmcinybiros6g Hathzatai [Constitutional Law 
Court], 1990/36 MK. 42 (Hung.) (unofficial translation on fde with the Brigham 
Young University Law Review; all pinpoint citations to this case which follow refer 
to the unofficial translation of the case on file with the Brtgham Young University 
Law Review) [hereinafter The Union Case]. 
88. "Trade unions and other organizations for the representation of interests 
shall safeguard and represent the interests of employees, members of cooperatives 
and entrepreneurs." A MAGYAR K~zTARSASAG AWCOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. 1, art. 
4 (Hung.). "Everybody shall have the right to form organizations with others with 
the aim of protecting economic and social interests." Id. ch. XII, art. 70/C(1). 
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consent.89 The decision to rely on the admittedly extra-textual 
right to human dignity, rather than the more relevant clause 
on union representation, further signals that the Court does 
not see a need to link its interpretations to  the text of the Con- 
stitution. 
A complementary trend, which minimizes the importance 
of the Constitution's text and the input of Parliament, is the 
Court's reliance on Western legal standards. The Union Case 
and The Death Penalty Case cite Western legal norms to  estab- 
lish both the irrevocable presence of the right to human dignity 
in Hungarian constitutional law and the contents of that right. 
While The Union Case only briefly cites "modern constitutions 
and the practice of constitutional courts" to  support its holding, 
The Death Penalty Case contains an extensive analysis of West- 
ern conventions. 
The Death Penalty Case reviews the various European 
protocols, as well as the status of capital punishment in the 
United States. Curiously, the standards of the West, including 
those of the Council of Europe, do not mandate the death pen- 
alty ban adopted by the Court. Only optional protocols in the 
West prohibit the death penalty.s0 However, a brief look at 
the case law of the judicial arm of the Council of Europe-the 
European Court of Human Rights-reveals that the death 
penalty conflicts with Western European values. The European 
Court requires very strict procedural safeguards for an applica- 
tion of the death penalty to  comply with the ban on "inhuman 
and degrading treatment." Recently, an extradition case pre- 
sented the European Court with the opportunity to review the 
procedures surrounding the application of the death penalty in 
the State of Virginia.g1 The European Court found a likelihood 
that Virginia's sentencing and appellate process would violate 
89. The explanation for not relying upon those union clauses was that they 
were remnants of the Stalinist Constitution and therefore could not be interpreted 
to require prior consent to the union representation. 
90. The two "optional protocols" outlawing capital punishment are the Supple- 
mentary Protocol, Art. I (adopted on April 23, 1983) to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed on November 4, 
1950) and the European Parliament's Declaration On Fundamental Rights and Fun- 
damental Freedoms, Para. 22. Both instruments call for the abolition of the death 
penalty. However, the terms of each document provide that it is only binding on 
the signatories and is not a pronouncement of international or European norms. 
See The Death Penalty Case, supra note 50. 
91. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1989). 
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the prohibition against "inhuman and degrading treatment." 
The European Court added that satisfaction of the standards of 
the United States due process clause and "cruel and unusual 
punishment" clause were inadequate to  ensure consistency with 
European standards. 
The extreme nature of the European Court's procedural 
emphasis indicates that capital punishment conflicts with the 
Council's substantive values.g2 Accordingly, the Constitutional 
Court actually did live up to its opinion's claim to be "moving 
in the same direction" as 
Part I1 analyzed the formal components of the structure 
enabling the Court to implement its authority over Hungary. 
This Part presents a substantive analysis of the controversial 
and multifaceted Land Act Case I .  The purpose of this Part is 
not to pass judgment on whether the logic and policy implica- 
tions of the decision are good or bad, but to  identify the legal 
theories underlying the opinion and their social science implica- 
tions. 
A. The Land Act Case I: Facts and Holdings 
In March 1990, Hungarian voters elected the Democratic 
Forum Party (MDF) to  a plurality of seats in Parliament." 
92. Professor Charles Black explains that " 'procedure' and 'substance' lock and 
become one" in a court's decision to require such heightened procedural safeguards 
surrounding the death penalty. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 95-96 
(1974). Relying on the decisions of the high court in ancient Jerusalem, Black 
concludes that the setting forth of such safeguards are not "collateral or accidental 
means . . . to avoid its [the death penalty's] infliction." Id. Rather, a court's deci- 
sion to implement strict procedural safeguards surrounding capital punishment 
embodies the point of view that "the justice of man is altogether and always 
insufficient for saying who may be" sentenced to death. Id. 
93. See The Death Penalty Case, supra note 50, at 14-35 (S6lyoq Pres., concur- 
ring). 
94. Sixty-two parties took part in the elections. 
Percentage of the Vote, March 25, 1990 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF): 24.7% 
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ): 2 1.3% 
Smallholders Party: 11.7% 
Socialist Party: 10.9% 
Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ): 8.9% 
Christian Democrat Party: 6.5% 
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The MDF platform combined economic pledges to institute a 
free market system and nationalist pledges to avoid permitting 
the country's assets to fall under the exclusive control of for- 
eigners. The appeal of the latter, nationalist sentiment left the 
MDF in a bind. Few Hungarians, other than some former mem- 
bers of the communist nomenklature, could afford to purchase 
Socialist Workers Party: 
Social Democrat Party: 
Agrarian Alliance: 






























































These statistics were compiled by Professor Andrew Arato from a variety of sourc- 
es, including the tables in R. Barnabas, Political Pluralization in Hungary, 43 
SO= S ~ ! ~ D I E S  120 (1991). 
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State pr~perty.'~ Yet if State property was not sold off, entre- 
preneurs would have little with which to work in developing a 
capitalist system. 
One solution to this conflict between desire for capitalism 
and resistance to foreign domination was to recreate a class of 
property owning Hungarians by giving large amounts of land 
and indemnification payments to those Hungarians from whom 
the communists had confiscated property. At first the idea may 
have seemed to be a stroke of political genius. It brought the 
needed support of the Smallholders Party-representing former 
peasant landowners-into the MDF ruling coalition and in- 
creased the potential for domestic participation in and enthusi- 
asm for privatization. 
During the ensuing months, however, the MDF began to 
comprehend more f a y  the extent of Hungary's financial prob- 
lems. The nation could not afford the costly compensation 
scheme fervently advocated by the  smallholder^.'^ The best 
solution for the nation was to expedite investment by foreigners 
rather than to spend money subsidizing citizen participation in 
investment. The MDF Council of Ministers retained a list of en- 
terprises that had to remain at least 51 percent State or Hun- 
garian owned:' and the MDF concluded that the country 
must not be sold to foreigners at bargain pr i~es?~ 
Meanwhile, the MDF became dependent on the 
Smallholders to retain their majority coalition.99 Other issues 
had eliminated any chance of the MDF abandoning the 
Smallholders to form a coalition with one of the other two ma- 
jor parties, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the 
Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ).lW The central issue 
of the Smallholders platform was compensation for land taken 
95. In addition, foreign investors had little interest in many properties, such as 
steel mills and small properties, which offered no immediately foreseeable profits. 
96. In addition, ,economists predicted that compensation would cause inflation. 
97. See Privatization Guide, DAILY NEWS OF THE HUNGARIAN EWS AGENCY, 
April 12, 1991, at 3. 
98. Arguably, the MDF had always preferred the implementation of capitalism 
through sales to foreigners rather than through re-privatization or compensation 
programs. Accordingly, MDF may well have perceived its adoption of the Small- 
holders' platform on re-privatization and indemnification as a political compromise 
rather than as a stroke of political genius. 
99. The Christian Democrat Party was also in the MDF coalition. 
100. The MDF also did not consider the Socialist Party, who won nine percent 
of the seats in Parliament, to be a viable candidate for a coalition partner. 
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by the communists. The MDF could not back out. The coalition 
drafted a bill providing for all those who had lost land due to 
the nationalization laws of the communist Parliament, com- 
mencing in 1949, to receive either the original plot or a similar 
plot. All those who had lost personal property were to receive a 
payment. 
Polls revealed that approximately two-thirds of the nation 
believed the final proposal to be economic s~icide.'~' At the 
last minute, the MDF figured out a way to delay having to vote 
on this proposal, while simultaneously keeping the coalition 
intact. The Prime Minister stayed the moment of truth by us- 
ing his power under the ACC to request an advisory opinion on 
the matter from the Constitutional Court. 
The Prime Minister set forth a "distinct" querylo2 for the 
Court t o  answer. He asked the Court only whether the equal 
protection clause, contained in Article 7OlA of the Constitu- 
tion,lo3 permitted the Parliament to compensate former real 
property owners by a different means than would be used to 
compensate former personal property owners. This question did 
not indicate any antipathy toward the general concept of pro- 
viding former owners with compensation. 
On October 2, 1990, the Court issued a decision responding 
to  the Prime Minister's question in the negative. The reasoning 
was straightforward and is not the subject of this Part. The 
Court held that payment constituted treatment that was signif- 
icantly different from the restoration of ownership of actual 
property. The Court concluded that such differential treatment 
violated the equal protection clause because it was not justified 
by any compelling government interest. 
What is more intriguing is the reasoning the Court used to  
resolve the larger issue which was plaguing the nation politi- 
101. Radio Brzdge Report (Radio Broadcast, Budapest, Hungary, 8:30 P.M., 
March 12, 1991); see also i e a  note 224 (survey results). 
102. See supra part II.C.l (discussing ACC, supra note 19, art. 22(2)). 
103. The Republic of Hungary shall ensure human and civil rights for every- 
one within its territory without discrimination of any kind, such as upon 
race, color, sex, language, religion, creed, political or other opinion, nation- 
al or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
. . . .  
The Republic of Hungary shall promote the attainment of the equality 
of rights also by measures aimed at eliminating inequalities of opportuni- 
ty- 
A MAGYAR KGICTARSASAG ~ o T M A N Y A  [Constitution] art. 7WA (Hung.) (1990). 
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cally: whether to compensate for past injustices at all. The 
Court determined that the coalition's current compensation 
proposal would be unconstitutional even if it compensated 
former owners of land and former owners of personal property 
by the same means. Under the decision, any distribution of 
government largess that discriminates between a former owner 
of property and a "non-former owner" (NFO) violates equal 
protection principles. The Court's decision was based on its 
conclusion that the bill's discrimination against NFO's was 
justified by neither an enforceable retroactive property right of 
the former owners nor a scientifically grounded policy objec- 
tive. loq 
In addition, the Court included in the same opinion a deci- 
sion resolving another issue on which the Prime Minister had 
requested an advisory opinion. The latter issue was whether 
the current regime could authorize the taking of land owned by 
agricultural cooperatives without providing compensation. The 
Court held that cooperatively owned property was independent 
of the State and therefore entitled to protection by the "tak- 
ings" clause.105 The decision concluded by stating that the 
Constitution required full compensation for all takings, wheth- 
er the taking was the result of a "single official resolution of ex- 
propriation" or  of any other State authorized infringement 
upon private property rights. 
B. The Political Delicacy and Signi'ance of Property Right 
Reform in Post-Communist Hungary 
The tale of The Land Act Cases is one of property right 
reform. In the United States property right reform brings to 
104. The wording of the decision did not declare the compensation bill to be 
absolutely unconstitutional. Since it was an advisory opinion rather than the 
review of an actual piece of legislation, the court simply stated that a scientific 
policy showing was necessary for the discrimination against NFO's to be constitu- 
tional. Such a showing is impossible. Providing capital to the former owners would 
facilitate the participation of Hungarians in the new free market economy; howev- 
er, providing capital to NFO's would also have this favorable result. In essence, the 
Court characterized compensation to former owners as an affmnative action pro- 
gram that is misdirected because it economically assists a group with neither a 
special need nor a right to the aid. See in#k part 1II.D. 
105. "Expropriation of property shall be allowed only exceptionally and for public 
interests, in cases and ways as determined by law and with full, unconditional and 
immediate compensation." A MAGYAR KC~ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. 
1, art. 13 (Hung.) (1990). 
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mind the State interfering with property interests over which 
private citizens previously thought they had control. In a soci- 
ety emerging from a system where nearly all property rights 
were possessed by the State, property right reform is of a dif- 
ferent nature. It involves the reform of the State's previous all- 
encompassing entitlement and the gradual creation of 
entitlements to State property on behalf of others. Heretofore, 
the reform of property rights was occurring primarily by pur- 
chases from the State. The Land Act Cases raise the specter of 
State decisions t o  reform property rights by the creation of 
entitlements on behalf of certain individuals to certain property 
interests. This subsection explains the political and philosophi- 
cal si@cance of property rights debates and why resolution 
of such debates is a particularly delicate and profound task in 
pos t-communist Hungary. The four subsections which follow 
will then analyze the substantive theories relied upon by the 
Constitutional Court to bring unity to the property right reform 
disputes present in The Land Act Cases. 
1. Political delicacy of property right reform 
According to James Madison, "the most violent strug- 
gles . . . [occur] between the parties interested in reviving, and 
those interested in reforming the antecedent state of proper- 
ty."'OB Avoidance of such factionalism was one of the reasons 
Madison endorsed a political structure that shields property 
rights from the possibility of modification through political 
debate.''' Professor Ronald Dworkin seems to  advocate a dif- 
ferent approach when he states, "Government must constantly 
survey and alter its rules of property, radically if necessary, to 
bring them closer to the ideal of treating people as equals un- 
der the best conception [of eq~ality]."'~~ 
The difference between the advice of Madison and Dworkin 
is due to the different aims of their work; but they share a 
106. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 23 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 
1981) [hereinafter Letter to Jefferson], quoted in Holmes, supra note 85, at 220. 
107. Alexis Toqueville similarly believed that to "polarize politics around the 
question of prosperity . . . would make the establishment of stable democratic 
institutions a more or less permanent impossibility." ROBERT 1MEISI'ER, POLITICAL 
IDENTITY 132 (1990) (describing Tocqueville's model of a "sincere democrat" in the 
aftermath of the 1848 upheavals). 
108. RONALD M. DWORK~N, LAW'S EMPIRE 310 (1986). 
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common premise: both perceive the rules setting forth property 
rights as central to the definition of a community. As a political 
scientist interested in  framing a nation's future, James Madi- 
son concerned himself primarily with maintaining the unity of 
the people of the United States. He realized that if there was 
any dispute capable of tearing the American community apart, 
it was a dispute rooted in conceptions of property rights. 
Dworkin does not focus on unity, but shares an ultimate 
belief in the critical role of property rights. His work consis- 
tently cites the fulfillment of a community's favored conception 
of equality as a basic function of the State. Accordingly, he as- 
serts that the State's most important obligation is adherence to 
a particular concept of equality, rather than to any particular 
set of property rights.lo9 Nevertheless, Dworkin concedes that 
property rights are the area of the law that must be addressed 
to bring about the realization of society's purpose of fulfilling 
the communal conception of equality. Thus, the respective 
thoughts of Dworkin and Madison, reflected in  the above quota- 
tions, rest upon a vision of the rules governing property rights 
as pivotal to the direction of a society. 
Dworkin's philosophical approach urges the modification of 
property rights rather than restraint. He views modification of 
property rights as the way to bring about different types of 
ideal societies. Madison, the political scientist, perceives the 
promotion of the modification of property rights as a way to pit 
proponents of opposing idealized visions against each other and 
thereby catalyze the division of an otherwise unified communi- 
ty. For Dworkin, the modification of property rights can fulfill a 
communal vision. That is true, when the community exists in 
the imagination. However, when the goal is to safeguard the 
unity of a certain grouping of people living within a defined 
geographical area, then debates on how to m o w  property 
rights are dangerous because such debates may divide the 
community. 
Dworkin concedes that radical modifications of rules gov- 
erning property rights can result in the creation of at least 
three fundamentally different types of communities.'" How- 
109. RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 277-78 (1978) (denying 
that there are natural property rights to which all just States must adhere); 
DWORKIN, supra note' 108, at 295-301 (explaining that rules governing property 
rights depend on which conception of equality a society chooses). 
110. See DWORKIN, supra note 108, at 297-301 (outlining three different models 
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ever, he never expresses dismay over the possibility that the 
radical changes in rules governing property rights, which his 
approach permits, might lead a community to divide into two 
or even three communities. For a philosopher, such a result is 
a successful step on the difficult path toward actualizing ideals. 
For a founding father of a unified nation, like Madison, such a 
result is the mark of failure. 
2. Significance of property right reform in post-communist 
Hungary 
How are property rights intimately connected to the basic 
ideals that either support or destroy the unity of a community? 
Property rights define entitlements or the expectations that 
will be guaranteed by law."' The standards underlying a con- 
cept of property rights dictate basic economic  relationship^.'^ 
Accordingly, property rights, along with the expectations they 
sustain, structure the practical aspects of life in which a citizen 
has faith.'13 
of equality based on different notions of property rights: natural rights, resource or 
material end equality, and utilitarian equality). 
111. See Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Theory of Property, in THE RATIONAL 
BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 206, 211-12 (John H. Wigmore & Albert Kocourek 
eds., 1923) ("Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of de- 
riving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in conse- 
quence of the relation in which we stand towards it . . . . Now this expectation, 
this persuasion can only be the work of law."); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, 
Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,46 YALE L.J. 52, 59 & n.10 ("[Dlam- 
age to 'property' is really damage to an expectancy." (citing SCHLOSSMANN, DER 
V E ~ G  8 39 (1934)). 
112. See Bentham, supra note 111, at 212 (The idea of property consists in an 
established expectation; in the persuasion of being able to draw such or such an 
advantage from the thing possessed, according to the nature of the case."); RICH- 
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-15 (1973) (property rights enable 
modern economic relationships to exist); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Ruks, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (basis of tort duties in entitlement theories). 
113. See Bentham, supra note 111, at 211. Bentham emphasizes that 
man is not like the animals, limited to the present; . . . he is susceptible 
of pains and pleasures by anticipation . . . . Expectation is a chain which 
unites our present existence to our future existence . . . . The sensibility 
of man extends through all the links of this chain. 
. . . .  
. . . [Accordingly, property is] a sentiment which exercises power- 
ful . . . influence upon human life. 
Id. 210-11; see a h  Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL .Q. 8, 
13 (1927) (The extent of the power over the life of others which the legal order 
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The resolution of the entitlement issues in The Land Act 
Cases will have dramatic socio-economic consequences. In 
Hungary's free market, rights to capital will play a central role. 
Currently, most Hungarians lack capital. Virtually all of the 
current rights to capital lie with the State or with foreigners. 
The standards that determine whether and how to distribute 
State property rights to  citizenry will determine who is to be 
empowered economically in the future. Citizens could face radi- 
cally different futures depending on whether entitlements are 
determined by the unfettered discretion of a vote in Parlia- 
ment, certain property titles antecedent to the nationalization 
laws, a particular theory of equal protection, a particular theo- 
ry of utilitarianism, or a combination of the above. Foreigners 
as well as Hungarians anxiously await the standards that will 
determine citizen entitlements to State property. Cries by the 
Smallholders contingent in Parliament to  return all property to 
"rightful owners" inhibit foreigners from investing in many 
State properties. 
Despite (and, perhaps, as a result of) their centrality, 
entitlements are based on precarious concepts. There is no 
natural or pre-political substance to property rights. The com- 
munity and State authorities can constmct the nature of prop- 
erty rights in a variety of directions. Absolute property rights 
advocates like Robert Nozick embrace the view that "[tlhings 
come into the world already attached to people having 
entitlements over them."'14 Commentators as diverse as utili- 
tarian Jeremy Bentham,"' post-structuralist Jean  
Baudrillard116 and natural law scholar John Finnis, have 
pointed out that a man-made myth is necessary to  support that 
view. Finnis observes that Nozick neglects to realize that 
"things" did originate ''from nowhere, out of nothing" and that 
therefore "things" only attain si@cance when a normative 
structure of property rights is imposed upon them."' Accord- 
confers on those called owners is not fully appreciated by those who think of the 
law as merely protecting men in their possession. Property law does more. It de- 
termines what men shall acquire."). 
114. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA 160 (1974). 
115. See Bentham, supra note 111, at 206-19. "[Tlhere is no such thing as natu- 
ral property, . . . it is entirely the work of law . . . . Before laws were made there 
was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." Id. at 211-13. 
116. See Jean Baudrillard, Fetishism and Idealogy, in FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SIGN 93, 97, 100 (Cristoph Levin trans., 1981). 
117. JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL AW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 187 & n.30 (1980). 
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ingly, Finnis concludes that diverse systems of property rights, 
including those supported by the standards of "bad men," can 
be "natural."118 
The history of Hungary impresses this idea on the citizen- 
ry, thereby increasing the anxiety accompanying debates on 
property right reform. Although property rights in the United 
States have gone through significant shifts, they have consis- 
tently been constructed upon strains of economic efficiency 
theories, distributional preferences, and certain traditional 
notions of justice.llg By contrast, in Hungary, standards such 
as anti-semitism and other ethnicity based criteria, the divine 
right of the Crown, and communist ideology have governed 
property rights over the years. 
Hungary is now in a position where the standards govern- 
ing the distribution of property rights can head in a variety of 
directions. The text of the amended Constitution provides some 
guidance, although not enough to resolve definitively current 
debates, such as those pertinent to The Land Act Cases. Cer- 
tain standards are out of bounds. Most noticeably, the Consti- 
tution proscribes those standards of the past such as bigotry 
118. See id. at 187-88 (Natural law would require the redistribution of property 
when it would "crystalize and enforce duties the property-holder already had . . . . 
Distributive justice is here, as in most contexts, a relation between citizens, or 
groups and associations within the community, and is the responsibility of those 
citizens and groups."); id. at 251 (referring to Sir John Fortesque's opinion that 
natural law possibly embodies the views of "bad men"); see also Bentham, supra 
note 111, at 214 ("Tyrannical and sanguinary laws have indeed been founded upon 
that property right."). 
Finnis does place some boundaries on just how "bad" "natural" property rules 
can be. "Natural law" requires conformity with the standards of the mature person 
of practical reasonableness, the spoudaios. However, the standards of the spoudaios 
are arguably not pre-defined, but dependent on the culture. FINNIS, supra note 117, 
at 15-19. 
Professor Sunstein also argues against a pre-political state of property rights. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 
(1984). He points out that all current property entitlements have been created by 
State actions and inaction. Sunstein's outlook relies in part, as does Finnis' view, 
on the hermeneutic truth that everything with a significance has a prior normative 
source-i.e., a "thing" does not attain definition "from nowhere, out of nothing." 
Since that normative source is constructed by the community or the State rather 
than by a divine entity, then it is not immune from modification. Id. at 1776; see 
also A. M. Honor& Property, Titk, and Redistribution, in PROPERTY, PROFITS AND 
ECONOMIC JUSTICE 84, 87 (Virginia Held ed., 1980) (Nozick's approach to property 
rules ignores the significance of historical and social context.); infra note 147. 
119. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melarned, supra note 112 (discussing substantive 
bases for entitlements in American common law). 
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and the absolute right of the State to possession of all proper- 
ty.120 The text of the Constitution offers some additional guid- 
ance through clauses providing for equal protection, fundamen- 
tal rights to certain types of welfare,12' and the protection of 
property from State interference without "full, unconditional, 
and immediate  omp pens at ion."'^ As American commentators 
and courts have shown, however, interpretation of an equal 
protection clause, welfare rights, and a compensation clause 
can lead to a wide spectrum of standards. 
Madisonian fears of a "violent struggle" over property 
rights are exacerbated in Hungary by the unavailability of a 
longstanding adherence to a particular conception of property, 
such as that of Locke, which the country could fall back upon 
as the "natural" law. The conflict in Hungary is not between 
those "interested in reviving and those interested in reforming 
the antecedent state of property."lzs All factions appear to re- 
ject the antecedent state of property. The efforts of the 
Smallholders to revive the pre-communist State is just another 
version of post-communist reform. Everybody in Hungary with 
an opinion on the direction of property rights today is a reforrn- 
er. Debate on the issue must occur. Due to this apparent clean 
slate, post-communist Hungary is perhaps the most fertile 
territory imaginable for a Dworkinian approach. For a 
Madisonian, Hungary is a worst case scenario.'" 
In The Land Act Case I, the Constitutional Court attempt- 
120. The limitation or the deprivation of the right of ownership "on the basis of 
branding people and certain social groups or any kind of discrimination may not be 
viewed as a public necessity . . . . The almost complete liquidation of property 
may not be viewed as [in the] public interest today." The Nationalization Case, 
supm note 53, at 8-9. 
121. The Hungarian Constitution guarantees the rights to provisions necessary 
for subsistence in case of old age, illness, disability, widowhood, orphanhood, and unemploy- 
ment due to circumstances beyond the person's control; A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG 
ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. XII, art. 7Q/E(1) (Hung.) (1990); t o  medical services 
and to "opportunities for physical exercise"; id. ch. XII, art. 704); and to education; 
id. ch. XII, art. 70/F, see also id. ch. XII, art. 704 (requiring every citizen "to 
contribute, proportionally to his/her income, and property circumstances, to public 
expenditures."). 
122. Id. ch. I, art. 13; see also id ch. I, art. 9. (setting forth the rights of 
enterprise and free competition and the right of equal treatment of private and 
public property). 
123. See Letter to Jefferson, supra note 106, at 23; see also text accompanying 
note 106. 
124. But see inj5-a note 63 and accompanying text (suggesting Madison did not 
advocate eliminating all debate regarding property rights). 
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ed to resolve some of the most thorny questions in the debate 
over how to reformulate property rights in Hungary. The Court 
had to set forth standards for determining: (1) whether proper- 
ty rights in effect antecedent to the communist regime were 
entitled to recognition; (2) under what circumstances the State 
could selectively distribute property; and (3) under what cir- 
cumstances to require the State to provide compensation for 
interference with property. The following subsections examine 
the substantive theories underlying the Court's holdings on 
these three questions and how the Court's endorsement of 
these theories functions to enhance the capacity of the Court to  
bring unity to the factionalism marking Hungary's current 
property right reform debates. 
C. Retroactive Recognition of Property Rights 
and the Continuity of Law 
Although The Land Act Case I involved decisions about 
property entitlements, the overriding issue in any debate on 
the modification of property rights is which conception of equal- 
ity to pursue. All entitlement rules discriminate by definition. 
They permit one party to have and thereby preclude another 
party from having. Which discriminatory entitlements the Con- 
stitution will permit depends on which substantive theories 
shape the Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause. 
The proposed legislation under review in The Land Act 
Case I would have created entitlements that discriminated 
against NFO'S.'~~ In the United States, those excluded from 
entitlements created by welfare programs have brought analo- 
gous challenges to the State's criteria for distinguishing be- 
tween the entitled and the unentitled. In most cases, the Unit- 
ed States Supreme Court has upheld the allegedly discrimina- 
tory classification because "[gleneral rules are essential if a 
fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of 
efi~iency."'~ In Hungary, however, the potential consequenc- 
es of inclusion in or exclusion from the compensation scheme 
were too great for the Court to take the Land Act's discrim- 
ination lightly. Accordingly, the Court engaged in an equal 
protection analysis of the proposed Act's discrimination be- 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining the term %on-former 
owner" (NFO) and how the Land Act discriminated against NFO's). 
126. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977). 
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tween former owners and NFO's. 
The first issue was whether the discrimination was justi- 
fied by the former owners' alleged fundamental right to the 
compensation funds. The Smallholders claimed 'that such a 
right existed prior to any enactment by the new Parliament. 
Whether the new system would recognize any entitlements 
stemming from rights antecedent to the nationalization laws is 
the one issue of post-communist property right reform most 
likely to lead to one of Madison's feared "violent struggles." 
Virtually the sole issue on the Smallholders' agenda has been 
the reform of property rights to reflect recognition of the pre- 
nationalization rights of peasant land owners. Even after the 
Constitutional Court denied the legitimacy of their claim, the 
steadfast Smallholders threatened to bring down the ruling 
coalition if Parliament did not move quickly to enact a bill 
granting special entitlements based upon pre-nationalization 
property rights. 
The Court rejected the Smallholders' view that pre-nation- 
alization rights had any legitimacy under the present regime. 
The Court cited Article 10(2) of the amended Constitution 
which permits the State to continue in its role as the owner of 
the property and enterprises to which it currently holds ti- 
tle." The Court then added that the titles resulting from na- 
tionalization were "legally sound," because they were in accor- 
dance with acts of Parliament, which supersede any Civil Code 
rules protecting property rights. 
The Court noted that its holding that former owners lacked 
inherent rights to  compensation was not dependent on whether 
the nationalization laws were consistent with the Stalinist 
Constitution in effect at the time of the ena~tments . '~~ The 
127. See A MAGYAR KGZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. I, art. lO(2) 
(indicating that the scope of the exclusive property and economic activity of the 
State shall be defined by law). 
128. In May 1991, the Court ruled on the constitutional challenges to nation- 
alization legislation. The Court held the nationalization laws, which were still on 
the books, to be invalid prospectively. But the Court refused to review the retroac- 
tive validity of the nationalization laws, because ACC art. 43(4)'s preconditions for 
retroactive review were not met. The Court explained: 
[I& would be a grave violation of legal security if legal rules[,] which 
were in effect for quite a substantial period of time and were applied in 
a great number of cases, and the legal relations[,] which developed on the 
basis of those legal rules . . . [,I were [retroactively] repealed. Most of the 
chattels taken into State ownership on the basis of the now [prospedive- 
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Court concluded that even if the nationalization laws somehow 
violated the Stalinist Constitution, "their [invalidation] . . . 
would not [affect] legal relations and the rights and obligations 
resulting therefrom that came into effect prior to the publica- 
tion of [a] decision"'" by the Constitutional Court. The Court 
cited limitations on its jurisdiction to impose solutions to cor- 
rect past injustices as the basis for the latter statement. 
The substance of the Court's reasons for denying the exis- 
tence of pre-nationalization property rights is not readily dis- 
cernable from the text of the opinion. The controlling variable 
appears t o  be the amended Constitution's failure to reject the 
legitimacy of the results of nationalization. However, Article 
10(2), which the Court found decisive, only states, "The scope of 
the exclusive property and economic activities of the State shall 
be defined by law." The "defined by law" clause permits an 
interpretation of Article 10(2) that would allow Parliament to  
adopt legislation defining State property as limited by what 
Parliament perceives to be the rights of former owners. 
In addition, the Court's blanket statement about limita- 
tions on its powers to retroactively "undo" unconstitutional 
interferences with property rights is overstated. There is no 
statute of. limitations on remedies for constitutional violations 
in Hungary. Accordingly, a finding of an unconstitutional in- 
terference with a property right always requires a court to  
''affect the legal relations and the rights and obligations result- 
ing therefrom" by ordering compensation and by enjoining the 
State interference from continuing. The Constitutional Court 
apparently realized that it had overstated the limits on its 
remedial powers, because it added that in other cases retroac- 
tive judicial interference could take place because of the pres- 
ly] repealed rules cannot be found in the form . . . in which they were 
at the time of the nationalization. Certain properties are annihilated, e-g., 
because of city-planning or for other reasons; others were in the mean- 
time altered to a great extent; . . . and finally, a number of properties 
are no longer in the ownership of the Hungarian State. 
The Nationalization Case, supra note 53, at 14-15. This May 1991 decision followed 
the Land Act Case I by "not affect[ing] the ownership right of the State based on" 
nationalization. Id. at 13. The Nationalization Case concluded that legal claims to 
compensation and legal challenges to State ownership could be premised upon the 
texts of the nationalization laws and regulations, see infra note 134, and that any 
compensation or re-privatization legislation had to be in accordance with the con- 
temporary principles of equality set forth in The Land Act Case I .  
129. The Land Act Case I, supra note 49, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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ence of "important interests" of 'legal security or .  . . of the 
petiti~ner."'~~ 
1. The continuity of law principle 
The Court's refusal to deny retroactively the validity of the 
reform of rights effected by the communist nationalization laws 
exemplifies more than responsiveness to Article lO(2) and limi- 
tations on the Court's remedial powers. Implicit in the Court's 
refusal to recognize the current validity of pre-communist 
rights is the Court's embrace of the continuity of law. An un- 
derstanding of the substance of this theoretical strain, which is 
at the foundation of the Court's holding, reveals why it is an 
effective means for resolving this hotly disputed issue of prop- 
erty right reform. 
The continuity of law means that the present regime's 
position of authority is a continuation of the last regime's posi- 
tion of authority. From this point of view, the authority of each 
regime that has been in power throughout history has been 
equally valid during the period of its power. The new regime 
can use its authority to completely modify the current laws. 
But the present authority lacks any power to deny the authori- 
ty of the prior regime's laws during the period of the prior 
regime's existence. In the essay "R,evolutions and Continuity of 
Law," Professor Finnis sets forth a succinct statement of the 
effect of the continuity of law on the current authority of a past 
regime's law reforms: 
A law once validly brought into being, in accordance with the 
criteria of validity then in force, remains valid until either it 
expires according to its own terms or terms implied at its cre- 
ation, or it is repealed in accordance with conditions of repeal 
in force at the time of its repeal.131 
According to the above principle, the negation of property 
rights by the nationalization laws, despite its arguably unethi- 
cal character, legitimately deprived citizens of property rights, 
because those laws conformed with "the criteria of validity then 
in forceH-i.e., the will of the communist government in power 
at the time. 
130. Citing to ACC, supra note 19, arts. 40-43; see also supra note 57 (on term 
"legal security"). 
131. Finnis, supra note 81, at 63. 
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To have been legitimate, the "criteria of validity then in 
force" need not have been related to the consent of the citizen- 
ry. The obsession with having consent serve as a basis for the 
legitimacy of "criteria of validity," especially when the State 
action being validated is the reform of property rights, is an 
Anglo-American phenomenon.'" To others, the legitimacy of 
authority rests primarily upon effectiveness and acquiescence 
rather than on consent.lB There is no doubt that the commu- 
nist regime's nationalization reforms of 'legal relations and the 
rights and obligations resulting . . . had come into force."" 
2. Exceptions 
Finnis adds, however, that an authoritative rule-a rule to 
which the citizenry appears to acquiesce--ean lack legitimacy 
in certain instan~es.'~ These occasions, when effective laws 
are not authoritative, can be applied to  identify those situa- 
tions in which rules, despite their consistency with "criteria of 
validity then in force," should not be treated as the authorita- 
tive rules for a past period. Finnis's two exceptions to  the state- 
ment that "the sheer fact of effectiveness is presumptively (not 
indefeasibly) decisive" are (1) when community rules have des- 
ignated a different party as authority during the past time or 
(2) when the minds of "mature practical reason" during the 
past period rejected the content of the law.'% 
132. see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 146-60 (1985) (explaining that common law principles underly- 
ing takings clause require that a taking by the State be justified by an individual's 
explicit waiver of a property right and not simply by prior notice from the State 
that a taking without just compensation could occur). 
133. See FINNIS, supm note 117, at 247-49; see also H.L.A. HAEET, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 113-14 (1961) (obedience by citizens and acceptance by officials are the 
criteria for validity of a legal system). 
134. Land Act Case I, supra note 49, at 6. In response to a direct challenge to 
the constitutionality of the nationalization laws, the Court refused to invalidate 
retroactively nationalization. Instead, the Court, in accordance with the Finnis 
continuity principle, held that victims of nationalization could currently "enforce 
their rights at the competent organs" if their particular property confiscation 
"exceeded the provisions of the legal rules in effect at that time" when the confisca- 
tion occurred. The Nationalization Case, supra note 53, at 12 (emphasis added); see 
supm note 128. 
135. FINNIS, supra note 117, at 250-51. 
136. Id. at 247-51. In the paragraphs that follow the term "minds of mature 
practical reason" is used to refer to those adhering to the communal order or 
sacred traditions. For a commentary on how to identify the contents of "minds of 
mature practical reason" in contemporary Western society, see PHILIP RIEFF, 
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A way to better understand the operation of these excep- 
tions is to examine the question of the legitimacy of the laws of 
the imperialist in a c~lony.'~' Natives often avoid punishment 
by appearing to comply with a colonizer's rules, while they 
retain steadfastly their own culture's rules. In fact, social scien- 
tists have documented native communities' maintenance of the 
authority of native laws under the camouflage of compliance 
with imperialist r ~ l e s . ' ~  In such a scenario, community rules 
and mature minds can be said to adhere to the native sacred 
order in many areas of the law, rather than to the "effective" 
imperial law. 
A decision that an imperialist law of the past was not 
legitimate and therefore is not entitled to recognition as having 
set forth rules governing that time period, rests upon the deter- 
mination that a distinct cultural rule thrived in "mature 
minds" during that past time period. The effect of such a deci- 
sion is to put forward the present day authority as a continua- 
tion of a pre-existing communal order that is distinct from the 
authority in power during the immediate past.lsS The denial 
FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST (3d. ed. 1979). 
137. The ensuing analysis of the practical application of the exceptions is my 
own and F i ~ i s  may well disagree. 
138. For a description of (1) how independent cultural orders are maintained 
under the "camouflage" of compliance with the rules of imperialists, racists or sex- 
ists; and (2) how the imperialists, racists and sexists cannot perceive the subver- 
sive activity, see LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE (C. Porter trans., 
1985) (developing feminist strategy of mimesis in which women comply with ste- 
reotypes and consequently subvert the stereotypes); Ethan Klingsberg, Narratives of 
the Resistance of Jamaican Women (Apr. 29, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the Brigham Young University Law Review) (discussing works of a Jamaican 
sociologist and novelist and relying on theories of resistance in H. K. Babha, Signs 
Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree Outside 
Delhi, May 1817, 12 C ~ C A L  INQUIRY 144 (Autumn 1985)); see generally M. 
Holquist, Stereotyping in Autobiography and Historiography, 9 POETICS TODAY 453 
(1988) (explaining how compliance with societal stereotypes can simultaneously 
reveal society's imperialist apperception). 
An example of camouflaged compliance would be the Maranos, the Inquisition 
Era Spanish Jews who convinced the Catholic Church that they had converted to  
Catholicism while they actually retained adherence to the rules of Judaism. See 
ABBA EBAN, HERITAGE: CIVILIZATION AND THE JEWS 172 (1984) (The Marams 
" 'were Jews in all but name, and Christians in nothing but form.'"). In such an 
instance, the Church would be considered an illegitimate authority in the Jewish 
community, despite the fad that its authority was in force. 
139. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1505 & n.17 ("Allegiance to the memory of 
an idealized past, with its idealized principles, has historically been the leading 
impetus to constructive social . . . transformation" in English history and according 
to the analyses of Hannah Arendt and of Michael Walzer.). 
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of the continuity of law relegates the prior regime to what 
H.L.A. Hart calls "a period of interrupti~n."'~~ The trials of 
Nazis in Western Europe after World War I1 attempted t o  
achieve this effect. For example, the determination by the 
French that rules of "war crimes" and "crimes against humani- 
ty" governed behavior on French territory during World War 11, 
rather than the Nazi laws in force a t  the time,"' has been 
portrayed as France's attempt to distinguish its culture from 
that of the Nazis.'" Similarly, Czechoslovakia's current 
lustrace- or "communist purgation" process is an attempt to  
associate the present authority with a community distinct from 
the authority of communism. 
Arguably the principle of the continuity of law should have 
another exception: The present regime should deny the continu- 
ity of law when the prior regime's rule conflicts with universal 
mores of conduct. However, reliance on universal norms as a 
separate exception to Finnis's continuity principle is superflu- 
ous and potentially misleading. If a prior regime's rule trans- 
gresses a universal rule, then it will activate the aforemen- 
tioned exception on conflicts with the mature, native order. 
Moreover, the formulation and application of transcendent 
140. HART, supra note 133, at 115-16. Hart insists that the 'questions . . . as to 
what was or was not law' in the territory during the period of interruption . . . 
may not be . . . [questions] of fact." Id. at 115. He is willing to grant the new 
regime unfettered discretion to pass laws which label the prior era a "period of in- 
terruption" and which retroactively deem the prior regime's rules to have been 
illegitimate. Hart dismisses attempts to evaluate empirically the legitimacy of a 
prior regime's authority. He explains that the determination of the stage at which 
one legal system has legitimate authority and a suppressed legal rule or system 
has "ceased to exist is a thing not susceptible of any exact determination." Id. I 
tend to agree on one level. This subsection's (III.C.2) criteria of legitimacy may not 
be subject to  exact results. Moreover, the standard favors recognition of the va- 
lidity of a prior regim-like the communists-which utilized ruthless methods to 
eliminate virtually all space for private adherence to a distinct, native order. 
But on another level, Hart's willingness to ignore empirical evaluation exhibits 
a lack of foresight into the dangers which can result from a new regime's unfet- 
tered discretion to deny the continuity of law. The decision whether to recognize 
the continuity of law must have an empirical basis to avoid the dangers of unin- 
tended self-condemnation and neglect of contemporary values. See discussion infra 
part III.C.3. 
141. Despite the frequent portrayal of Nazi authority as Yawless," the codes 
were filled with positivist enactments authorizing the regime's vast powers. See 
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JEWSALEM 290 (1964) Nazi atrocities "took place 
within a legal order. That, indeed, was their outstanding characteristic."). 
142. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial 
of &us Barbie, 98 Y m  L.J. 1321, 1339 (1989). 
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rules is a precarious exercise. Otto Kirchheimer relates the 
difficulties which the Nuremberg tribunals had defining "uni- 
versal" concepts like war crimes, crimes against the peace, and 
crimes against humanity." The basis for those difficulties 
was the diversity of local norms among the AUies.14 Conse- 
quently, the Nuremberg tribunals based charges whenever 
possible on war-crime charges derived from "all the traditional 
common crimes."'" The implicit justification for the applica- 
tion of traditional, domestic laws of crimes to the Nazis is the 
aforementioned "mature, native order" exception.'" 
143. OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE TO 
POLITICAL ENDS 323-27 (1961). Similar problems plagued the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo following World War IX. See Kopelman, Ideolo- 
gy and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J .  I m .  L. & POL. 373, 435 (1991) ("[Tlhe failed attempt 
at defining 'aggression' in the Tribunal's Charter . . . revealed the Allies as a 
shaky coalition of victor nations capable of uniting only for the immediate purpose 
of dispatching the vanquished."). 
144. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 143, at 323-27. The definition of war crimes was 
subject to the "uncertain and shifting boundary lines of warfare," id. at 324; the 
defmition of crimes against peace was undermined by the post-War dissension 
among the Allies, id. at 325; and crimes against humanity suffered from the "ab- 
sence of a boundary line between atrocity beyond the pale and legitimate policy 
reserved for the individual state," id. at 326. 
145. Id. at 323-27. 
146. A similar outlook on trials of Nazis can be derived from HART, supra note 
133. At one point, Hart severely criticizes a post-World War 11 German Court of 
Appeals decision upholding the conviction of a Nazi informant. Id. at 204-07. Hart 
defends the convict as having complied with valid Nazi era laws. He reasons that 
the Nazi laws were valid based on "the distinction between what law is and what 
law ought to be." Id. at 206. Earlier in m e  Concept of Law, Hart seems to contra- 
dict his stance on the German Court of Appeals ruling. He defends a new regime's 
right to declare a prior regime's laws retroactively invalid. Id. at 115-16; see supra 
note 140. 
Hart's apparent contradiction can be resolved. There is a difference between the 
basis for the denial of the continuity of law by the German Court and by Hart's 
hypothetical new regime. The faulted German Court relied on universal, higher law 
principles--a "sense of justice." HAIYT, supra note 133, at 254-55. By contrast, the 
hypothetical new regime's justifiable denial of the continuity of law is founded on a 
vision of the prior regime as "a period of interruption." Id. at 115-16. The "period 
of interruption" theory is consistent with the approach advocated by this Article; it 
invalidates a prior regime's law based on the view that the true, native order was 
suppressed during the prior regime and has been resurrected by the new regime. 
See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
H a ~ a h  Arendt makes a similar point in her argument that the Israeli 
judiciary's authority in the E i c h m a ~  trial would have been more well-founded if it 
had been founded on a "territorial principlew rather than on "universal jurisdiction." 
See ARENDT, supra note 141, at 258-63. Under the territorial principle, Eichmann 
would have been charged for infringement upon the legal order of the Jewish 
community rather than for a nebulous universal violation. Arendt explains that the 
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Application of transcendent norms, without identification 
of a basis in the particular community, is especially inappropri- 
ate in the realm of property rights. While many societies are 
prone to believe that visions of a free conscience are natural 
and universal, the idea of natural, universal rights to  property 
is clearly an oxymoron.147 The contours of property rights on- 
trials of Nazis in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Russia, and 
France were premised upon the "territorial principle" or infringement upon the dis- 
tinct orders of those lands. Id. Later, however, Arendt changes perspectives and 
argues for the establishment of an international tribunal with "universal jurisdic- 
tion* in the case of genocide, because genocide is a crime beyond any common 
crime within a community. Id. at 267-77. 
Resurrection of the "mature, native order" which preceded the prior regime is 
also more effective than reliance on assertions of universal laws when the prior 
regime is put on trial by the successor. The three main defenses in so called 
"successor trials" are (1) the act of State doctrine, (2) the superior orders defense, 
and (3) the claim that the conviction constitutes retroactive justice in violation of 
ex post facto principles. See, e.g., WILLIAM J .  BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG 40- 
66, 130-44 (1970) (international and domestic lawyers' critiques of problems with 
Nuremberg trials). With regard to the first two defenses, the resurrection of the 
traditional law preceding the prior regime de-legitimizes the acts of the prior State 
and the superior orders of the prior regime. With regard to the third defense, the 
charges are not based upon malleable universal rules which appear to have been 
created especially for the occasion, but upon longstanding, native traditions. 
For a survey of the international law instruments available for prosecution of a 
prior regime's human rights violations and an argument in favor of their potential 
effectiveness, see Roht-Aniaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute 
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449 (1990). 
147. See discussion supra part 1II.B. The following statement reveals a typical 
Western distinction between norms that are universal and norms that are products 
of a particular legal system and therefore inherently flexible: "[Plroperty (unlike 
freedom of conscience, for example) could not exist without the mechanism of 
government." Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of 
hivate hoper@, in CONSIT~~~~ONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 241, 
264. Even freedom of conscience, however, is a particularistic norm. For example, a 
community of monks would set forth different rules to create a free conscience 
than would a community of so-called "free-thinkers." Nedelsky hints that she is 
aware that other rights are no more absolute and transcendent than property 
rights: "[Plroperty is, of all the basic rights, perhaps most obviously the creation of 
the state . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). 
In Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), discussed in the next subsection, 
Chief Justice Marshall recognized the continuity of a British legal rule on property 
rights even though it was "opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized 
nations." Id. at 591. "[P]rinciples of abstract justice" amounted only to "the private 
and speculative opinions of individuals," because the rule was consistent with the 
particular "system under which the country had been settled" and the particular 
circumstances of the settlement. Id. at 572, 588, 591. 
Michel Foucault dedicates his scholarship to illustrating that all that is consid- 
ered "naturaln-from sexual behavior to the ideals of political liberation 
movements--are concepts constructed by humans with historicist rather than divine 
or natural origins. See infb note 204. 
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ly exist as a result of a country's particular legal rules, and 
therefore certain contours can be "naturaln only with regard to 
a particular community or set of communities which have the 
same rules simultaneously. 
Another misleading consideration in continuity of law de- 
terminations is whether the prior regime legally authorized the 
present regime. Under the Finnis approach, such a technical, 
legalistic factor is irrelevant to the continuity of law. Simply 
because a prior regime legally authorized a subsequent regime, 
as was the case in the Hungarian transition, does not mean 
that the prior regime's law is entitled to retroactive recognition. 
The prior regime's laws may lack legitimacy and the present 
regime's authority does not rest on the prior regime's authori- 
zation. Conversely, if a regime takes power by technically ille- 
gal means, such as a coup d'etat, then the continuity of law 
still may apply. Professor Finnis points to several examples 
from British history in which a monarch forcibly regained pow- 
er from a usurper. The monarch then recognized the validity of 
the usurper's laws during the prior period, because the usurper 
had legitimate authority during that period? The United 
States Constitution's supersession of the Articles of Confedera- 
tion is another example of a technically illegal transition in 
which the continuity of law prevailed.'" 
148. See Finnis, supra note 81, at 44-61 (criticizing Hans Kelsen's focus on 
Y awful devolutionw). 
149. Neither the Articles of Confederation nor State laws authorized the methods 
used to ratify the Constitution. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 6, at 456-57 & n.3. 
Nevertheless, the continuity of law was never doubted. James Madison wrote that, 
even without a reference in the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, 5 1, the 
debts and property rights against and in favor of the United States which had 
been established under the Articles would retain validity under the Constitution. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also infra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the assumption of the prior 
regime's debts as a manifestation of the continuity of law). Professor Ackerman 
notes that the framers considered it irrelevant to search the Articles to find legal 
authority for the Constitution's ratification. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 456-57 & 
n.3. A basis in popular sovereignty was all that was necessary "to legitimate their 
act of constitutional creation." Id. at 457 n.3. Ackerman's assertion that popular 
sovereignty is the sole legitimating factor and that attempts to "legalizew the 
Constitution's ratification are unnecessary parallels Finnis's emphasis on the 
"mature sector of society" in response to Kelsen's "pure law" approach to changes 
of regime. As long as "popular sovereignty" or the "mature sector of society" 
(spoudaia polis) is at the foundation of the prior and new regimes, then the 
continuity of law should be -ed without regard to whether the prior regime 
legally authorized the new regime. 
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3. Problems accompanyingthe denial of the continuity of law 
a. Unintended self-condemnation. Two problems may 
plague denials of the continuity of law. The first problem is 
that the present regime can be easily construed as a continua- 
tion of the past regime. In Czechoslovakia for example, the 
lustrace is showing that the authority of the prior regime was 
of such a pervasive nature that nobody outside of prison main- 
tained a distinct set of cultural rules under the camouflage of 
compliance with communism. The revelations of the lustrace 
may eliminate the capacity of the present regime to put itself 
forward as a continuation of a communal order that was dis- 
tinct from the authority of communism. 
Similar links existed between the supporters of British 
oppression of Native American Indians and the community 
authorizing the independent American government. Conse- 
quently, Chief Justice Marshall in 1823 upheld the continuity 
of a British rule on Indian rights, rather than denying the 
continuity of law and simultaneously condemning the values 
and authority of the contemporary American government. The 
dispute in Johnson v. ~ ' I n t o s h ' ~  was whether Indians, in 
years prior to the independence of the colonies (1773 and 1775), 
could have made valid land sales to private individuals. Follow- 
ing the principle of the continuity of law, Chief Justice Mar- 
shall looked to the legal rule in force in 1773 and 1775. The 
British legal rule-which was "maintained and established as 
far west as the river Mississippi, by the swordn-permitted 
Indians to  possess rights to  occupy land, but prohibited their 
possession of rights to  sell that land.'" 
Chief Justice Marshall's continuity of law inquiry, like the 
approach derived from Finnis, did not end with the identifica- 
tion of the legal rule in force in 1773 and 1775. Two potential 
obstacles to  Marshall's recognition of the British legal rule 
stemmed from the rule's "wantonly oppress[iveIn nature. The 
first obstacle was the conflict between the. British rule and 
"principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things 
has impressed on the mind of his creature man." Marshall 
150. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
151. Id. at 587-88. The European principle of "discovery gave [Great Britain] an 
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or 
conquest." Id. at 587. 
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disposed of this argument by dismissing the applicability of 
"abstract justice" to  a rule that is consistent with "that system 
under which the country has been settled" and the particular 
circumstances of that settlement. Flaws with the "original 
justice of the British rule" merely amounted to "the private and 
speculative opinions of individuals." 
The second obstacle, which stemmed from the "wantonly 
oppress[ivel" nature of the British rule, was that it inhibited 
the Indians from "separat[ing] from their ancient connexions." 
The Indians had not accepted the British rule's validity and 
therefore America had not become "one people" under one au- 
thority. Marshall therefore perceived the legitimacy of the 
British rule's authority over the Indians to be q~estionab1e.l~~ 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court applied the British rule 
to the pre-Revolution transactions. Marshall succinctly stated 
the basis for his acceptance of the continuity of the British law: 
"The British government . . . was then our government," while 
those who authorized the sales by Indians chiefs were "their 
people."lrn The "civilized inhabitants [who] now hold this 
country," were part of the British community in 1773 and 1775, 
as opposed to a community of   savage^."'^ The continuity be- 
tween the oppressors of American Indians and the post-Revolu- 
tion American authorities was further exemplified by the in- 
corporation of the British rule in State and federal laws follow- 
ing the Revolution. The United States was the heir to the Brit- 
ish with regard to the "savages," rather than the heir to either 
the Indian order or a higher order of "abstract justice." Johnson 
v. WIntosh aptly avoided a condemnation of the cherished 
regime of the present which accompanies the denial of the 
continuity of law when the prior regime and the present regime 
152. [Hhmanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights of the 
conquered to property should remain unimpaired . . . [so] that [the con- 
quered people's] confidence in their security should gradually banish the 
painfbl sense of being separated fiom their ancient connexions and united 
by force with strangers. 
When the conquest is complete, and the conquered inhabitants can be 
blended with the conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people, pub- 
lic opinion, which not even the conqueror can disregard, imposes these 
restraints upon him; and he c a ~ o t  neglect them without injury to his 
fame, and hazard to his power. 
Id. at 589-90. 
153. Id at 588 (emphasis added). 
154. Id. at 587 (emphasis added). 
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are closely linked. 
b. Neglect of contemporary values. The second potential 
problem with the denial of the continuity of law is that contem- 
porary values often fail to  emerge. If the continuity of law is 
denied, then the current authority must adopt rules that sup- 
posedly reflect the true communal order suppressed during the 
prior regime's rule. These laws often function as a vehicle to 
make a statement that "we" of the present are not "them" of 
the past, rather than as an expression of the affmnative beliefs 
of the present community. At the Klaus Barbie trial, the legal 
rules stated only that Nazism was unlawfiil, without any elabo- 
ration of what substantive, French standards of conduct made 
Nazism unla~fu1. l~  The lustrace emphasis is also basically 
anti-communist, without an emphasis on what distinctly 
Czechoslovakian values distinguish communist acts as trans- 
gressive. 
c. The continuity of nationalization. Both of the aforemen- 
tioned problems would have applied to Hungary had the Court 
denied the continuity of the nationalization laws' reform of 
property rights. First, condemnation of the supporters of na- 
tionalization as anti-Hungarian would have been a condemna- 
tion of the Hungarian community rather than of outsiders.ls6 
While it is true that elements of violent enforcement and Soviet 
imperialism characterized communist rule in Hungary, it would 
be false to claim that a Lockean culture existed over the last 
four decades beneath a camouflage of Hungarian compliance 
with the communist nationalization laws. Although commu- 
nism arguably suppressed a traditional strain of free market 
activity in Hungarian society,ls7 nationalization did not in- 
155. See Binder, supra note 142, at 1328, 1339-55. 
156. Cf. SBjo, supra note 16, at 12 11.19. 
Obviously there is a general tendency in the Hungarian transformation 
process to offer survival possibilities for many supporters of the commu- 
nist regime. As a matter of fad there were too many collaborators or at 
least non-resistants. Hungary (and the GDR or Romania) is different from 
Poland where "you exped the great divide to lie between opposition and 
collaboration, black and white, the craven and the brave." 
Id. (quoting TIMOTHY G. ASH, THE USES OF ADVERSITY 148-49 (1989)). 
157. Elem& Hankiss writes, "Until the late 1940s Hungary was a market econo- 
my. Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial spirit had a long tradition both in the 
cities and in some of the mral areas." Elem& Hankiss, Between Ttvo Worlds, in 
RESEARCH REVIEW: PROJECT NO. 2, CHANGING VALUES IN HUNGARIAN SOCIETY 39, 
44 (P. Somalai ed., 1989). Hankiss further notes that "without the skills, attitudes, 
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fringe upon an innate Hungarian tradition of natural property 
rights. Prior to the communists' rise to power in 1947, property 
rights had been founded upon State ordered confiscations from 
large landowners in 1945,'~ from Germans in 1945,'" and 
from Jews during World War II.'* Moreover, prior to the rise 
of communism, the "large-scale involvement of the Hungarian 
government in the country's economy [reached] the point where 
it is not an exaggeration t o  say that the nationalization of the 
Hungarian economy began during World War II."'6' 
and values transmitted by this tradition, the 'second economy' could not have taken 
off so easily and swiftly in the 1960s and 1970s."). Id. at 44 n.4. 
158. See Charles Gati, Fmm Libemtion to Revolution, in A HISTORY OF HUNGARY 
370 (P. Sugar et. al. eds., 1990) (YTIthe Land Reform Act of 1945 . . . provided for 
the expropriation of estates larger than one thousand hold (1,420 acres) and the 
seizure of some smaller estates as well."). Viktor Orbtin also notes that "the benefi- 
ciaries of the 1945 land reform [which broke up large estates and distributed land 
to individual farmers] obtained their property precisely because of the same viola- 
tion of the sanctity of property as those who received theirs as a result of 
collectivization." Viktor Orb&, The Case Against Compensation, UNCAPTIVE MINDS, 
Summer 1991, at 35 (speech by leader of FIDESZ Party in Parliament on February 
4, 1991) (brackets in original). 
159. See Celestine Bohlen, Hungarians Debate How Far Back to Go to Right Old 
Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at Al, A6 ("Ethnic Germans estimate that 
980,000 acres and about 60,000 homes were seized aRer the war."). 
In 1945, following the end of World War 11, Hungary not only redistributed to 
the poor the land of ethnic Germans, but also large amounts of property owned by 
"Horthy fascists," the Church, as well as banks and other private enterprises 
involved with Germany. J. HOENSCH, A H I ~ R Y  OF MODERN HUNGARY 169 (K. 
Traynor trans., 1988). 
160. Hungarian Jews not only lost businesses under various World War I1 prop- 
erty reform laws, see L. Tilkovszky, The Late Interwar Years and World War 11, in 
A HISTORY OF HUNGARY, supra note 158 (discussing transfer of property rights to 
"high ranking officials and military leaders" under "[tlhe law of 1942 which nation- 
alized land owned by Jews"), but also had land expropriated pursuant to decrees 
issued in the 1920s. See HOENSCH, supra note 159, at 106. Much of the land 
expropriated in the 1920s ended up in the hands of Admiral Horthy's 18,000 mem- 
ber Order of Heroes. The State granted each member of this ultra-patriotic organi- 
zation a farm of up to 50 hectares at no charge. Id. at 107. Hungarian participa- 
tion in the Holocaust also led to confiscations h m  Jews. See Bohlen, supra note 
159 ("An estimated 337,000 properties belonging to [Hungarian] Jews who died in 
Nazi concentration camps were turned over . . . under deeds that showed that the 
former owners had died of 'poisoning.' "). 
The Constitutional Court similarly traced the "gradual[]" implementation of 
nationalization back to the racist takings of the World War I1 era and the post- 
War land reform: "At the beginning, this was directed at certain social groups, 
then it was executed according to the size of the property, and finally, the nearly 
complete liquidation of property took place." See The Nationalization Case, supra 
note 53 (holding nationalization laws prospectively unconstitutional). 
161. Gyorgy Ranki, The Hungarian Economy in the Late Interwar Years, in A 
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The second problem with the argument against the conti- 
nuity of law in Hungary is that it would hinder the develop- 
ment of property right reforms that reflect the views of contem- 
porary Hungary. The explanation of the first problem indicates 
that Hungary has a flexible tradition in the realm of property 
rights. The property rights of a particular moment prior to 
1947 are not distinctly Hungarian and have no definitive con- 
nections to the present Hungarian community. The recognition 
of pre-communist rights would be part of an effort to deny the 
connections between the prior regime and the Hungarian com- 
munity, rather than the result of any connection between the 
pre-communist order and the present Hungarian community. 
The Court's validation of pre-communist rights would amount 
to an imposition on Hungary of fimdamental rights that have 
no roots in the current community.'" 
HISTORY OF HUNGARY, supra note 158, at 366. Other precommunist departures 
from the sanctity of property rights occurred in 1941 and December 1945. In 1941, 
Hungary authorized the expropriation of non-Magyar property in the territories re- 
gained from Hungary's neighbors during World War 11. See HOENSCH, supra note 
159. Under the 1945 armistice, those territories were returned to Hungary's neigh- 
bors. 
On November 7, 1945, Hungarians elected a Parliament in the "the freest and 
least rigged of any [national election] ever held in Hungary." Id. at 173. On 
December 6, 1945, that Parliament voted to place the mines %rider state 
control-amounting in practice t o  nationalization." Id. at 174. That measure, 
introduced by the Communist Party, which only had 17% of the seats, passed with 
the support of popularly elected left wing leaders of the Smallholders Party (57% 
of the seats) and the Social Democrat Party (17% of the seats). Id. at 173-74. 
From one perspective, the various pre-1947 property reforms and confiscations 
reaf3hned the centrality of free market property rules in Hungary. If free market 
property rules had not also been in force in pre-1947 Hungary, then the pre-1947 
takings would not have been able to  achieve their purposes of harming and bene- 
fitting respective sedors. However, the pre-1947 reforms and confiscations were not 
considered to have been unlawful stealing any more than the confiscations by the 
Crown in nineteenth century Hungary. Instead, those pre-1947 takings were 
considered natural departures from free market principles for the sake of various 
higher State purposes, such as bigotry and opposition to aristocracy. The postc1947 
reform of property rights under nationalization was in this same tradition of 
serving a State principle superior to free market rules. 
The various post-1947 nationalization programs reflected Hungws ambivalence 
toward respect for and infringement upon property rights. At no time was all 
private property ordered to be nationalized. Moreover, some of the nationalization 
laws had provisions for compensation and permitted portions of the economy to 
remain subject to private control. 
162. See Ethan Klingsberg, "Letter to the Editor," The New York Times Maga- 
zine, Dec. 1, 1991 (Article on the return of property in the former G.D.R. to pre- 
communist owners showed that the result was the subordination of "the contempo- 
rary German community's interests" to "the interests of someone from another era 
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Madison might have viewed such a denial of the continuity 
of law as an ingenious solution. The inevitable "violent strug- 
gle" accompanying the creation of new property rules after the 
rejection of communism could be avoided simply by structuring 
new entitlements on the basis of those property rights in exis- 
tence prior to  communism. It is more likely, however, that 
Madison would have endorsed the continuity of law approach 
taken by the Constitutional Court. One of the bases of 
Madison's opposition to the reform of property rights was that 
the current state of property rights reflected the existing com- 
munal traditions. His fear was that if the topic was opened up 
for debate, then the unity might disintegrate. In contrast, Hun- 
gary has yet to  produce a stable communal vision of property 
rights with which to  begin before Madisonian prudence can be 
invoked. The suppression of debate on a topic on which a com- 
munal consensus does not yet exist would infringe on 
Madison's basic notions of liberty and popular ~overeignty.'~ 
The Court's decision t o  uphold the continuity of law did not 
resolve the debate, but it enabled the debate to  avoid certain 
obstacles. Recognition of the continuity of law eliminates the 
credibility of the distracting and false claim that pre-commu- 
nist entitlements are the true Hungarian state of affairs. The 
Court's decision directs energies away from futile efforts to 
distinguish the past four decades and toward the constructive 
and, as [the former owner] has come to realize, another place."). 
163. Madison advocated neither the elimination of all factionalism stemming 
from property rights nor the imposition of constitutional rules that do not emanate 
from the people. 
On Madison's embrace of factionalism, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Madison indicated that there were 
two ways to eliminate the "disease" of factions. First, one could eliminate the 
liberty "essential to its existence," but that would be "worse than the disease" 
itself. A second option was "giving to every citizen the same opinions" which is 
"impracticable"). 
Later in the same essay, Madison recognized that "the most common and dura- 
ble source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property." 
Id. at 79. This recognition indicates that Madison's response to Jefferson (that 
property rules must remain stable and that the unequal distribution of property 
must not be interfered with by the State, see supra part II1.B) assures the continu- 
ation of factionalism, rather than serving to eliminate factionalism. Despite 
Madison's reluctance to permit upheavals, as indicated in his response to Jefferson, 
Madison realized that even by taking a prudent approach he was permitting wide- 
spread factionalism. 
On Madison's vision of popular sovereignty, see McConnell, supra note 6 (the 
people are the fountain of all power). 
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and pressing project of communal self-definition. 
D. The Prospective Creation of Property Rights: 
The Rejection of Metaphysical Justifications 
in Favor of Scientific Policy Objectives 
The Land Act Case I did not end after the Court's refusal 
to recognize pre-communist rights. The Constitutional Court 
did not just take away the possibility of using pre-communist 
rights as guideposts for the creation of entitlements and then 
leave Parliament to its "violent struggle." The Court proceeded 
to set forth constitutionally permissible standards for determin- 
ing entitlements. The Court held that the grant of an exclusive 
entitlement to former owners, a party who lacked a prior fun- 
damental right to such a property interest, would only be per- 
mitted if "such a distribution of State property would have a 
more favorable total social result than equal treatment, and if 
it undoubtedly follows from the facts that another solution that 
9 164 is not discriminatory against non-owners [NFO s ] would 
not be comparable to this [total soc ia  result."lBS The opinion 
explained that to establish a "more favorable total social re- 
sult," "it is necessary [for the Parliament] to give a complete 
account of the interests of both the preferred and discriminated 
groups together with the method of evaluati~n."'~ While the 
Court did not elaborate further on the contours of "a more fa- 
vorable total social result," it implied that the "total social 
result" is the product of an empirically based, utilitarian policy 
calculation and that the precise nature of the formula is subject 
to the discretion of Parliament. 
The only apparent justification for Parliament's proposed 
creation of a discriminatory entitlement on behalf of the former 
owners was to remedy injustices of the past. The Court did not 
have to  make a final determination on whether the explanation 
would ultimately satisfy the "favorable total social result" stan- 
dard, because The Land Act Case I was a request for an adviso- 
ry interpretation of the Constitution, rather than for a review 
of a .  actual enactment or proposed enactment. The Constitu- 
tional Court observed, however, that the basis appeared to be 
1 See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term %on-former 
owner" W O )  and how the Land Act's provisions discriminated against NFO's). 
165. The Land Act Case I ,  supra note 49, at 9. 
166. Id. at 10. 
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inadequate. lp7 
Parliament's sense of justice could only support the dis- 
criminatory distribution of State property if the roots of this 
sense of justice could be traced beyond the metaphysical realm 
of moral sentiments t o  a policy-oriented, forward-looking "fa- 
vorable total social result" formula. Nationalization undoubted- 
ly had harmed the former owners. Nevertheless, the entitle- 
ment of the former owners to benefits would neither meet a 
special need of assistance, which they have and other Hungari- 
ans lack, nor benefit the entire community more than a non- 
discriminatory scheme ~ o u l d . ' ~  
167. Another possible justification was the facilitation of domestic entrepreneurial 
activity. The argument was quickly dismissed because providing entitlements only 
to former owners did not encourage fkee market activity anymore than distributing 
the State largess in a non-discriminatory manner (to all citizens without regard to 
possession of pre-communist rights). 
168. I have included the satisfaction of individual special needs as falling within 
the penumbra of "favorable total social result." See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 
U.S. 55, 70 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (government can address special needs 
as part of efforts to improve community). A focus on addressing special needs to 
bring about a "more favorable total social result" must include consideration of the 
new needs created by the cost of benefitting a special need. For an attempt to give 
content to the term "special needs" based upon a communal consensus of basic 
rights, see Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of 
Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1976). 
Any demoralization suffered by the former owners as a result of nationalization 
has to be measured by nationalization's infringement upon their expectations. The 
discussion of retroactivity and the continuity of law in the previous section shows 
that nationalization did not violate any fundamental vision of property rights 
prevalent in Hungary; therefore, the special needs of the former owners for com- 
pensation to help them overcome the demoralization of nationalization are minimal. 
See Frank I .  Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun- 
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (explaining 
demoralization costs). 
A variety of economic fadors dictate against the provision of benefits to pre-na- 
tionalization property owners such as the lack of sufficient knds in the Hungarian 
Treasury, the administrative costs of verifying pre-communist rights, and the risk 
of inflation. 
Most compensation proposals provide pre-nationalization owners with preferenc- 
es or subsidized opportunities to purchase their former properties. Such an enad- 
ment would be costly. Many years may pass before the State Property Agency and 
the courts wi l l  be able to clarify which properties have former owners with veriti- 
able pre-nationalization titles. The State Property Agency may have to delay the 
privatization of many properties while claims to preferences (based on precommu- 
nist rights) are pending. Furthermore, investors will continue to hesitate to pur- 
chase property out of fear that a "rightful" owner may be identified. Moreover, the 
owners of those State properties that have become private, such as agricultural 
cooperatives, will hesitate to invest in the long-term future because of the probabil- 
ity of a "righthl" owner making a claim. Current private owners who lose property 
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At first glance, it appears strange for a court to hold that a 
legislature's sense of justice is insufficient grounds for the cre- 
ation of an entitlement. Metaphysically based concepts of jus- 
tice have been present in determinations in the United States 
of whether an adequate justification exists for a discriminatory 
distribution of entitlements. For example, a fundamental con- 
stitutional right often only has a basis in a metaphysical sense 
of justice,lBg and satisfaction of such a right is a' sufficient 
grounds for the creation of ap entitlement to State proper- 
ty.170 On occasion, a metaphysical sense of justice also has 
played a role in the United States Congress' formation of 
entitlements, like those proposed in The Land Act Case I, that 
do not emanate directly from a fundamental right in the Con- 
stitution. For instance, a metaphysical sense of justice motivat- 
ed the United States Congress recently to grant entitlements to 
those who had been interned in concentration camps during 
World War I1 with the approval of the Supreme Court. The 
legal status of the recently entitled victims of Korematsu v. 
United  state^"^ was similar to that of the Hungarian victims 
of nationalization. According to the courts, both groups lacked a 
prior fundamental right to the entitlements. Moreover, all of 
the members of each group did not necessarily currently pos- 
sess a special, forward-looking need for the entitlement.'" 
The only basis for the entitlement was morality. However, a 
to %ghtfuln owners will suffer demoralization. 
For a discussion of how the msts of remedying past injustices outweigh the 
benefits in America, see EPSTEIN, supra note 132, at 346-49. 
169. See Ronald Dworkin, Appendix: A Reply to Critics, in TAKING RIGI-~~S SERI- 
OUSLY, supm note 109, at 291, 364-68 (by definition, rights do not have a utilitari- 
an justification). 
170. These metaphysically-based rights are inherent rights existing prior to any 
legislative action. See Frank I. Michelman, h p e r t y  as a Constitutional Right, 38 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981) (distinguishing between "direct rights" to proper- 
ty which emanate fkom the Constitution and "indirect rights" to property which are 
created by a government promise); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL LAW 685-701 (1988) (distinguishing between inherent or core rights and 
positivist rights). 
171. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding constitutionality of internment of Japanese 
Americans during World War 11). 
172. It is arguable that the victims of World War I1 internments possessed a 
special need for the funds to enable recovery from their demoralization. Cf. 
Michelman, supra note 168 (fitting justice concerns into utilitarian calculation). It 
would be more difficult to argue that former owners are emerging fkom Hungary's 
four decades of communism any more demoralized than the rest of the Hungarian 
people. 
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metaphysical sentiment such as justice or morality is rarely the 
sole basis for the creation of an entitlement to property in the 
United States. Anglo-American law has a longstanding tradi- 
tion of limiting the scope of legal interference to realms of sci- 
entific policy, as opposed to pure morality.'" Accordingly, in 
the absence of a prior fundamental right, the presence of a sci- 
entific policy justification is usually necessary in the United 
States for Congress to create an e11tit1ement.l~~ 
Opinions in a recent United States case analogous to The 
Land Act Case I offer insights into the substance of the ratio- 
nale for invoking the scientific-policy/metaphysics dichotomy in 
the equal protection scrutiny of entitlements. In Zobel v. Wil- 
liams,'" the United States Supreme Court struck down an 
173. For a discussion of the history of purely moral justifications for interference 
by the State in America, see Duncan K e ~ e d y ,  Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjzldication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1725-28 (1976). Kennedy relates how 
prior to the Civil War, the American legal system limited its non-constitutional 
justifications for interference to the pursuit of policy objectives as opposed to purely 
moral aims. After the Civil War, justifications for legal interference took the form 
of an ethic which had a strong practical, scientific dimension; simultaneously, ju- 
risprudence experienced "the total disappearance of religious arguments, and the 
fading of overtly moralistic discussions." Id. at 1728. 
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), lists the 
rare and delicate situations in which the State has "traditionally concerned itself 
with the moral soundness of its people." Kennedy, supra, at 1728. Yet even those 
situations--such as restrictions upon obscenity and homosexual condudcdo not 
pursue metaphysical or moral objectives without regard for scientific policy con- 
cerns. Obscenity restrictions apply only to expression without redeeming social 
merit, see Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and cannot apply to ob- 
scene expression without any conceivable social ramifications. See Stanley v. Geor- 
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy prohibition 
because homosexuality "malign[s]" people just as rape does. Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Burger, CJ., concurring). Perhaps Chief Justice Burger's 
opinion in Bowers shows that virtually any moral viewpoint can masquerade as a 
policy in the pursuit of the general welfare. I will explain at the end of this 
section why the identification of some sort of scientific policy objective is important 
from a political science perspective, although meaningless to perceptive legal 
observers. 
To survive equal protection analysis, a classification must have a scientific 
policy element. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); see also McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (legislature's scientific policy justification for the 
provision of time for recreation activities enables Sunday closing laws to survive 
equal protection challenge). 
174. Of course, there are limits on the acceptability of certain policy or util- 
itarian justifications. See Ronald Dworkin, Reverse Discrimination, in TAKING 
R I G ~ S  ERIOUSLY, supra note 109, at 223-39 (distinguishing the argument that 
segregation has a utilitarian value because it prevents race riots). 
175. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
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attempt by Alaska to create discriminatory entitlements justi- 
fied by a communal sense of morality. Alaska had sought to 
distribute its surplus mineral profits to residents in amounts 
proportional to  the length of time a resident had lived in the 
State. The longtime residents, like the pre-nationalization prop- 
erty owners, lacked a fimdamental right to the larger 
entitlements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court had to determine 
the motive behind the discriminatory scheme and whether it 
was constitutionally adequate. 
The basic motivation of the Alaskan legislature was to 
compensate the longtime residents for the hardships they had 
endured while living in Alaska prior to the discovery of oil 
there. Thendustice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority over 
whether a utilitarian policy justification accompanied this mo- 
tive. The majority held that, despite the existence of these past 
hardships, a utilitarian concern, such as a special need on the 
part of longtime residents or the improvement of life in the 
State ,  did not exist to justify the discriminatory 
 entitlement^.'^^ Accordingly, the Court held that the scheme 
violated equal protection. Justice Rehnquist in dissent, citing 
the post-lochner legacy of deference to legislatures, was willing 
to give the Alaskan legislature the benefit of the doubt that a 
utilitarian justification existed.'" 
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the Zobel majority, 
but on a much more fundamental level than Justice 
Rehnquist. 17' She found nothing "innately improper" about 
176. Id. at 61-63 (denying that the statute has a rational relation to any of the 
forward-looking policies advanced -by Alaska as the purpose of the statute). Alaska 
unsuccessfully advanced three justifications for the discriminatory treatment of the 
compensation plan: (1) the need to create financial incentives to induce individuals 
to stay or move to Alaska; (2) the need to reward residents for their contributions 
to the State; and (3) the need to encourage proper management of the State 
mineral revenue trust fund. 
177. Id. at 84 @ehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In striking down the Alaskan scheme, 
the Court seems momentarily to have forgotten 'the principle that the Fourteenth 
Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their 
views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.' " (quoting Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970))). 
178. Justice O 'Co~or  concurred in the judgment only. She voted to invalidate 
the enactment solely for its infringement on the right to travel. The majority hold- 
ing was based on both the right to travel violation and the more general equal 
protection violation discussed herein. Justice B re~an ' s  concurrence elaborated on 
how the majority opinion's right to travel discussion was not essential for the 
finding of the equal protection violation upon which this Article focuses. 
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the legislature's reliance on a metaphysically based conception 
of justice or of "civic ~irtue.""~ 
In response, Justice Breman's concurrence pointed directly 
to the danger of the principle endorsed by Justice O'Connor. 
Inherent in any metaphysical belief that justifies discriminato- 
ry creation of property entitlements is the "premise that 'some 
citizens are more equal than others."180 The only way to 
show that such a premise does not underlie the discrimination 
is to show empirically that the result will benefit the communi- 
ty, compensate individuals for a lack from which they currently 
suffer, or "remedy continuing  injustice^."'^^ If such forward- 
looking justifications do not exist, then the basis for the enact- 
ment is simply a metaphysical belief that something in the 
past, without any material relevance to the present or fbture, 
makes "some citizens more equal than others." Breman con- 
cluded O'Comor7s viewpoint would allow legislatures to distrib- 
ute entitlements on grounds such as the recognition of aris- 
tocracy.'" Indeed, overtones of the recognition of the inherent 
rights of nobility characterize the creation of entitlements to 
property in response t o  the length of time one has lived in a 
State or to the amount of property one owned many years ago. 
The anti-metaphysics principle of Zobel and The Land Act 
Case I can be summed up by an analogy to  basic equal protec- 
tion standards governing the creation of entitlements for Afri- 
can Americans, also known as affirmative action programs. 
Slaves, longtime residents of Alaska, and pre-nationalization 
property owners all have suffered in the past. However, the 
suffering during slavery days, like the troubles caused by the 
lack of oil in Alaska and by nationalization, did not violate any 
fundamental rights for which one would be constitutionally 
179. 457 U.S. 55, 72 (O'co~or ,  J., concurring); see ako Suzanna Sherry, Civic 
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 
(1986) (identifying a theme of deference to community value choices or "civic vir- 
tue" in O'Co~or opinions such as her Zobel concurrence). For a general discussion 
of the metaphysical, as opposed to scientific, basis of "civic virtue," see RIEFF, 
supm note 136. 
180. For additional criticism of the potential dangers of permitting "civic virtue" 
rather than utilitarian calculation to serve as a justification for property right 
reform, see EPS~EJN, supra note 132, at 344-46. Epstein also considers much of 
what many post-Lochner thinkers would let pass as utilitarian policies to be neg- 
ative-sum gains. 
181. 457 U.S. at 68-71 @reMan, J., concurring). 
182. Id. at 69 & n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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entitled to a current benefit. In light of the absence of any 
fundamental rights to a current benefit, something more than 
merely a communal desire to redress the difficulties of the past 
is necessary to justify the discrimination of an affirmative ac- 
tion program, the Alaskan surplus distribution plan, and the 
Land Act. The past has to have left these groups with current, 
special needs that would be met by the creation of 
entitlements. Alternatively, the entitlement should benefit the 
community in a way that non-discriminatory action could 
From a certain perspective, even the scientific policy re- 
quirement in both Zobel and The Land Act Case I has an ele- 
ment of metaphysics to it. A scientific policy objective often 
brings to State action more of a mystique of acceptability than 
actual scientific justification. In reality, there are so many 
different utilitarian formulas, as well as definitions of special 
need and "favorable total social result," that many different 
types of property reform could be adopted and found acceptable 
by a scientific policy calculation. Evidence of this truth is the 
current, post-Lochner era of judicial review. Government attor- 
neys and judges in this era have become ingenious at  identify- 
ing a utilitarian policy consideration underlying regulatory 
enactments.'" The United States Supreme Court even ratio- 
nalizes discriminatorily underinclusive distributions of 
entitlements as first steps toward addressing broader utilitari- 
an needdS5 
The Land Act Case I indicates that the Constitutional 
Court may not be so permissive. The decision condemns as 
183. Kathleen Sullivan argues that affirmative action should not only redress the 
"sins of discrimination" but .also pursue a vision of the future. See Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Mirmative Action Cases, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986). Both of those objectives are forward-looking policies. 
M i t i v e  action as a response to the "sins of discriminationn is based upon 
redressing the current and -future harmful effects of past discrimination rather 
than purely upon backward-looking moralism. 
184. See, eg., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (&ing that %he extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming 
up rational bases for state regulationn in the post-Lochner era has gone too far in 
equal protection review of entitlements); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."). 
185. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at  486-87 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas 
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) to support the underinclusive classifications of a welfare 
program). 
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unacceptable an enactment with a policy justification that is 
either underinclusive (if the justification does not support enti- 
tling all of the former owners) or overinclusive (if the justifica- 
tion would also support an enactment entitling NFO's).'" 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court's "favorable total social 
result" standard is inherently vague and will not totally elimi- 
nate metaphysical underpinnings from justifications for entitle- 
ment decisions by Parliament. 
Although the perceptive legal scholar may be able to 
deconstruct the myth of the scientific policy/metaphysics dichot- 
omy," the Court's requirement of a scientific policy basis for 
the Land Act may play an important role from a political sci- 
ence perspective. As discussed earlier, stormy political contro- 
versies lurk behind the legal issues of The Land Act Case I and 
of similar property right reform issues that are inevitably in 
store for Hungary and all other nations emerging from commu- 
nism. Simply suppressing these debates is impossible. Some 
degree of property reform is inevitable when leaving behind a 
communist state of affairs.188 Moreover, suppression of these 
debates would enhance the dangers of divisiveness and limit 
the chances of arriving a t  innovative solutions which could 
uni@ the nation. '" 
The Court's requirement that scientific policy objectives 
underlie the contents of this inevitable debate is a means of 
making Hungary's k tu re  struggles over entitlement reform 
less divisive and more constructive. Metaphysical debates tend 
to be divisive because their contents embody opposing basic 
beliefs and values. Parties adhering to different basic beliefs 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term "non-former - 
owner" or "NFO" and how Land Act's provisions discriminated against NFO's). 
In The Land Act Case III, the Court stated that, to avoid violation of the equal 
protection clause, Parliament must provide an overview of its future plans to 
entitle those excluded from an underinclusive entitlement scheme. The Land Act 
Case III, supm note 63. By contrast, the United States Supreme Court has been 
willing to uphold underinclusive plans based on its assumption that Congress 
would proceed "one step at a time." Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 
(1955); see also supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
187. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988) (discuss- 
ing the proper relation between morality and scientific rationality). 
188. See supm text accompanying notes 119-24 (discussing how property right 
reform is inevitable when leaving communism behind and how the Land Act Case 
debate cannot be limited by resurrecting fundamental rights to property from the 
1940s). 
189. See Sunstein, supra note 8. 
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and values can appear to each other as if they are from differ- 
ent communities. In contrast, scientific debates on property 
reform can encompass radically different viewpoints, but they 
force all parties to arrive at  a common language-empirical 
measurements-and the same conceptual goal-"more favor- 
able total social result." 
If Parliament reforms entitlements on scientific grounds, 
then the effect on the losing parties will be less alienating than 
if Parliament rejects the losing parties' views on metaphysical 
grounds. The defeat of a viewpoint on metaphysical grounds 
labels that position's means and ends as devoid of moral justifi- 
cation. Theoretically, the victorious proposal in a scientific 
policy debate need not be repugnant to the basic values of the 
backers of the losing proposal. A scientific defeat only indicates 
disagreement with empirical measurements rather than funda- 
mental value differences, 
In addition, because the defeated proposals have the same 
objectives and underlying standards as today's victorious 
scheme, the losers in a scientific-policy debate have the conso- 
lation that the proposals defeated today will have a chance for 
enactment in the fixture. In contrast, a metaphysically ground- 
ed viewpoint is not subject to modification by experience. Ac- 
cordingly, metaphysical divisions in a community are not only 
likely to  be perceived as more fundamental, but they also may 
result in more longstanding and insurmountable disputes. 
The above analysis admittedly oversimplifies the reality of 
the scientific-policylmetaphysics dichotomy; however, the reali- 
ty is not necessarily as important as its political effect. If Hun- 
gary will have to face difficult questions of entitlement reform, 
then the Court's ruling that Parliament's resolutions must 
pursue scientific policy objectives should modify the nature of 
the debates. The factions will avoid focusing on issues that 
highlight differing fundamental beliefs within Hungary, such 
as what inherent significance one believes pre-communist titles 
have today. The theme of how to help Hungary will provoke 
differing opinions, but it will also facilitate the maintenance of 
unity in a community of diverse beliefs. 
E. A Lesson of The Land Act Case I: 
Leaving the Past Behind and the Metaphysical 
Justice /Scientific Policy' Dichotomy 
The pursuit of forward-looking policy objectives constitutes 
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not only a wise approach to the delicate issue of property right 
reform, but also an efficient and unifPing method for leaving 
behind the unattractive remnants of communism in general. 
For instance, members of the new government have complained 
that many senior members of the judiciary are simply lefiover 
communist party hacks, rather than skilled j~rists.'~" The 
Parliament must now choose between two approaches to reme- 
dying this problem. The metaphysical justice approach would 
be to undertake a process like Czechoslovakia's lustrace. Such 
an approach would find senior judges unworthy of office based 
upon their strong ties to the illegitimate authority of the past. 
The social consequences would be the dangers explained in 
III:C:3. By contrast, a forward-looking policy to leaving behind 
the era of unqualified judges would avoid such drawbacks. The 
scientific policy approach, which has recently found favor 
among some members of Parliament, would subject all senior 
judges to a competitive exam which measures professional legal 
skills.1g1 Those judges who occupy senior positions solely be- 
cause they issued the decisions ordered by communist party 
officials, rather than as a result of their superior legal skills, 
would be identified. The past's "hack" judiciary would be left 
behind through focus on improving the capacity of H u n g d s  
judiciary to function with intelligence and independence, rather 
than through a witch-hunt with costly social implications.'" 
F. Addressing Uncertainty 
The final part of The Land Act Case I is a completely dif- 
ferent advisory opinion that the Court included in the same 
decision. The petition submitted by the Prime Minister asked 
whether the Constitution's takings clause requires payment of 
compensation when the property of an agricultural cooperative 
changes ownership by 'tirtue of law" rather than by an "official 
resolution of expropriation." The question raised two issues 
190. Oltay, supra note 34. 
191. Id. 
192. I concede that the advocated approach would not identi& all communist 
party hacks. Moreover, the mation of neutral, merit-based exams is a difficult 
task. However, the records relied upon by the lrcstrace process are also turning out 
to be far from accurate. 
Another step critical to the reform and independence of the Hungarian judiciary 
is the improvement of salaries and working conditions, which are currently far 
below those of the average private attorney. 
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concerning the situations under which the Constitution re- 
quires compensation: (1) what types of owners are entitled to 
compensation after a taking and (2) under what circumstances 
does a taking occur. 
The Court answered the fmt question by holding that the 
takings clause protects all property right owners, including 
cooperatives, "natural persons," and 'legal entities." The own- 
ers only need to  operate independently of the State. An owner 
is still protected even if it is regulated by the State or was 
formed originally by State action. 
The Court answered the second question by stating that 
the Constitution requires the payment of compensation for the 
taking of a property right even if the taking occurs by a means 
other than an official decree of expropriation. If State action 
infringes upon the property right or if the State transfers the 
rights to another private party, then the Constitution requires 
compensation. The Court also emphasized that all compensa- 
tion must be "immediate, unconditional and full." 
The opinion appears to impose an element of absolute 
respect for property rights onto Parliament's property reform 
efforts. The Court may have made such statements in this 
advisory opinion to counteract uncertainties as to the integrity 
of property rights in Hungary. Two circumstances peculiar t o  
this opinion had the potential for creating the harmful econom- 
ic consequences which flow from such uncertainties.lg3 
First, the Court probably wanted to  eliminate any uncer- 
tainty in the economy created by the first part of The Land Act 
Case I. The rejection of the rights of pre-communist property 
owners to compensation could be misinterpreted as a sign that 
the protection of property rights is not a priority of the new 
regime. The convenient inclusion of this opinion alongside the 
rejection of the Smallholders' claims enabled the Court to  avoid 
letting the first part of the decision create the impression that 
post-communist property rights are not protected from future 
193. See Richard Epstein, AZ Quiet on the Eastern Front, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
555 (1991) (the extent of property right protection by East European nations dic- 
tates whether foreign investors will take a short term or long term view of in- 
vestment prospects). 
On the costs which result from uncertainty as to the integrity of property 
rights, see generally BRUCE A. ACKE-, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITU- 
TION 41-70 (1977) (discussing utilitarian approach to takings clause adjudications); 
POSNER, supra note 112 (discussing the economic theory of property rights). 
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nationalization efforts. 
Second, the opinion appears to be a response t o  Smallhold- 
ers' Party proposals to order the transfer to pre-nationalization 
owners of the rights to certain properties. These proposals had 
been hindering the privatization process by scaring investors 
away from State properties once owned by supporters of the 
Smallholders Party. The opinion serves to eliminate those 
investors' apprehensions and the negative effects they were 
having on the economy. In particular, the opinion relieves the 
uncertainty as to the future value of the property rights of 
independent agricultural cooperatives, which were formed from 
nationalized land. 
These two circumstances are rooted in the particular con- 
text of this case. Accordingly, whether the Constitutional 
Court's fiture applications of the takings clause will have the 
same fervor as the rhetoric in this advisory opinion may de- 
pend on whether the foreseeable takings at  that time have as 
high a potential to disrupt the economy as the takings at issue 
in this opinion. 
Parts I1 and I11 examined the formal extent of the Court's 
power and the substantive theories underlying a major opinion, 
respectively. In one sense, Parts I1 and I11 revealed sources of 
the Court's authority. From a hermeneutic perspective, howev- 
er, those sources must have a source as well. The Article now 
goes a step further t o  examine the ultimate source of the form 
and substance of the Court's authority. In accordance with the 
democratic republican notion of government by consent, the 
Hungarian community appears to  be at least partially the ulti- 
mate source of the Court's exercise of power. 
The Court's capacity to  root the form and substance of its 
authority in the Constitution and the ACC is prima facie proof 
that the Court is responsive to the community. Democratic 
republicanism does not require the Court to  ignore the consti- 
tutional text or jurisdictional legislation because of its percep- 
tion of a contradictory popular consensus. lg4 Technically, re- 
sponsiveness to the constitution and the ACC should be a 
194. Cf. McCo~ell, supra note 6 (criticizing Professor Perry for advocating a 
system of judicial review which responds exclusively to extra-legal sources, rather 
than the actual written law). 
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sufficient indication that judicial review is responsive to the 
community. However, skepticism often exists as to whether 
judicial review conforms with democratic republican theory, 
even when the Court is acting within the scope of its lawful 
authority.lg5 This is especially true in Hungary, where the 
democratic republican roots of the Constitution and the ACC 
are not readily apparent.lg6 Accordingly, investigation beyond 
the technical legality of judicial review is necessary to clarify 
the issue of the Court's legitimacy as a democratic republican 
body. 
The following subsections discuss two aspects of the com- 
munity pertaining to the function of judicial review: (1) expec- 
tations of the nature of judicial decisionmaking and (2) expec- 
tations of the meaning of constitutional law. The first subsec- 
tion shows how the Court's formal authority responds to Hun- 
garian culture's visions of judicial precedents and the adjudica- 
tory process. The second subsection examines whether the 
Court interprets the Constitution in a manner which is consis- 
tent with the ideals of the social movement which produced the 
amended Constitution. 
A. Hungarian Legal Tradition 
The American jurisprudential mind may fmd anathema the 
Constitutional Court's advisory opinion and pre-enactment 
jurisdiction, as well as the other factors that increase the scope 
of the Court's power to  interpret the Constitution. The roots of 
this reaction are, at least partly, due to two aspects of Ameri- 
can jurisprudence that are absent from Hungarian legal cul- 
ture: the common law adjudicatory tradition and legal realism. 
The ensuing discussion shows how Hungarian legal traditions 
are responsible for the absence of these two strains of Ameri- 
can legal thought from Hungarian culture and how Hungary 
consequently has significantly different expectations of the 
nature of judicially created precedent and of judicial interpreta- 
tion of legal texts. Both of those expectations are sources for 
the Court's extensive authority to issue binding precedents and 
195. See supra note 16. 
196. Id.; see Boz6ki, supra note 10, at 549 ("One can only answer the question 
whether the new Constitution and system of public law correspond to the political 
and legal culture of the country [Hungary] after several years of tested experi- 
ence ."). 
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to engage in constitutional interpretation. 
1. The difference between precedent in Hungary's civil code 
culture and America's common law culture197 
In the United States, expectations of judicial adherence to  
broad, neutral principles are in constant tension with expecta- 
tions of narrow, specific holdings. The former expectation ema- 
nates from the universal definition of legality, while the latter 
is an attribute of the common law tradition. America's common 
law heritage emphasizes the restrictions upon the scope of 
holdings. Decisions are fact-bound. The principles they set forth 
are readily malleable with changes in distinguishing circum- 
stances. Decisions may discuss abstract principles; but common 
law adjudicatory techniques stress that each decision is limited 
to  analogous fact patterns. These restrictions on common law 
adjudication technically do not apply beyond the development 
of the common law. However, in American constitutional case 
law, the common law tradition has created expectations of the 
scope of judicial authority. These common law characteristics 
are equally prominent in constitutional case law. Accordingly, if 
a United States Supreme Court Justice's opinions lean too far 
toward setting forth and adhering to neutral principles that 
apply "across the board," then he will be criticized as an ab- 
197. This subsection shows that the Civil Code tradition serves as a source with- 
in the Hungarian community for the Constitutional Court's scope of authority, 
notwithstanding the fad that in practice Hungary may not be a purely Civil Code 
legal system. For instance, the Constitutional Court is not a Civil Code court; the 
Constitutional Court's opinions have characteristics of the common law case ap- 
proach; and Hungarian Civil Code adjudications may be moving in a direction 
where common law i~ovations and fad-bound precedents become more frequent as 
a diversity of novel and complex issues like pollution disputes begin to come before 
the courts. This subsection relies upon the Civil Code solely for its role in defining 
the Hungarian community's expectations of judicially created precedent. 
Perceptive observers could point out the fact-bound nature of precedents in a 
Hungarian Civil Code system. In addition, the common law system has attributes 
of the Civil Code system. See, e.g., Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 456 
(K.B. 1789) (Where cases are new in their principle, there I admit that it is 
necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in order to remedy the griev- 
ance; but where the case is only new in the instance, and the only question is the 
application of a principle recognized in the law to such new case, it will be just as 
competent to Courts of Justice to apply the principle to any case which may arise 
two centuries hence as it was two centuries ago . . . .") (quoted in Epstein, supra 
note 193, at 559 n.5). 
My goal is to show the role played by popular propositions and expectations, 
rather than to demystify these popular conceptions. 
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solutist and possibly as  an activist and a counter- 
maj oritarian. lg8 
Hungary's Civil Code tradition has produced a legal culture 
with different expectations of precedent. Prior to the operation 
of the Constitutional Court, the only judicially created prece- 
dents in Hungarian law were those Supreme Court opinions in 
response to fact scenarios without a pertinent Code provi- 
sion? The Hungarian Supreme Court precedents set forth 
the principle missing from the Code, rather than a solution 
bound to a fad pattern. Hungarian lawyers do not rely on the 
particular circumstances from which a precedent was derived 
to limit the applicability of the precedent's principle.200 Law- 
198. See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 162, 173-74 (criticizing Justice Black's lack of 
passive virtues); Deutsch, supra note 3 (discussing the extreme adherence of 
Justice Hugo Black to neutral principles and the consequent "immodesty" of his 
jurisprudence). 
The expectation of common law restraint in constitutional case law surfaced in 
a recent debate between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia on the appropriate 
scope of the Webster v. Reproductive Health Services opinion. Justice O'Co~or, who 
favored a limited holding, wrote that there is a " 'fundamental rule of judicial 
restraint,' " 492 US. 490, 526 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Three 
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)), which states that 
the Supreme Court will not "generally 'formulate a rule of constitutional law 
broader than is required by the precise fads to which it is to be applied.' " Id. 
(O'Co~or, J., concurring) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y., & Phila. Steamship Co. v. 
Commissioner of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))). 
Justice Scalia responded with an insightful analysis of recent opinions which 
shows that the Supreme Court's adherence to the fundamental rule quoted above is 
only a myth. Nevertheless, even after this penetrating critique, Justice Scalia 
concluded that he had only shown that it is a "reality that our policy not to 
'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts' 
has a frequently applied good-cause exception." Id. at 534 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). Despite the revelations of his survey of recent opinions, Justice 
Scalia showed that the expectation of judicial restraint is still present because he 
felt compelled to provide a "good-cause exception" to justify expanding the scope of 
the Webster holding. 
199. Technically, there is no such thing as a binding case law precedent in 
Hungary's Civil Code system. The Hungarian Supreme Court fills in gaps in the 
Code by issuing decrees of varying specificity, rather than by resolving an actual 
case. The actual Supreme Court case law, as opposed to the Supreme Court 
decrees of legal principles (the judicially created precedents), is not binding 
precedential authority. 
200. However, it would be an overstatement to claim that a skilled Hungarian 
lawyer, while disputing whether a precedential principle governs a case or what 
result a principle requires, would refrain from referring to specific fact scenarios to 
which courts have applied the principle. My point is only that the American 
cultural perception is that at the foundation of a common law precedent are the 
facts from which the precedent is derived, while the Hungarian cultural perception 
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yers look to these Civil Code precedents as if they were "black 
letter" rule entries in the Code, rather than holdings with pos- 
sible sui generis characteristics. Hungary's Civil Code tradition 
defines precedents as broad, abstract pronouncements. Accord- 
ingly, the Constitutional Court, unlike the United States Su- 
preme Court, emerged from a legal culture that lacks the ten- 
sion between expectations of neutral principles and expecta- 
tions of precedents of limited substance and authority. The 
Constitutional Court's broad powers to issue abstract principles 
reflect the communal expectations in Hungary of a high court's 
role. 
However, whether Hungarian legal culture will always 
accept Constitutional Court precedents with the same ease as 
the decrees of the Hungarian Supreme Court is questionable 
due to  one significant factor: the Constitutional Court's abstract 
pronouncements restrict the will of Parliament, while the Hun- 
garian Supreme Court's announcements of norms complement 
Parliament's efforts by filling in gaps in legislation. Conflicts 
between the Constitutional Court and Parliament may well 
inspire Parliament to attempt to challenge Hungarian cultural 
expectations of judicial precedent with respect to the Constitu- 
tional Court's work. 
2. The non-legal realist vision of the interpretation of legal 
texts 
Hungary's civil code tradition also results in an absence of 
legal realism from mainstream Hungarian legal thought. The 
bulk of Hungarian judicial decisionmaking involves the appli- 
cation of the pertinent Code provision, rather than the creation 
of precedents. Most Hungarians view the application of the 
Code as a technocratic act, rather than as a decision dependent 
on ideological preferences. The case study method appears to a 
typical Hungarian jurist as an emphasis on practical studies. 
Hungarian lawyers typically claim, "American law students do 
not have any exposure to theory when they only learn by the 
case study method.'a01 American legal realists do not share 
is that at the foundation of a Civil Code precedent is the principle itself. 
201. I witnessed such remarks by Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Romanian 
lawyers at the Hungarian Ministry of Justice Seminars, Budapest, January 21-23, 
1991; the Jan Hus Foundation Law Reform Conference, Bratislava, November 1990; 
and the Soros Foundation Rule of Law Conferences, Cluj-Napoca and Bucharest, 
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this reaction because they view a case as the product of a judi- 
cial interpretation that could have gone in other directions. By 
contrast, a Hungarian jurist does not perceive a simple adjudi- 
cation of a case under the Code as requiring theoretical choices 
for the judge.202 
This vision of self-applying law is likely a product of the 
Soviet influence on the judicial system and of East-Central 
Europe's naivete about the Western civil code tradition, rather 
than of the civil code system itself. In contrast to the civil code 
judiciaries emerging from communism, courts in Western civil 
code countries frequently cite authorities to justie their partic- 
ular interpretation of a legal rule.2" A court's denial of the 
role of authorities guiding interpretation conceals the control- 
ling influences upon the interpretation of a rule and facilitates 
manipulation. Such easily accessible manipulation was in the 
interest of communist regimes. In addition, a decision that 
shows the genealogy of its interpretation of a rule implicitly 
concedes that the interpretation is subject to future superses- 
sive interpretations, while a decision that purports to be the 
product of a self-applying rule implies fmality and perfec- 
tioa204 
May 1991. At those events, Professor George Fletcher noted that lawyers in civil 
code countries often have such an outlook upon the case study method. 
202. See Sbjo, supra note 16, at 18 (Hungarian judges "want very clear rules 
and refuse responsibility for creative precedent-setting. They would like to act as 
the paragraph-automat of Max Weber."). 
203. Professor George Fletcher has repeatedly pointed this out to lawyers and 
judges in post-communist nations who claim that civil code legal cultures have no 
use for the study of case law and for the citation of authorities to justify a judge's 
particular interpretation of a rule. See Remarks of George Fletcher and of Hungari- 
an lawyers and judges, Hungarian Ministry of Justice Seminar, Hungary, January 
21-23, 1991; Remarks of George Fletcher and of Romanian lawyers and judges, 
Soros Foundation Rule of Law Conferences, Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 
May 27, 29, 1991; Remarks of George Fletcher and of Czechoslovakian lawyers, 
Jan Hus Foundation Law Reform Conference, Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, Novem- 
ber, 1990. However, Western civil code judiciaries regard the authority of professors 
and treatises more highly than do common law courts. 
204. The research of Michel Foucault focuses on revealing genealogies or the 
history of the authorities which society implicitly relies upon to support visions of 
"the natural" and "the truth." Foucault's revelation of genealogies enables him to un- 
mask the apparently "natural" and "true" as only an artificial construct. See Michel 
Foucault, Two Leckres, in POWER~KNOWLEDGE 83 (1980) ("Genealogies . . . are 
precisely anti-sciences. Not that they vindicate a lyrical right to ignorance or non- 
knowledge . . . . [Genealogies] are concerned, rather, with the insurrection of 
knowledges that are opposed . . . to the effects of the centralising powers which 
are linked to the institution and functioning of an organised scientific discourse 
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Hungary's non-legal realist outlook contributes to  the ac- 
ceptability of the Constitutional Court's broad powers of consti- 
tutional interpretation. Hungarians are accustomed to accept- 
ing judicial application of the Code and are more willing to 
view a decision of the Constitutional Court as the sole, correct 
application of the constitutional text. To Hungarians accus- 
tomed to observing civil law adjudications, the Court's tasks of 
constitutional interpretation appear much more innocent and 
less subject to interpretive discretion than they would t o  a legal 
realist culture. 
The absence of legal realism from Hungarian culture is 
likely to  disappear quickly, at  least with regard to the Court, 
for two reasons. First, the Constitutional Court explicitly cites 
the extra-textual authorities which guide its interpretation of 
the constitutional text. References to philosophers, Western 
European domestic laws, international norms, Hungarian legal 
experts, and previous decisions of the Court have all appeared 
in recent Constitutional Court opinions. The Court's implicit 
concession that the Constitution is not self-applying invites 
criticism that the Court has chosen the wrong interpretation. 
The second factor is that the Constitutional Court is not en- 
gaged in the application of Parliament's rules but in the review 
of those rules. Consequently, the political branches are more 
likely to engage in criticism of the Court's work. Such critiques 
will surely lead to legal realist allegations that ulterior motives 
influence decisions .205 
B. The Rendszemaltozas and the Constitution 
Judicial review can be responsive not only to the commu- 
nal outlook upon the judicial role but also to the outlook upon 
the meaning of constitutional law. Hungary's present amended 
Constitution emerged from the rend~zervaltozas.~~ If the 
within a society such as ours."). In case law, the revelation of a legal 
interpretation's genealogy subjects the interpretation to supersessive interpretations. 
205. Indeed, the Court's opposition to compensation schemes has been attributed 
to the alleged communist sympathies of the Judges. Part 111's extensive discussion 
of the Court's legal reasoning in The Land Act Case I shows that accusation to be 
unfounded. However, true motivations can always be hidden behind legal reasoning 
and reliance on precedents. That is why even a court which cites authorities for its 
interpretation of a legal rule is subject to legal realist accusations of manipulation 
by dark forces. 
206. See supra note 11 (rendszervaltozas means "change of regime"). 
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Court's constitutional interpretations are the products of prior 
communal consent, then they should reflect the communal 
ideals of the rendszervaltozas. Social scientists have not yet 
definitively resolved what the rendszervaltozas means to Hun- 
ga r i an~ .~~ '  However, based upon available evidence and 
scholarship, this subsection arrives at three normative catego- 
ries for analysis of the transition's significance. Each category 
is used to assess the democratic republican character of the 
Court. 
1. The rendszervaltozas as restoration 
a. A change without a focus. A good place to start a search 
for the ideals of the rendszervaltozas is Hungary's past. Para- 
phrasing the observations of Hannah Arendt and Michael 
Walzer, Professor Michael McCo~el l  writes, "[Alllegiance to 
the memory of an idealized past, with its idealized principles, 
has historically been the leading impetus to  constructive so- 
cial. . . transf~rmation."~~~ There are some indications that 
the ideal of the rendszervaltozas is a resurrection of the state of 
affairs before the communist of the government 
began in the late 1940s. Streets have regained their pre-com- 
munist names. In addition, the traditional Hungarian coat of 
arms has replaced the red-starred shield as the national sym- 
bol. Most importantly, several 'sleeping beauty' [political] par- 
ties have awakened from their several-decades-long sleep . . . to  
claim legal continuity"20s with the pre-communist era. Among 
the "sleeping beauties" are the Smallholders Party, the Hun- 
garian People's Party, the Social Democrat Party, and the 
Christian Democrat Party. 
However, legal signs, as well as the obsemations of sociolo- 
gists, tend t o  indicate that the transition was not a revolution- 
ary "swinging back"210 into a particular preordained order. If 
the rendszervaltozas has continuity with the pre-communist 
era, then the rendszervaltozas must view the communist era as 
the illegitimate suppression and reformation of the pre-commu- 
207. Boz6ki, supra note 10, at 538 ("A generally accepted set of conceptions and 
a scientih paradigm of the postcommunist transition are not yet available."). 
208. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1505 & n.17 (quoting ARENDT, supra note 
3, at 35-36). 
209. Boz6ki, supra note 16, at 6. 
210. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 35-36. 
411 JUDICIAL REVIEW: COMMAND OR CONSENT 127 
nist era. But, unlike Czechoslovakia, Hungary has refrained 
from undergoing a lustrace or purgation process premised on 
the belief that association with the prior regime was associa- 
tion with an illegitimate a~thority.~" Indeed, the new regime 
recently prosecuted someone for unlawful infringement upon 
the authority of the communists, before it prosecuted two com- 
munist officials for having breached their lawful a u t h ~ r i t y . ~ ~  
Another sign of the continuity between the authority of the 
prior regime and the present regime is the unquestioned inher- 
itance of the communist debt.213 
211. In November 1991, Parliament passed a law which 
permit[s] trials of all those people accused of committing murder and 
treason between December 1944 and May 1990 whom the Communist 
Government had protected from being brought to trial . . . . Sponsors of 
the legislation say that perhaps 100 people could be tried, compared with 
the hundreds of thousands who could possibly lose their [public em- 
ployment] positions [under the lustrace law] in Czechoslovakia. 
Judith Ingram, Coming TZ.ials That May IZy the Hungarian Soul, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 1991, at A4. Moreover, the new law may never go into effect. President Goncz 
has refused to sign it and a challenge to the law before the Constitutional Court 
will be resolved in early 1992. See Letter of Dr. Gabor Halmai, Chief Clerk to 
President S6lyom of the Constitutional Court, to Ethan Klingsberg @ec. 20, 1991). 
Goncz similarly precipitated a constitutional challenge to Parliament's third Land 
Act bill by his refusal to sign it. See infra note 257. The President's decision to 
exploit the formal requirement that he sign all legislation is a significant develop- 
ment in the balance of power in Hungarian government, because Goncz is a mem- 
ber of an opposition party. 
212. The new Chief Prosecutor charged the defendant in the first case with 
unlawfully revealing State secrets. The defendant had informed the public that, 
prior to and during the transition negotiations, the secret police were monitoring 
the meetings of the "Opposition Roundtablen-the leaders of the opposition par- 
ties-and then providing the information to the Socialist Party. The defendant 
received a "censure": a mild form of a conviction which carries no sentence with it. 
The communist defendants, put on trial several months later, were the supervisors 
of the operation which the defendant in the first case had revealed to the public. 
The defendants in the second case received "the lightest possible sentences." Z. 
Lovas, " f i r  Danubegate," Uncaptive Minds, Summer 1991, at 17. 
See &o Sbjo, supm note 16, at 17 ("In Hungary, a handful of the most promi- 
nent judges who have sentenced innocent people in political trials or the partici- 
pants in the 1956 revolt were asked to retire. All that took place without any 
publicity."). Such singling out of those judges who suppressed the 1956 uprising, as 
opposed to those judges who enforced nationalization and other communist pro- 
grams, corresponds with the next subsection's reading of the centrality of 1956 for 
the rendszervaltouls. 
213. See Holmes, supra note 85, at 212 (explaining natural law principle: "if you 
inherit another's property (e.g., his throne) you also inherit his debts"). Such a 
theory of debt inheritance is premised upon the continuity of law theory elaborated 
in Part 111. If you inherit another's throne you also inherit his past 
generally-including his laws, legal institutions, and property right reforms. Al- 
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Furthermore, sociological analyses have not characterized 
the rendszervaltozas as a revolutionary call for the restoration 
of the pre-communist state of affairs. These preliminary assess- 
ments of recent events emphasize the decentralized nature of 
the transition and the consequent failure of a particular set of 
ideals to emerge. As Hungarian sociologist And& Boz6ki puts 
it, the transition has been "morose rather than ~athartic."~" 
Several factors are responsible for confounding efforts to  
put labels on the significance of Hungary's transition from 
communism. One factor is the key role of the Hungarian com- 
munists in the transition. The degree to which communist 
leaders facilitated and took part in the rendszervaltozas while 
simultaneously endorsing socialist rhetoric can baffle attempts 
to make sense of the transition. A complementary factor is the 
gradual nature of the transition. Sociologists link the transition 
of 1989 to reforms which began a decade earlier.215 
Another factor is the factional nature of the opposition to 
commimism. Unlike the situation in Poland and Czechoslova- 
kia, a single anti-communist movement never existed in Hun- 
g = ~ . ~ ~ ~  The various opposition groups which did emerge pos- 
though you can change those laws, institutions, and property right reforms for the 
present and future (in accordance with contemporary standards), you c a ~ o t  change 
their authority over the past in most circumstances. By inheriting his throne, you 
are recognizing the legitimacy of the exercise of power in the past by the occupier 
of that throne. By contrast, if you took power, but not as an inheritor of the prior 
regime's throne, then the continuity of law would not apply. 
The Socialist Party has been required to return all of their material posses- 
sions to the State. At h t  glance, this order appears to be an example of disconti- 
nuity, because the order condemns the Socialist Party's possession as illegitimate. 
However, the Socialist Party made the purchases as a trustee of the State. Accord- 
ingly, the retention of the merchandise by the State as the Socialists step down 
from power indicates that the same State is still the authority. 
AU of the factors listed refer to the present regime's acceptance of the legitima- 
cy of the exercises of authority during the communist era. However, the fad that 
the prior regime technically authorized the present regime's Constitution does not 
require such acceptances of the continuity of law. See supm part III.C.2. The 
current disdain for the communist era indicates that this is a new era but does 
not indicate that the exercises of authority during the past era were illegitimate at 
the time. 
214. See An&& Boz6ki, The Authoritarian Legacy in Hungary's Transition from 
Communism (June 27, 1991) (unpublished paper delivered at the Convention of the 
Hungarian Sociological Association, Budapest). 
215. Sociologists' incessant focus on Hungary's gradualism makes one susped 
whether there really was a marked change in the last two years. See, e.g., Boz6ki, 
supm note 214; Szabo, supra note 64. 
216. Szabo, supra note 64. 
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sessed radically different outlooks and often fiercely criticized 
the agendas of their fellow anti-c~mrnunists.~~' The fust free 
elections manifest this phenomenon. Six parties, each with a 
unique platform, attained an influential number of seats in 
Parliament, while no party emerged with a majority of 
seats.218 The "sleeping beauty" parties with their pre-1947 ide- 
als only fared slightly better than the Socialist Party.219 Tra- 
ditional political trends, such as nationalism and rivalries be- 
tween urban and country dwellers, characterized the transi- 
t i ~ n ; ~ ~ '  but the rendszervaltozas neither resurrected a partic- 
ular collective ideal from the pre-communist era221 nor reject- 
ed the legitimacy of the authority exercised by the communists 
in the past. 
The Court's constitutional interpretation in The Land Act 
Case I reflects the insignificance of the pre-communist era 
values to the popular movement which led to the creation of 
the amended Con~t i tu t ion .~~~  The Court had to decide wheth- 
er or not Article lO(2) of the Constitution permits Parliament 
to recognize pre-communist property rights.2B The Court in- 
terpreted Article lO(2) to recognize nationalization's reform of 
property rights as a legitimate exercise of authority and to 
deny the current validity of the pre-communist rights. Part I11 
established that this interpretation rested on sound legal theo- 
217. A. Arato, The Rise, Decline, and Possible Revival of Civil Society (June 27, 
1991) (unpublished paper delivered at the Convention of the Hungarian Sociological 
Association, Budapest). 
Boz6ki writes of the plethora of disputes between opposition parties prior to, 
during, and following the Roundtable negotiations. It appears that only resentment 
toward the communist attempts to exploit this factionalism resulted in any cooper- 
ation at all. See Boz6ki, supra note 16; Bozbki, supra note 10. 
218. See supra note 94. 
219. The two most successful "sleeping beauty" parties were the Smallholders 
with 11.7% and the Christian Democrats with 6.5% of the votes. The Socialists 
received 10.9% of the votes. 
220. Szabo, supra note 64. 
221. Indeed, Boz6ki argues that opposition to communism developed on an 
individual level rather than on the level of any collective ideals. See Boz6ki, supra 
note 16. 
222. See discussion supra part 1II.C. 
223. If Parliament could recognize pre-communist property rights, then a justi- 
fication would exist for enactment of an entitlement scheme which discriminates in 
favor of the pre-communist property owners. Article 10(2) of the amended Constitu- 
tion indicates that the scope of the exclusive property and economic activities of 
the State shall be defined by law. A MAGYAR KCZZTARSASAG ALK(YI'MANYA [Constitu- 
tion] ch. I, art. lO(2) (Hung.). 
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ry and social policy. This examination of the social events 
which created the Constitution shows the decision to have also 
been responsive to the Hungarian community. 
However, the thesis that the Court interpreted the Consti- 
tution in a manner consistent with the popular vision which led 
to the creation of the amended Constitution must overcome one 
striking piece of evidence: The majority of the first elected 
Parliament endorsed the recognition of pre-communist property 
rights. The parliamentary majority's support for the Smallhold- 
ers Party's effort to resurrect pre-communist property rights 
does not necessarily indicate that all aspects of the Land A d  
responded to majority views of the Hungarian community. 
Surveys reveal that only the minority Smallholders Party and 
an  additional small percentage of the citizenry actively support- 
ed the Land Act. The Smallholders used threats to bring down 
the ruling coalition, rather than the backing of a popular ma- 
jority, to attain the support of a parliamentary majority.224 
Normally, the results of such special interest politics are 
consistent with democratic r e p u b l i ~ a n i s m . ~ ~  Moreover, judi- 
cial review's role is not to confound the efforts of special inter- 
est groups. However, when special interest group politics result 
in  legislation founded on conflicts with the majority's funda- 
mental beliefs, as reflected in the Constitution, then judicial 
review is consistent with democratic republican principles. In 
such a scenario, judicial review and constitutional law are more 
responsive to the community than is the legislature. The Land 
Act Case I was one such scenario.226 Judicial review in The 
224. Of those surveyed in June 1989, when the Opposition Roundtable first 
began the transition negotiations with the communists, two thirds said that some 
reform of the State's monopoly on property rights was needed, but only 18% 
endorsed returning land to the pre-communist owners and only 9% endorsed the 
return of other types property to the pre-communist owners. Hankiss, supra note 
157, at 55 (Gallup survey). A survey conducted in March 1991, five months after 
The Land Act Case I and two months before Parliament endorsed another compen- 
sation scheme, revealed that two-thirds of the nation opposed the compensation 
concept. See supra note 101. 
225. Cf. supra note 9 (the dissenters or minority in a republic consent to the 
majority's adopted decision or rule, because, as participants in a republican govern- 
ment, the minority has consented to decisionmaking procedures and to the results 
of those procedures). 
226. For a more detailed account of the political events preceding The L a d  Act 
Case I, see discussion supm part IIIA. For a defense of the consistency of judicial 
review with majoritarianism in American history, see Ackerman, supra note 6; 
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
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Land Act Case I operated on the basis of neither surveys nor 
the Judges' sociological instincts; it operated on the basis of 
constitutional interpretation. Surveys and other indications of 
- public sentiments, however, aflj.rm that the Court's application 
of the Constitution was responsive to  the populace. 
b. 1956 and the ideals of 1989. Even though the transition 
was not a consensual call to return to the pre-communist era, 
there is one past event which served as an inspirational model 
for the rendszerualtozas: the 1956 uprising. Like the 
rendszerualtozas, the 1956 conflict was between the Soviet 
backed wing of the communist party and a diverse group of 
reform communists, bureaucrats, Smallholders, nationalists, 
students, and urban intellectuals. Due to the diverse nature of 
the 1956 movement, all participants in the rendszerualtozas 
have been able to draw upon those events for support and in- 
spiration. 
Simultaneously with the announcement that the commu- 
nist party would "accept political pluralism," reform communist 
Imre Poszgay attracted attention by publicly describing 1956 as 
a "popular uprising." Poszgay's statement was a radical revi- 
sion of the previous appellation: "counter-revolution." It was 
the "rehabilitation" of a previous era and therefore an indica- 
tion that a transition was a t  hand.227 Then the commence- 
ment of the negotiations between the Opposition Roundtable 
and the communists was marked on June 16, 1989, by the 
formal reburial of reform communist Imre Nagy and other 
heroes, who had been executed by the Soviets in 1956 and then 
buried ignominiously. Hundreds of thousands attended speech- 
es by leaders fkom the Opposition Roundtable and the commu- 
nist party. The speakers associated their respective causes and 
roles in the current negotiations with the martyrs of 1956.~" 
1013 (1984). 
227. For emphasis of the importance of this event, see Szabo, supra note 64; 
Boz6ki, supra note 16. 
Reform communist Imre Nagy Began to lose his once enormous popularity" by 
Odober 24, 1956, when it appeared that the 1956 Revolution would succeed. 
Charles Gati recalls, T h e  people no longer [would] think in terms of the Party 
and its factions. At issue was not 'socialist legality'," but a more fundamental 
change to political pluralism. Gatii supra note 158, at 380. A similar fate befell 
1989s popular communist reformer Imre Pozsgay after the legalization of political 
plurality. 
228. See Fekete Doboz, THE HUNGARIAN TRANSITION (Video with English narra- 
tion) (showing the Imre Nagy Funeral, the digging up of Imre Nagy's bones as 
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Then finally, Parliament intentionally passed the amendments 
which entirely changed the 1949 Constitution on the anniversa- 
ry of the 1956 uprising, October 23, 1989.228 
The transition's identification with the events of 1956 is 
helpful in assessing the significance of the rendszervaltozas. 
The 1956 uprising is not just a malleable icon of opposition to  
orthodox communism. Similarly, the rendszervaltozas was more 
than merely the ouster of the communists without any accom- 
panying idealistic focus. The 1956 movement and the 
rendszervaltozas may not have been defintive calls to return to  
either the pre-communist or any other particular state of af- 
f a i r ~ ; ~ ~  however, both 1956 and 1989 stood for democratiza- 
tion, the legalization of factionalism, and the limitation of the 
State's unfettered domination of property rights, public debate 
and other fundamental aspects of civil society. Moreover, 1956 
and 1989 both stood for the cooperation of groups who share 
these broad ideals despite their ultimately diverse agendas. 
Boz6ki's analysis of 1989 concludes, "[O]pposition cooperation 
was the movement of nationwide s~ope."~' 
well as pre-1989 illegal ceremonies at the unmarked Nagy grave site and in the 
streets of Budapest commemorating the 1956 uprising). The events in the video all 
link the recent transition movement to 1956. 
A similar reburial of communists, who had been ignominiously executed by or- 
thodox communists, helped spark the 1956 movement. On October 6, 1956, L&z16 
Rajk and three other communists who had been killed in the 1949 purges were 
reburied in a ceremony attended by tens of thousands. At the Rajk reburial, as at 
the Nagy reburial, the authorities used the ceremony to manifest their commitment 
to reform, while the opposition used the ceremony to show the Communist Party's 
guilt and corruption. Gati, supra note 158, at  377-79. 
229. In addition, a quiet purgation process has been directed at judges who 
imposed sanctions against the participants in the 1956 uprising, but not against 
judges who helped enforce nationalization and other communist programs. See 
supra note 2 12. 
Although nobody in government would risk the backlash of refraining from 
praising the 1956 uprising, there are members of the government who try to play 
down the importance of the memory of 1956. Many current party leaders had 
stayed on the sidelines during the 1956 revolt and now associate the 1956 move- 
ment with reform communism. Accordingly, MDF neglected to commemorate the 
anniversary of the reburial of Imre Nagy and has endorsed a national holiday 
based on the accomplishments of St. Istvan rather than the events of October 
1956. 
230. As in 1989, the movement of 1956 had a few indications of a popular 
desire to return to an earlier era: Nagy's government announced plans to restore 
the traditional emblem; the post-World War I1 political parties announced plans to 
reorganize; and Cardinal Mindszenty was liberated from prison. See Gati, supra 
note 158, at 379-83. 
231. Boz6ki, supra note 16, at 19-20 (emphasis in original); see a h  Vihor 
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On a formal level, the Constitutional Court embodies the 
broad ideals embraced by the Hungarian transition movement. 
The extensive burden placed on the Constitutional Court to 
provide binding pronouncements of constitutional law responds 
to an underlying desire to impose restrictions upon the State. 
During the communist era, restrictions on the State had been 
meaningless, despite the existence of a Constitution and the 
founding in 1983 of a constitutional advisory committee to the 
Parliament.232 By 1989, i t  had become clear that binding en- 
forcement of constitutional law by an independent body was 
necessary to effect the ideal of restricting the State. Moreover, 
the broad grants of mandatory jurisdiction enable the Court to 
serve as a reliable guardian of constitutional rights. In con- 
trast, if jurisdiction was more difficult to attain, the Court's 
role as the designated protector of constitutional limitations 
upon the State would be diminished. 
The Court not only limits the State in order to provide 
room for Hungary's affinity for factionalism and civil society, 
but the Court also limits factionalism and the exercise of liber- 
Orban's Speech at t h  Reburial of Imre Nagy, UNCAPTIVE MINDS, October 1989, at 
26 (opposition leader's outline of broad "ideals of 1956" and their significance for 
1989 transition). 
A crucial event in bringing about the rendsze~altozas was the united rally of 
the opposition parties on March 15, 1989, in Budapest. This rally attended by 
"100,000 people and nearly every group in the Hungarian oppositionn revealed that 
the communists would not be able to retain their power through exploiting the 
opposition's factionalism and reaching separate compromises with the various 
opposition groups. What Does the Hungarian Nation Demand?, UNCAPTNE MINDS, 
MayJuneJuly, 1989, at 20. The opposition groups formulated a list of demands 
and "read them to the crowd who approved them by acclamation." The list of 
demands reflects the ideals of the rendszervaltozas described above. 
232. The Constitutional Law Council was made up mostly of members of the 
Congress of People's Deputies, the body which the Council was supposedly in- 
structing. Moreover, the Council lacked the power to review enactments or to issue 
binding constitutional interpretations. The positivist legal acts of the government 
continued to determine the scope of constitutional law despite the existence of the 
Council. See generally Isvan Kovks, From the Constitutional Law Council to the 
Constitutional Court (April 1989) (unpublished manuscript included in Materials of 
Roundtable Conference on Constitutional Reform, February 1990). The Constitu- 
tional Law Council failed to function as an independent guardian of constitutional 
rights as a result not only of formal fadors, but also of the fact that the members 
of the Council were communist party collaborators. 
The creation of the Constitutional Court is part of post-communist Hungary's 
effort to reform the Constitutional Law Council so that its work has authority. The 
authorization of the Constitutional Court to take over the advisory opinion requests 
on the Council's docket reinforces this vision of continuity between the two bodies. 
See ACC, supra note 19, ch. 5, 5 58; see also KovBcs, supra. 
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ty so as to protect the rendszervaltozas ideal of cooperation. A 
statement by the Minister of Justice on the transition encapsu- 
lates how the Constitutional Court is a response to this senti- 
ment: 
The unintended consequences-especially anarchy, a lack of 
patience for changes, and the danger of violent solutions--are 
real, partly as a consequence of the special characteristics of 
the Hungarian political culture, and partly due to the unfore- 
seeable, at present still unknown, patterns of the disintegra- 
tion of the previous political system. The process of 
constitutionalism may play a special role in warding off these 
unintended consequences.233 
Empowering the Constitutional Court with vast jurisdiction 
permits the Court to  impose boundaries on factional agendas 
and thus to  ensure unity with regard, at least, to certain basic 
p r in~ ip l e s .~~  
2. The rendszervaltozas and the scientific policy ideal 
The Land Act Case I opinion's rejection of metaphysical 
State objectives and requirement of verifiable scientific policy 
justifications for State actionzs5 also responds to an apparent 
attribute of the transition. The thesis of this subsection is that 
the public, being disillusioned with the communist regime's 
metaphysically based policies, supported the rendszervaltozas 
so that critical scientific analyses would support future govern- 
233. KBlmsln Kulcsgr, Constitutional State, Constitutionalism, and Human Rights 
in the Transformation of the Hungarian Political System 10 Veb. 1990) (unpub- 
lished manuscript included in materials of Roundtable Conference on Hungarian 
Constitutional Reform). KulcsAr was the Minister of Justice during the historic law 
reforms of October 1989 and is now ambassador to Canada. 
See also Boz6ki, supra note 16 (describing contemporary fears that national 
socialist demagoguery will take over in Hungary). 
234. A recent call by President Vaclav Havel for the creation of a Czechoslo- 
vakian Constitutional Court reflected a similar response to post-communist fears of 
factional violence. Public fears of civil strife arose after certain leaders of Slovakia 
issued a series of separatist statements in late 1990. President Havel stated that 
he would never utilize the military to ensure unity. Instead, Havel called for the 
immediate creation of a national constitutional court to  review the legality of the 
proposed actions of the Slovak leaders. Havel believed that constitutional law could 
unify the country more effectively than could military force. Since the Czechoslova- 
kian Constitution at the time was still the discredited Stalinist Constitution of the 
pre-Velvet Revolution regime, it would be even more precise to say that Havel's 
confidence was in the institution of the constitutional court. 
235. See discussion supra part 1II.D. 
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ment policies. 
The communist regime had originally rested its authority 
upon claims to both a metaphysical "mission" and the scientific 
pursuit of the public goode2= By the 1980s, the propaganda 
emphasis on the latter ground inten~ified.~~' The so-called 
"scientific worldview" and "entrepreneurship" of the commu- 
nists, however, lacked any demonstrable basis. There is some 
preliminary evidence that the populace behind the 
rendszervaltozas sought a new regime characterized by well- 
founded, scientific policy. A study of Hungarian voting patterns 
in 1990 by Susan Gal and Katalin Kovacs reveals that voters 
preferred to choose candidates based on the evidence of their 
technical expertise, as opposed to their party affiliations and 
 platform^.^" Furthermore, surveys in the 1980s revealed that 
Hungarians have little respect for natural rights.23g This is 
another indication that the decision to head in a new direction 
236. The party justitied its leading role, in part with its claim of a historic 
mission, in part through the claim that, as the only repository of a scien- 
tific worldview, it is its sole prerogative to define the "public good." In 
terms of this ideology, society is not competent to participate in political 
decisions. 
Lbsz16 Bruszt, 'Without Us But For Us?" Political Orientation in Hungary in the 
Period of Late Patenzalism, in RESEARCH REVIEW: PROJECT NO. 2, CHANGING VAL- 
UES IN HUNGARIAN SOCIETY, supra note 157, at 59, 62. 
237. See Hankiss, supra note 157, at 46 (describing how "entrepreneurship" and 
"enterprising" had become key phrases in communist propaganda in the 1980s). 
238. Susan Gal & Katalin Kovacs, The Elections of 1990 (June 25, 1991) (un- 
published paper delivered at the Convention of the Hungarian Sociological As- 
sociation, Budapest). The September, 1990 study focuses on a rural commanity of 
three thousand and local elections. 
239. Elemer Hankiss, assessing the results of the European Values Systems 
Study of 1982, concludes that Hungarians do not exhibit "an individualism rich in 
values but a rude, resenthl, convulsive egoism and privatism." Hankiss, supm note 
157, at 42. For instance, only 31% of Hungarians responded that they would raise 
their children to respect others, while the rest of Europe responded positively to 
that question on an average level between 43% and 62%. See id. 
Based upon a national survey of rights consciousness in Hungary in December 
1986 and January 1987, Andrbs SAjo writes, "Arguments on human dignity are 
scarce and because of prejudices some people are not willing to extend human 
dignity to all members of society . . . . There is little respect among the citizens 
toward each other." Andr6s Sbjo, Rights-Awareness in Hungary, in RESEARCH 
REVIEW: PROJECT NO. 2, CHANGING VALUES IN HUNGARIAN S O C m ,  supm note 
157, at 27, 38. Sdjo seems to doubt not only citizens' rights consciousness, but also 
the public's capacity to question whether social policy is scientifically grounded: 
Hungary is "a country where childish dependence on the goodwill of the authorities 
was raised into supreme virtue and where experience teaches that insistence on 
rights is being overfussy." Id. 
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out of recognition of the practical utility of 
such a change, rather than as part of a sudden awakening to  
the moral superiority of the free markets and l i be ra l i~m.~~  
The Land Act Case I instructs Parliament that laws affect- 
ing entitlements must have a demonstrable scientific policy 
justification. As discussed in Part 111, the Court implies that for 
Parliament to create entitlements the Constitution requires 
more than simply a vague, post-Lochner reference to the public 
good. This interpretation of the Constitution responds to the 
popular enthusiasm for scientific policy which, according to  
preliminary evidence, underlies the rends~ervaltozas.~~' 
3. The rendszervaltozas and the ideal of the West 
A final candidate for an ideal of the rendszervaltozas is the 
desire to  emulate the West. Part 1I.G explained how Western 
legal norms play an authoritative role in the Court's constitu- 
tional interpretations. This subsection proposes that such a 
development responds to a popular trend underlying the cre- 
ation of the amended Constitution. 
The Hungarian community may not be Nly  knowledgeable 
of the substantive details of Western legal standards;242 but 
in a democratic republican State, the populace often consents to  
the pursuit of broad ideals rather than detailed  particular^.^^ 
In the realm of constitutional law, the adoption of judicial re- 
view and the text of the amended constitution both manifested 
240. On the economic utility of recognizing human rights, see discussion infra 
part lV.B.3 (explaining that conformity with human rights norms enables member- 
ship in the Council of Europe which is a stepping stone to the practical benefits of 
membership in the EEC). 
241. This thesis, like the prior one, must overcome the fact that the elected 
Parliament has enacted legislation in a manner contrary to this supposed attribute 
of the majority. See discussion supm part 1V.B.l.a (constitutional interpretation can 
be more responsive to communal ideals than ads of the legislature). 
242. See SBjo, supra note 16, at 7 ("The choices [for the future] are determined 
by the available Western models (which are often little and selectively known . . . 
-3. 
243. - Westerners often refrain from authorizing their legislators and judges to 
implement particularized results. Instead, the populace authorizes officials to 
deliberate for it in accordance with certain broad ideals. See supra note 8 (explain- 
ing how exercise of deliberative function is responsive to electorate and in accor- 
dance with democratic republican theory of government by consent). See also SAjo, 
supm note 16, at 15 ("[IN is quite understandable that in a society at the verge of 
economic collapse and where the faculty of self-determination was systematically 
destroyed, one expects an active intervention even in [the] shaping of liberal 
institutions . . . ."). 
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a desire t o  emulate the legal norms of the West. Judicial re- 
view is a Western c o n ~ e p t , ~  as are most of the clauses of the 
amended Constitution. The President of the Constitutional 
Court recently warned, "If considerable limitations were im- 
posed on our jurisdiction, then the Hungarian legislature would 
have to encounter intense reaction from all over Europe and 
would need to give an explanation."245 A departure from Eu- 
ropean expectations of the Court's formal role would require an 
explanation, because the Hungarian community perceives con- 
formity to Western legal conventions to be of sigmfkance. 
While Hungary's general fascination with the WestU6 
may be partially attributed to psychological reasons, there are 
also practical bases underlying the communal desire to have 
legal standards conform to those of the West. The responsive- 
ness of the Court's constitutional interpretations to Western 
norms manifests this practical foundation. The Death Penalty 
Case's adherence to Western European legal trendsU7 may fa- 
cilitate Hungary's admission into the Council of Europe and 
ultimately the European Economic Community. If Hungarian 
legal standards, especially in the area of human rights, satisfy 
Western criteria, then the Council of Europe is more likely to 
admit Hungary. Admission to the Council is important because 
it serves as a stepping stone to the financial benefits of mem- 
bership in the European Economic Community. In the Fall of 
1990, Hungary began a one year probationary period preceding 
admission to the Council. If during this period the Council had 
reviewed Hungarian procedures surrounding the application of 
the death penalty and had found them to be inadequate, as it 
244. See Machecek, supra note 84, at 10 (judicial review by a constitutional 
court is "form of expression of the European legal culture"). 
245. S6lyom, supra note 25, at 1-2. 
246. Hankiss provides a survey from 1989 which shows the Hungarian admira- 
tion for the West. Hanbiss, supra note 157, at 57-58. However, he notes, "It is one 
thing . . . to admire the success of Western countries; and it is another and more 
difficult thing . . . [to choose] to adopt an already existing" model of economics and 
government. Id. at 58; cf SAjo, supra note 16, at 8 n.7 ('The early communist 
regimes of the region tried to justify themselves by proving that the legal solutions 
they appl[ied were] identical with those of the Soviet law. Now the most common 
reference is that the legal solution is in conformity with the Western solution. 
People are never particularly clear what . . . they mean [by] Western."). Professor 
SAjo adds that appeals to  religion, anti-communism, nationalism, and consumerism 
may be more persuasive than references to standards of Western constitutionalism. 
Id. at 7. 
247. See discussion supra part 1I.G. 
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did those in the United States,* then Hungary's chances for 
admission by the end of 1991 would have been seriously 
hanned. Accordingly, the effort of The Death Penalty Case to 
conform Hungarian law to European norms responded to  prac- 
tical concerns which may underlie the desire to emulate the 
West. 
The strict standards of the takings clause enunciated in 
The Land Act Case 1249 also manifest a practical strain in 
Hungarian constitutional case law's responsiveness to  the tran- 
sition movement's Western ideals. As described in Part 111, the 
holding attempted to eliminate circumstances which inhibit 
Western businesses from participating in the Hungarian econo- 
my.260 The decision's acquiescence to Western property right 
standards could well result in economic benefits for the 
country. 
V. EPILOGUE: 
R~~CENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE UNCERTAINTY 
Parts I1 and I11 set forth the structure of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court's authority. Part IV traced the credibility 
of judicial review's form and substance to sources in the Hun- 
garian community. Whether the roots of the Court's formal 
elements of power and substantive theories in underlying com- 
munal sources will be sufficient for the Court to be politically 
effective is currently indefinite. 
Since October 1990, Parliament has enacted three compen- 
sation statutes in defiance of the fundamental principles enun- 
ciated in The Land Act Case I .  The fvst enactment, the Church 
Property Act, provides for grants of State property to church- 
es.251 With regard to such a statute, The Land Act Case Ps 
248. See discussion supra part 1I.G (discussing Council's standards for procedures 
surrounding the death penalty and Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Court H.R. 
(ser. A) at 23 (1989)). 
249. See The Land Act Case I,  supra note 49. 
250. See supra part 1II.F (discussing how opinion was responsive to factors 
inhibiting foreign businesses from (1) making long-term investments because of the 
possibility of future nationalization efforts and (2) investing in properties targeted 
by Smallholders Party for reprivatization). 
251. The majority of elementary schools and large numbers of university dormi- 
tories will be returned to religious groups. The Act provides the churches with ten 
years to establish a "social function." Although this Act ostensibly facilitates the 
development of civil society, the pervasive role of State support actually stunts 
such development. See Arato, supra note 217. 
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principles set forth the following rules: (1) the churches have 
no inherent right to any State property even though the State 
acquired property from the churches through nationalization; 
and therefore (2) the creation of entitlements on behalf of 
churches discriminates against other private organizations, 
unless Parliament can show that the goal of the statute is the 
pursuit of "a more favorable total social result." The Act super- 
ficially attempts t o  comply with The Land Act Case I's require- 
ment that such a discriminatory entitlement scheme have "a 
more favorable total social result." Under the terms of the Act, 
the churches receive the property rights to facilitate their ful- 
fillment of a forward-looking "social function," rather than 
exclusively as restitution for the communist confiscations. Putt- 
ing aside the issue of churchlstate ~eparation:~' the "social 
function" objective would probably enable the Act to survive 
deferential, post-Lochner equal protection type scrutiny.253 
However, The Land Act Case I implies that more than simply a 
superficial reference to the present and future general welfare 
is necessary to satisfy the "more favorable social result require- 
ment."25" In addition, The Land Act Case I stresses that 
"underinclusive" justifications are unac~eptable.'~~ The "social 
function" obj ective appears to be underinclusive, because Par- 
liament failed to consider that the creation of equivalent 
entitlements on behalf of secular organizations would also 
fulfill a "social function." The Court has yet to review the 
Church Property Act, even though it has been subject to popu- 
lar criticism. 
The other two enactments are revised plans t o  compensate 
pre-nationalization property owners. The revisions respond to 
252. The churches function separately from the State in the Republic of Hunga- 
ry. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] ch. XII, art. 60(3) (Hung.). 
253. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday 
closing laws against equal protection challenge because closing businesses on Sun- 
day serves a beneficial social function as well as a religious function); cf. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON~TITWIONAL LAW 1223 n.61 (2d ed. 1988) ("If 
the society decides that all enterprises whose dominant purpose is charitable . . . 
should be granted an exemption [from having to pay taxes] for all their activities, 
there seems no strong reason to withhold such beneficial treatment from charitable 
institutions which are religious in character."). 
254. The President of the Court indicated, with regard to the Church Property 
Act, that the Land Act Case I had not been studied by Parliament in its context. 
S6lyom, supra note 25, at 41; see also supra text accompanying notes 184-86 
(discussing level of scrutiny). 
255. See supra text accompanying notes 166, 184-86. 
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minor constitutional issues, but still violate the equal protec- 
tion clause and takings 'clause principles discussed in Part 111. 
Any attempt by backers of these compensation statutes to limit 
the Court's power is unlikely, because the ruling coalition lacks 
the two-thirds majority necessary to amend either the ACC or 
the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court has exhibited signs of 
appeasing the ruling coalition on the compensation issue. In 
April 1991, the opposition Alliance of Free Democrats peti- 
tioned the Court to  review the proposed Land Act I1 before its 
passage. As described in Part II.C.2, the Court denied jurisdic- 
tion. The development of a justiciability limitation in that case 
may have been not only an attempt to limit the burden of the 
Court's large docket:" but also a sign of deference to the po- 
litical branches on a delicate topic. In May 1991, Parliament 
passed the Land Act 11. On June 3, 1991, the Court struck it 
down. In contrast with The Land Act Case Ps unanimous decla- 
ration of the fundamental constitutional problems with com- 
pensation schemes, the most recent opinion focused only on 
minor issues. Only one concurring opinion restated the founda- 
tional principles discussed in Part III.257 
256. See supra part 1I.C (justiciability restrictions are a response to large dock- 
et). 
257. See m e  Land Act Case III, supra note 63 (Voros, J., concurring). 
The Land Act Case III responded to the six questions set forth in the petition 
of President Arpad Goncz. Both the Court and President Arpad Goncz's SZDSZ, 
which is a strong supporter of the institution of judicial review, may have focused 
on the six minor issues so that the Court could strike down the Act without 
putting itself into fundamental conflict with the compensation concept and the 
ruling parliamentary coalition. The explanation for such a desire would be the 
avoidance of criticism of judicial review by the ruling coalition. In addition, the 
limited scope of The Land Act Case III prevents the leader of the ruling coalition, 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), from delegating responsibility for a 
difficult political decision to the Constitutional Court. Taking into account public 
opinion and sound economic policy advice, the MDF would probably prefer to 
withdraw its support for the compensation concept. Nevertheless, MDF is bound to  
maintain its support for compensation because of the demands of its coalition 
partner, the Smallholders Party. If the Court had pressed the issue of discrim- 
ination against NFO's, see supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term 
%on-former owner" or WFO" and how Land Act's provisions discriminated against 
NFO's), and thereby had declared the compensation concept fundamentally uncon- 
stitutional, then the Court would have done MDF's dirty work. Both the Court and 
SZDSZ would prefer to have compensation ultimately defeated in the political 
arena to preserve the Court's political capital. In addition, the limited holding is in 
SZDSZ's interest because it increases the likelihood that either the MDF-Smallhold- 
ers coalition will collapse or the MDF will be associated with an unpopular bill. 
In response to the six questions in President Arpad Goncz's petition, the Court 
held that (1) the limitation of compensation to those who lost property after 1949 
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On June 26,1991, the ruling coalition passed the Land Act 
111. The statute attempted to respond to the most recent hold- 
ing but made no attempt to remedy discrimination against 
NFO's (non-former owners).268 On June 28, 1991, the Social- 
ist Party announced the commencement of a campaign to initi- 
ate a referendum to block the enforcement of the Land Act 111. 
The signatures of 100,000 citizens is necessary to initiate a 
referendum. If over fiRy percent of the population participates 
in the balloting, the results of the referendum vote become as 
binding as a Court holding. 
The drawn out referendum process has similarities to  the 
democratic republican vision of movements to amend the con- 
stitution, a process "through which mobilized masses of ordi- 
nary citizens finally organize their political will with suEcient 
clarity to  lay down the law to those who speak in their name 
on a daily basis in"2" the national legislature. The fact that 
the referendum process can fulfill a role parallel to  that of judi- 
cial review is revealing as to the democratic republican ideals 
of judicial review. But the decision of opponents of the Land 
Act I11 to turn to the referendum process to enforce the commu- 
nal consensus, rather than simply to petition the Court, is an 
indication of a lack of confidence in the capacity of judicial 
review and constitutional law to enforce the communal consen- 
sus. The Court's ow. recent passivity in the last two Land Act 
Cases may be responsible for that dearth of confidence. Future 
developments in the compensation scheme controversy and 
is not inherently unconstitutional, (2) but the Compensation Act violates the 
Constitution due to its failure to provide either (a) a "constitutional reason" for the 
plan's exclusion of those who lost property as a result of pre-1949 confiscations, 
such as those directed at Germans in 1945 and at Jews in 1939, or (b) an outline 
of plans to compensate PI-e-1949 victims; (3) the limitation of compensation to 
victims of financial and material losses is constitutional; (4) the Act violates the 
Constitution's equal protection clause by ensuring that at least 94% of former land 
owners will receive full compensation, while only providing partial compensation to 
former owners of other types of property; (5) the Act violates the constitutional 
rights of local governments by ordering property under local control to be turned 
over to former owners; and (6) the Constitution permits Parliament to create 
coupons exchangeable for shares of property currently under the control of agricul- 
tural cooperatives. For a more detailed critique of the politics and reasoning behind 
the recent decision, see Ethan Klingsberg, Hungary: The Constitutional Pditics of 
Compensation, 2 SOW AM) EAST EUROPEAN LAW 1 (June 1991) (published by 
Columbia Law School's Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law). 
258. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04 (explaining term %on-former 
owner" or W O "  and how Land Ads  provisions discriminated against NFO's). 
259. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 475. 
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other upcoming events, such as the possible adoption of a new 
Constitution and parliamentary elections, will further clarifs 
the nature of the Court's authority?" 
This Article should enable readers to understand better the 
bases for the authority of constitutional courts. The various 
procedures and circumstances which make the Hungarian 
Court's power possible have been reviewed. Moreover, the rami- 
fications of the policy and philosophical choices available in the 
critical constitutional matters confronting the post-communist 
regimes are now clarified. Most importantly, investigations 
such as this into the sociological underpinnings of judicial re- 
view demonstrate that despite the circuity of the connections 
between an institution exercising judicial review and the popu- 
lace, those connections can be meaningful. 
This last realization is particularly important with respect 
to Eastern Europe where cynicism about the legitimacy of the 
new constitutionalism is widespread?' While Hungarian le- 
gal thinkers appear willing to take refuge in natural l adB2 as 
a basis for the new constitutional law and judicial review, those 
same thinkers continue to question the legitimacy of the new 
constitutional system through reference to  the criteria of demo- 
cratic republican theory.26s To an extent, this natural 
law/majoritarianism schizophrenia haunts all serious probes 
into the foundation of judicial review. But in Eastern Europe, 
the ambivalence has a special sigmficance. 
Most of the dissidents under communism relied upon natu- 
ral law, because it enabled them to justify radical positions 
that lacked the support of either a symbol of authority or mass 
p ~ p u l a r i t y . ~ ~  NOW that those dissidents possess the seats of 
260. The referendum initiative failed to materialize. The Court has received 
thirty petitions challenging the constitutionality of the most recent compensation 
statute, but has yet to issue a decision. Letter from Dr. Gabor Halmai, Chief Clerk 
to President S6lyom of the Constitutional Court, to Ethan Klingsberg (Dec. 20, 
1991). 
261. See supra note 16. 
262. HLA. Hart explains the classical underpinning of "Natural Law: that there 
are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with 
which man-made law must conform if it is to be valid." HART, supra note 133, at 
182. 
263. See supra note 16. 
264. The Solidarity movement is an exception. Solidarity had the authority of an 
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power and their stances are becoming enshrined in law, the 
need to appeal to  higher law is no longer ne~essary.~" But 
these new leaders realize that a transition from communism is 
not successful simply because certain higher principles have 
become the law of the land. The change from communism to 
democracy requires the development of a new type of citizenry. 
New participatory muscles will have to be used by the masses. 
If the directions of the new regime are ultimately dictated by 
the higher law visions of an elite group of law professors serv- 
ing on the Constitutional Court, then the development of those 
new muscles will be fhtile. Fear of such a scenario is why the 
former dissidents still question the legitimacy of the new con- 
stitutional system, despite its substantive consistency with 
their beliefs. This Article responds to their concerns by showing 
that there is a connection between the Court and the public. 
Many characteristics of the public's input indicate that the 
citizenry is not taking full advantage of its potential for influ- 
encing the Court. For example, the popular desire to imitate 
the West, as well as the current expectations of precedent and 
the adjudicatory process, indicate citizens' willingness to  ab- 
stain from development of particularistic views and to invest 
the Court with a large degree of discretion. But the important 
factor is that the connection between the Court and the public 
exists. The rest can be left to the evolution of a more educated 
independent hierarchy and large demonstrations for most of the 1980s. In Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, the situation was much different. Opposition was 
often not manifested. Dissent passively existed only in the minds of individuals. 
Consequently, dissidents lacked even "underground" authority. As late as 1985, 
most Hungarian citizens refused even to indicate dissatisfaction with the State in 
anonymous surveys. See Hankiss, supra note 157, at  49-51 (Hankiss attributes 
"radical, though contradictory, changes" in responses to similar surveys conducted 
in 1985 and 1989 Yto the fact that people are now, in 1989, . . . less constrained 
to  show themselves loyal to the system and its institutions; . . . [there is a] newly 
acquired courage . . . ."). This is why social science analysts generally misjudged 
Eastern Europe. As late as 1988, few social scientists thought the populace of 
communist nations, other than Poland, had any impetus to support profound 
changes. Only observers like Timothy Garton Ash, who took a more journalistic, 
first-hand approach, were able to perceive that the masses were ready to give 
active support to alternative regimes. See, e.g., Timothy Garton Ash, Prague-A 
Poem Not Disappearing, in VACLAV HAVEL: LIVING IN TRUTH 213-21 (Jan Vladislav 
ed., 1986). 
265. See supra Part III.B & 1II.C (discussing JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL AW 
AND NATURAL RIGHTS (under most circumstances, mature minds of practical reason 
look to the law that is in force as the embodiment of "natural law," as described 
in note 262)). 
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and activated citizenry. Moreover, the cynicism of new leaders 
and domestic commentators is a positive sign, because it shows 
that they are truly dedicated to democracy and will not settle 
for an era founded solely on natural law. 
